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ABSTRACT 
EXPERIMENTS ON REDISTRIBUTION, TRUST, AND ENTITLEMENTS 
BY 
DANIEL THOMAS HALL 
 
May 2010 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. James C. Cox 
Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation comprises three essays. The unifying theme is experiments used 
as the empirical methodology. Each essay is an independent study, but aspects of 
behavior related to cooperation, trust, and entitlement are present in each essay. 
The first essay looks at the efficiency-equality tradeoff of increasing redistribution 
in a small group setting. Subjects generate a stronger sense of entitlement to their labor 
earnings by performing a real effort task. Subjects must trust other members of their 
group to work in order to keep labor a profitable activity under higher levels of 
redistribution. We find a significant efficiency-equality tradeoff explained by lowered 
work incentives. Labor supply decisions also show strategic and cooperative behavior 
similar to behavior found in public goods experiments. The efficiency-equality tradeoff 
calls for a reconsideration of increasing dependence on the public sector for charity 
provision. 
The second essay investigates how the application of a role-reversal protocol 
affects behavior in cooperative games. Subjects play all possible player roles in the game 
under a role-reversal protocol. We test if behavior results from a two-role trust game are 
robust to applying a role-reversal protocol. We find that paying subjects for one role 
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leads to no significant role-reversal effect whereas previous studies paying for both roles 
find reductions in generosity in both roles. 
The third essay is co-authored with Dr. James C. Cox. We test for differences in 
trust-related behavior under private and common property environments. Subjects 
participate in payoff equivalent 2-person Private Property Trust Game or Common 
Property Trust Game. We strengthen property right entitlements by asking subjects 
perform a real effort task to earn their private or common property endowments. 
Strengthening entitlements leads to behavioral differences in the two trust games not 
previously found. We find second mover generosity in response to first mover decisions 
is lower in the Common Property Trust Game. Second movers are relatively less 
generous because first movers overturn the status quo opportunity set which is most 
generous and signals “full trust.” Many first movers anticipate this and respond optimally 
by choosing extremes which signal “full trust” or “no trust” in the game.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to further knowledge of social preferences and 
investigate some recurring methodological issues in measuring and interpreting related 
behavior in laboratory experiments. This dissertation comprises three essays. The effect 
of redistribution on work incentives is the theme of the first essay. The effect of role-
reversal on trust-related behavior is the theme of the second essay. The effect of earned 
entitlements on trust-related behavior in private and common property environments is 
the theme of the third essay. The unifying theme of the three essays is the empirical 
methodology of experimental economics and choices made in environments which reveal 
social preferences. Aspects of behavior related to redistribution, trust, and entitlements 
overlap in all three essays. 
Redistribution, the voluntary or involuntary reallocation of income amongst 
individuals, is present in all three essays. In the first essay, redistribution of labor 
earnings is involuntary but can be avoided if the subject chooses to reduce labor supply. 
In the second and third essays redistribution is carried out through the social exchange of 
endowments and surpluses generated or preserved by trust. 
Trust-related behavior is present in all three essays. Trust is defined as an action 
of generosity and/or cooperation in hope or expectation others will return the favor. In 
economics experiments the betrayal of trust is financially rewarding for the trustee and 
financially damaging to the trustor. In the first essay trust takes the form of cooperation. 
Cooperation is signaled to members of the group through labor participation. Higher 
group cooperation minimizes the burdens of redistribution on total group income. It may 
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benefit others to be uncooperative in the short-run, but not in the long-run because there 
is less income to redistribute. In the second and third essays, subjects play the role of 
trustor, trustee, or both. Three trust games are examined: the Investment Game, the 
Private Property Trust Game, and the Common Property Trust Game. The social 
dilemmas surrounding trust are clearer here because the two roles are played out 
sequentially. All three trust games have the same equilibrium prediction: the trustee will 
betray the trust of the trustor to maximize his/her own income, and the trustor in 
expectation of this will not trust. However, evidence shows that many people trust 
anonymous strangers with their money and their trust is often rewarded (Berg, Dickhaut, 
and McCabe 1995; Cox 2004; Cox et al. 2009). 
Finally, behavior related to entitlements can be found in three essays. Since 
subjects are paid in all three experiments, subjects are bound to feel some sense of 
entitlement to their monetary endowments and final earnings. In the first essay, 
entitlements are strengthened because effort is expended to earn the money that is subject 
to redistribution by performing a real effort task. Perceptions of entitlements mix with 
perceptions of fairness: subjects who are relatively less productive benefit from 
redistribution while subjects who are relatively more productive incur losses from 
redistribution. In the second essay, entitlements are weakened under role-reversal because 
only one of the roles is selected for payoff instead of both. Since subjects do not know 
which role will be selected while making their decisions they may feel less entitled to the 
endowment or surplus controlled by the first mover and second mover roles. In the third 
essay, entitlements are strengthened by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota on 
a real effort task to earn their private property or common property endowments in a trust 
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game. If they do not meet the performance quota then they do not get to play the trust 
game. 
The purpose of the first essay is to assess the labor supply effects of increasing 
redistribution by the public sector to provide charitable goods and services. Since 
redistribution is the public sector’s instrument for providing charity, an experiment is 
designed to test how different levels of redistribution affect the size and distribution of 
charitable goods and services. Income redistribution, by transferring income from the rich 
to the poor, will provide charity and increase income equality but may also reduce total 
income, leading to an efficiency-equality tradeoff. The efficiency loss associated with 
income redistribution has at least two possible sources: (1) the costs associated with 
administering income redistribution; and (2) decreased output as income redistribution 
lowers incentives for work. 
The contribution of this essay is the focus placed on how redistribution affects 
work incentives. This is accomplished by removing the administration costs of 
redistribution from the experimental design. Income redistribution is implemented by 
proportionately taxing individuals’ labor earnings which are divided equally amongst the 
group members. Low and high tax rates are implemented in separate treatments to 
measure effects on efficiency, equality, and labor supply. A second contribution is that 
work incentives are salient because leisure is offered as an alternative paid activity for 
subjects. Entry and exit in the labor task is frictionless as subjects freely allocate time 
between labor and leisure to test how redistribution affects work incentives. A third 
contribution is the emphasis placed on the fact that many people care not only how 
redistribution affects their earnings but also how it affects others’ earnings and the drivers 
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behind the outcomes of redistribution. Subjects receive feedback each period telling them 
whether they are net taxpayers into redistribution or net recipients from it. They are told 
they are net taxpayers if they are more productive (and perhaps working harder) than the 
average member of the group. They are told they are net recipients if they are less 
productive than the average member of the group. 
The first essay finds the following. A significant efficiency-equality tradeoff 
explained by lowered work incentives exists. However, the size of the tradeoff depends 
on which pairs of low tax and high tax groups are compared. Within each redistribution 
level, efficiency and equality actually move in the same direction across groups. If a 
subject is paying more into the redistribution account than they are receiving from it then 
they know they are more productive and likely working harder than other members of 
their group. Labor participation becomes the signal of cooperation, and more cooperative 
groups tend to have both more efficiency and equality within each redistribution level. 
Labor supply decisions show strategic and cooperative behavior similar to behavior 
found in public goods experiments (Ledyard, Kagel, and Roth 1995). The efficiency-
equality tradeoff calls for a reconsideration of increasing dependence on the public sector 
for charity provision. The cooperation by labor participation findings leads to promising 
new research on how fairness attitudes may mitigate or exacerbate the negative effects of 
redistribution. 
The second essay looks at previous experiments designed to see if the results of 
sequential games, where subjects play a single-role, are robust to applying a role-reversal 
protocol. In games where there are multiple roles and individuals who play only a single 
role they may picture themselves in the other player’s shoes in determining the best 
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action to take. If role-reversal is applied to the game then a player knows in advance that 
he or she will be actually wearing the other player’s shoes in a repetition of the game. 
Role-reversal may encourage strategic play or promote empathy as a result. Role-reversal 
may also weaken a subject’s sense of entitlement to their role because all subjects have 
the same opportunity to play each role.  
Some researchers use role-reversal protocols to gather more information about 
how decisions are made in the single-role protocol. This makes role-reversal a valuable 
empirical tool as long as behavior in the single-role protocol is robust to the application 
of a role-reversal protocol. A contribution to the literature is made by surveying previous 
role-reversal studies. The essay finds that evidence on the effects of role-reversal is 
mixed. The mixed evidence is due to the lack of within-study tests of role-reversal, and 
the lack of consensus amongst researchers on how to design a role-reversal protocol. 
An experiment is conducted comparing behavior in a trust game called the 
Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995) to behavior in its role-reversal 
protocol. The contribution of this essay is to make a distinction between the joint effects 
of role-reversal and role-payment previously interpreted as a single role-reversal effect. 
Only one role decision is selected for payoff in the role-reversal protocol to look for a 
fundamental role-reversal effect in trust games similar to the Investment Game. Paying 
both roles makes each role decision more payoff salient, but it carries the crucial 
disadvantage of adding income effects, portfolio effects, and/or feedback effects which 
cannot be separated from any potential role-reversal effect. 
 
6 
 
 
The second essay finds the following. Paying subjects for one role instead of all 
roles in the role-reversal treatment leads to no significant role-reversal effect. This differs 
from a previous study which paid both roles and found that applying role-reversal first 
reduced generosity in both roles (Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen 2003).  
The third essay, co-authored with James C. Cox, reports a theory-testing 
experiment designed to test for differences in trust-related behavior amongst private and 
common property environments. The policy literature assumes that less cooperation and 
trust will occur in the common property regime. This is due to a confusion of common 
property environments with open access environments and that a “tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin 1968) will occur under common property environments.1 Cox, 
Ostrom, and Walker et al. (2009) test payoff equivalent Private Property Trust Games 
and Common Property Trust Games to test for differences in trust-related behavior. 
While many theories predict that there should be no behavioral differences between the 
two games, Revealed Altruism Theory, developed by Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008), 
predicts that positive reciprocity (trustworthiness in trust games) could be relatively 
lower in a Common Property Trust Game if second movers are sensitive to first mover 
deviations from the status quo opportunity set offered to the second mover. The status 
quo opportunity set is upheld by the first mover not sending any of his/her private fund to 
the second mover in the Private Property Trust Game. The status quo opportunity set is 
upheld by the first mover not withdrawing any of the common fund shared with the 
second mover in the Common Property Trust Game. Withdrawing any funds from the 
common fund overturns the status quo set, which may cause second mover preferences to 
                                                 
1 The “tragedy of the commons” according to Hardin is that more people requires more resources from the 
commons (our planet), and births are nonexcludable extractions from the resource, unchecked population 
growth will destroy the commons (Hardin 1968) 
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become less altruistic in the Common Property Trust Game than if an equivalent amount 
was not sent to the second mover in the Private Property Trust Game. Cox, Ostrom, and 
Walker et al. (2009) found marginally greater, albeit insignificant, levels trust and 
trustworthiness in a Common Property Trust Game compared to the Private Property 
Trust Game (Cox et al. 2009). We investigate if these results are robust to assigning 
stronger property right entitlements. 
We strengthen subjects’ property rights by requiring that all subjects meet a 
performance quota in an effort task to earn their private or common property endowment. 
One contribution is that the protocol for strengthening entitlements is kept simple. The 
size of the private and common property endowments is independent of performance in 
the effort task. First mover and second mover roles are randomly assigned and are also 
independent of performance on the real effort task. This keeps senses of entitlement 
symmetric across roles: no subject should feel more entitled to the property right than the 
other. Subjects who meet the performance quota will then use their private or common 
property endowment in the respective Private or Common Property Trust Game. In 
subsequent treatments we change the manner in which second movers submit decisions: 
instead of second movers making one decision after learning their paired first mover’s 
decision they are asked to submit a planned response to each possible first mover choice 
before learning the actual choice. This elicitation method is known as the strategy method 
protocol (Brandts and Charness 2000). We use the strategy method protocol to provide a 
direct test of the prediction made by revealed altruism theory within subjects. Because we 
run treatments with and without the strategy method protocol a second contribution is 
made in the debate on the effect of applying a strategy method protocol: two new games 
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are tested and the domain of the debate is expanded to stronger property right 
entitlements. 
We find similar levels of cooperation in both games and a significantly higher 
variance of cooperation in the Common Property Trust Game. The stronger property 
rights lead to a divergence between decisions made in the Private and Common Property 
trust games not found in the previous study. First mover decisions in the Common 
Property Trust Game move to the extreme decisions of zero generosity and full 
generosity, traditionally interpreted as “no trust” and “full trust” towards the second 
mover. First mover decisions in the Private Property Trust Game are similar to decisions 
made in the previous study. When we switch to the strategy method protocol we find that 
lower positive reciprocity is found in the Common Property Trust Game. These findings 
provide support for Revealed Altruism Theory. The question remains why these findings 
did not occur until the real effort task was added. We offer the following explanation: 
stronger property rights, by making property ownership more salient, lower second 
mover generosity in response to withdrawals and motivate first movers to anticipate this 
in the Common Property Trust Game. We also find that reductions in saliency, achieved 
either by removing the real effort task or by switching to the strategy method protocol, 
lead to more generous decisions in both first movers and second movers. We offer the 
following explanation: reductions in saliency may lower the emotional expectations of 
first movers and second movers. First movers may be less attached to the money lost and 
thereby are less prone to betrayal aversion when there is no real effort task. First movers 
may be less prone to betrayal aversion when second movers submit a strategy method 
protocol instead of a more direct and personal response. Second movers may not expect 
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as much when they put less effort towards their earnings and are therefore less 
disappointed with less generous first mover decisions. Second movers are forced to 
compare all first mover choices under the strategy method protocol and are less likely to 
play ignorance to fact that the first mover could have offered less generous opportunity 
sets. 
Findings from each essay contribute to our understanding of social preferences by 
examining behavior that is motivated by trust, reciprocity, fairness, and cooperation. A 
particular contribution is in the methodology of examining this type of behavior in 
laboratory experiments. Traditionally subjects are given a randomly assigned role which 
comes with an endowment or inducement with which they use to make decisions dictated 
by the order of the game. These conventions are broken in this dissertation. Endowments 
are earned, sometimes more than one role is played, and sometimes decisions are made in 
advance. These changes move laboratory experiments another step in the direction of 
external validity, which can lead to more robust theory and better inform policy.
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE EFFICIENCY-EQUALITY TRADEOFF IN PUBLIC SECTOR CHARITY 
PROVISION 
 
Introduction 
The welfare of the unfortunate continues to be a concern to society. Many people 
help those less fortunate by donating time, money, and/or other resources through various 
independent sector organizations; but, sometimes voluntary efforts for the provision of 
public goods such as poverty alleviation do not have satisfactory scale. On that basis 
some people advocate for government provision.2 
The government provision of public goods has the advantage that it can compel 
the acquisition of capital through taxation. But, government cannot ratchet up taxes 
without limit. Economic theory, as well as empirical and experimental evidence, suggests 
that the government has diminishing and perhaps even negative returns over some levels 
of taxation. This study assesses the inefficiency of public sector charity provision; 
specifically, the inefficiencies of redistribution of income from an effort based task. 
Background and Literature 
 One type of charitable redistribution commonly used by the public sector is 
income redistribution. For example, some people pay positive federal income taxes, and 
others receive federal earned income tax credits. Income redistribution, however, can lead 
to inefficiencies. This indicates that there can be a tradeoff between efficiency and 
reductions in poverty and inequality. We must decide how much efficiency we are 
willing to sacrifice for a given reduction in poverty and inequality (Okun 1975). 
                                                 
2 The private sector consists of all for-profit firms, the public sector consists of all government entities, and 
the independent sector consists of households, nonprofit businesses, individual volunteers, and donors 
(Cornuelle 1965). 
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What is the source of the inefficiency? Some of it comes from the administration 
costs of redistribution. Administration costs include the resources used by the 
government to collect and redistribute income, as well as the compliance costs of net 
taxpayers and application costs of net recipients. 
A second source of inefficiency is those distortions in work incentives caused by 
redistribution financed by an income tax. Theory tells us that people who are “net tax 
payers” work less when the substitution effect (a negative labor supply response to higher 
taxes on wages) dominates the income effect (a positive labor supply response to 
maintain the same standard of living. Such a reduction in work effort results in 
inefficiency (Break 1957; Brown 1980; Okun 1975). 
Income redistribution can also result in allocative inefficiency. The public may at 
first advocate for the public sector to increase redistribution in order to provide a social 
safety net. Redistribution funds can be used for other purposes instead (Mueller 2003). In 
particular, redistribution funds can be captured by groups with outside interests through 
rent-seeking activities (Linster 1993; Stigler 1971). 
The effectiveness of the public sector in reducing poverty is mitigated by the 
problems associated with income redistribution: administration costs, disincentives to 
work, and the misallocation of redistribution funds. The beauty of laboratory experiments 
is that a controlled and simplified environment can be set up to analyze one problem at a 
time. This research asks, “Assuming zero administration costs and proper allocation of 
redistribution funds, does redistribution still result in an efficiency loss due to lowered 
work incentives?” 
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This experiment builds upon previous experiments that give predictions on how 
redistribution may affect the labor supply of taxpayers and recipients. The Laffer Curve 
states that tax revenue will rise, peak, and fall as the tax rate increases (Laffer 2004). 
Naturally, the public sector’s capacity for charity provision follows this pattern.3 Field 
studies have looked at the effects of income redistribution on the recipients’ labor supply. 
The most famous and expensive studies were the negative income tax experiments. The 
Negative IncomeTax experiments provided in-cash transfers to households which fell 
below a specified minimum income level. The transfers decreased in size as the 
recipient’s household income approached the maximum level of eligibility. This created 
dynamic income and substitution effects. Five separate NIT experiments were conducted 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Four of the five programs found significant reductions in labor 
supply (Brown 1980).4 
While the variance of tax rates in the field is limited, laboratory experiments have 
the advantage of looking at all possible tax rates. Some have in fact replicated the Laffer 
Curve (Lévy-Garboua, Masclet, and Montmarquette 2009; Ottone and Ponzano 2007; 
Sutter and Weck-Hannemann 2003; Swenson 1988). 
The experiment runs low and high tax rate treatments to look for changes in 
efficiency, equality, and labor supply. Subjects allocate their time between performing a 
labor task and taking leisure each period. Subjects’ labor earnings were taxed and 
redistributed equally at the end of each period, making subjects who earned above 
(below) the group average net taxpayers (net recipients). We find a significant efficiency-
                                                 
3 Unlike the Laffer Curve, the efficiency-equality tradeoff only requires an overall negative labor supply 
response to higher taxes. 
4 The New Jersey Experiment (or Urban Income Maintenance Experiment) showed an insignificant 
household labor supply response. 
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equality tradeoff. The primary efficiency loss comes from reduced output following 
subjects’ reduced labor supply. Subjects reduce their labor supply by allocating more 
time towards leisure activities. We also find that the efficiency-equality tradeoff does not 
always hold: if labor productivity and cooperation is high enough to keep inequality low, 
intensive redistribution can reduce both efficiency and equality. A higher level of income 
redistribution significantly reduces income inequality, but fewer funds are available for 
charity provision when there are large reductions in labor supply. 
Experimental Design5 
The experimental design consists of two treatments differing only in the tax level 
used to carry out redistribution. Subjects participate in only one of the two tax treatments: 
a 20% tax treatment or an 80% tax treatment. The experiment is designed to test the 
following hypotheses: (1) efficiency will be lower in the 80% tax treatment; (2) 
inequality after redistribution will be lower in the 80% tax treatment; (3) labor supply 
will be lower in the 80% tax treatment; and (4) the significance of the tradeoff will 
depend on within-group cooperation as subjects compare their labor participation and 
output to other group members. 
Key features of the experimental design include: (1) zero administration costs in 
the redistribution process; (2) homogeneous labor task and leisure options; (3) subjects 
make labor-leisure choices in real time; (4) subjects receive feedback on whether they 
gain or lose money from income redistribution; and (5) subjects receive information on 
their opportunity cost of labor (their potential leisure earnings). 
 
                                                 
5 Subject instructions for the experiment are located in Appendix A. 
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These features are important for testing the efficiency-equality tradeoff 
effectively. Administration costs are removed such that efficiency is only a measure of 
subject output. Subjects have homogeneous labor and leisure tasks to allow inequality to 
arise naturally: inequality comes only from heterogeneity in the ability and effort levels 
subjects bring to the lab. Homogenous labor and leisure tasks also remove fairness 
considerations external to the fairness considerations surrounding redistribution. 
Allowing subjects to allocate his or her time between labor and leisure removes friction 
from the process of self-selecting into and out of the labor force. Subjects are given 
feedback on whether they gain or lose from redistribution so we can test whether net 
taxpayers and net recipients behave differently. Subjects are also given information on 
their potential leisure earnings because this information will also play a role in their 
decision to substitute labor for leisure. 
 Both treatments of this experiment involve subjects performing a repetitive labor 
task. Subjects perform the labor task on a computer using a program created in Visual 
Basic. The labor task is to type, exactly as shown on the screen, a random sequence of 
five single-digit numbers between 0 and 9. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the labor task. 
Each time a subject copies the sequence of characters correctly a confirmation of 
“CORRECT!” flashes on their screen and the subject receives a piece-rate payment. Each 
time a subject copies the sequence of characters incorrectly a confirmation of 
“WRONG!” flashes on their screen, but there is no penalty, only the opportunity cost of 
forgone leisure earnings he or she could have made instead while typing the incorrect 
sequence. This work task follows a similar work task used by Dickinson (1999) where 
subjects were paid a piece-rate each time they copied a paragraph (Dickinson 1999). 
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There are thirteen periods in each treatment: one Double Pay Period followed by 12 
Regular Pay Periods. Each period lasts 5 minutes and 30 seconds. The last thirty seconds 
of each period give subjects time to review their earnings. The Regular Pay Periods last a 
total of one hour plus six minutes of review time. 
 
 
In the Double Pay Period subjects earn a piece-rate of $0.06 for each correctly 
typed sequence. This is double the piece-rate subjects are paid for the remaining Regular 
Pay periods. We double the pay in order to give subjects extra incentive to work at their 
productivity threshold. The number of correct sequences a subject types during the 
Double Pay Period gives a raw measure of ability. We use subjects’ ability measures to 
control for heterogeneity in ability, since changes in effort are of greater interest. The 
Double Pay Period also ranks subjects on their productivity to build groups of five for the 
 
Figure 1. Computer Screenshot of a Subject’s Labor Task 
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Regular Pay Periods. We rank subjects on their productivity to create groups with similar 
compositions of low, medium, and high productivity members. The rank-to-group 
matching procedure is taken from Blumkin, Ruffle, and Ganon (2008), is shown in Table 
1 (Blumkin, Ruffle, and Ganun 2008). This group formation procedure serves two major 
purposes: (1) to ensure that a wide initial income distribution exists in each group given 
similar effort levels; and (2) to reduce variation in total productivity across groups for 
better intergroup comparison. 
 
 
The Regular Pay Periods introduce more complex work incentives because 
subjects now make real labor-leisure decisions. At any time during the Regular Pay 
Periods subjects can switch from labor to leisure and back by clicking the Labor and 
Leisure Tabs shown on their computer screen. Subjects can make labor earnings and 
leisure earnings but not both at the same time, so they must allocate their time between 
Table 1. Group Assignment According to Rank in Double Pay Period 
Rank in Double Pay Period Group Number 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 3 
5 2 
6 1 
7 1 
8 2 
9 3 
10 3 
11 2 
12 1 
13 1 
14 2 
15 3 
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receiving labor and leisure earnings. We induce subjects’ value for the leisure task: 
subjects earn 1 cent for every two seconds the Leisure Tab is active. Induced values of 
leisure are used instead of homegrown values because Esarey, Salmon, and Barrilleaux 
(2007) found that the redistributive tax rate had no significant impact on productivity in 
their experiment. The explanation they offer is “subjects had nothing else to do but 
produce” (Esarey, Salmon, and Barrilleaux 2007). Figure 2 shows a subject screenshot of 
the leisure task. When the Leisure Tab is active, there is no real leisure activity for 
subjects to take part in. Subjects could rest their head, daydream, or read quietly, but no 
suggestions for leisure activities are made. This is done to remove any positive or 
negative framing for taking leisure over labor. External validity lies in favor of 
homegrown values of leisure, but homegrown values are difficult to measure. In addition 
homegrown values are too low in the lab because subjects participate with intentions to 
make money and can delay taking leisure until after the experiment. The objective is to 
take a step closer towards external validity by allowing subjects not only to endogenously 
choose their productivity output, but also self-select into and out of the taxed labor sector 
freely. 
The Regular Pay Periods have the same labor task as the Double Pay Period 
except subjects receive a lower pay and face redistribution. First, they earn a lower piece-
rate of 3 cents for each correct labor task. Second, their labor earnings are subject to 
redistribution. Subjects’ leisure earnings are free from taxation, so they simply keep their 
leisure earnings. Subjects’ labor earnings are subject to redistribution as shown in the 
following equation:  
ߨ௜஺ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߨ௜஻ ൅ 1 5ൗ ෍ ߬ߨ௜஻
ହ
௜ୀଵ
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At the end of each Regular Pay Period,  represents the labor earnings before 
taxation and redistribution, and  represents the labor earnings after. Here  is the tax 
rate, or the proportion of labor earnings to collect each period for redistribution. The 
collected labor earnings are put into a Group Account, which is split equally amongst all 
members of the group. The redistribution equation keeps subjects from trading positions 
on the income distribution due to redistribution, so position changes will only occur if a 
subject becomes relatively more productive (or another subject becomes relatively less 
productive) in the next period. 
Subjects receive feedback on how the choices of others in their group affect their 
earnings through income redistribution. Subjects receive feedback information, shown in 
Figure 3, on the right side of their screen. During a period, subjects receive constant 
feedback on what their labor earnings are before redistribution and how much labor 
 
Figure 2. Computer Screenshot of a Subject’s Leisure Task 
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earnings they are transferring to the Group Account. Subjects’ leisure earnings increase 
continuously whenever their Leisure Tab is active. At the end of each period, subjects are 
given their 20% or one-fifth share of the Group Account. Their total earnings at the end 
of each period equal: 
Total Earnings = Labor Earnings – Labor Earnings Transferred To the Group Account 
+ 20% Share of the Group Account + Leisure Earnings 
 
 
Subjects are told that if the amount they transfer to the Group Account is larger 
(smaller) than their 20% share of the Group Account then: (1) they have completed more 
(fewer) sequences than the average member of their group; and (2) have contributed more 
to the Group Account than at least one other member. Also given at the end of each 
period is additional information on “Earnings if the entire period was spent taking 
 
Figure 3. Computer Screenshot of a Subject’s End of Period Earnings Information 
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leisure.” This gives subjects their opportunity cost of labor under income redistribution, 
which is simply their forgone leisure earnings plus their share of the Group Account 
(without their labor earnings transfer). We tell subjects that this number represents what 
their earnings could have been if they spent the entire period with the Leisure Tab active. 
Subjects see how this number is calculated in the instructions. It is the maximum leisure 
earnings of $1.50 (equal to 300 seconds * $0.005) plus their 20% share of the Group 
Account after excluding their transfers. We remind subjects that this is hypothetical 
earnings and that if everyone in the group spent the entire period in leisure then the 
Group Account would be zero and each member would make $1.50 for the period. 
Subjects receive this information to help them recognize the incentives present in the 
design and to lower their decision making cost. 
The Double Pay Period is the same for both treatments. The Regular Pay Periods 
differ across treatments only in the tax level. Two treatments are run: a 20% tax rate 
ሺ߬ ൌ 0.2ሻ and an 80% tax rate ሺ߬ ൌ 0.8ሻ. Using an across-subjects treatment design does 
have the potential drawback of sample heterogeneity across treatments, but using a 
within-subjects treatment design can cloud treatment effects because order effects can 
arise as productivity and cooperation vary over time with any given tax rate. In all 
treatments, subjects’ earnings are the sum of their Double Pay Period earnings and 
Regular Pay Periods earnings. 
This design creates incentives quite similar to those present in voluntary public 
goods provision experiments which also have important implications for charity 
(Ledyard, Kagel, and Roth 1995): (1) the pool of funds collected for redistribution are in 
fact a public good; (2) income earned from leisure provides a pure private return; (3) 
21 
 
 
income earned from labor provides a private and public return; (4) the supply of labor 
becomes a 100% contribution to the public good as the tax rate approaches 100%; and (5) 
subjects are given feedback at the end of multiple periods which allows them to compare 
their contribution to the public good (labor productivity in this experiment) to other group 
members’ contributions. 
There are major differences, however, between this experiment and other 
voluntary public goods experiments. First, the activity (labor) which increases provision 
of the public good (the Group Account) yields both a public (taxed labor earnings) and a 
private return (untaxed labor earnings). The marginal per-capita return from typing one 
correct sequence differs across tax treatments: 
1. The marginal per-capita return from the Group Account is 0.2*0.2*0.03= $0.0012 
for the 20% tax rate and 0.8*0.2*0.03 = $0.0048 for the 80% tax rate. Here the 
return is 4 times larger in the 80% tax treatment. 
2. The marginal after-tax return is 0.8*0.03=$0.024 for the 20% tax rate and 
0.2*0.03=$0.006 for the 80% tax rate. Here the return is 4 times larger in the 20% 
tax treatment. 
3. The marginal total return to labor is $0.0012+$0.024 = $0.0252 for the 20% tax 
rate and $0.0048+$0.006=$0.108. Here the return is 2.333 times larger in the 20% 
tax rate. 
Leisure yields a 100% private return of $0.005 per second. Effort is not directly 
observable. Each correctly typed sequence is a function of an individual’s ability, effort, 
and time supplied to labor, which cannot be perfectly separated. Subjects’ labor time and 
effort are observable to the experimenter, but subjects do not know other members’ exact 
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time and effort placed into increasing the Group Account. Subjects have to infer what 
each group member’s labor supply is by comparing their share of the Group Account 
with their transfers to the Group Account. Finally, the individual returns to labor and 
leisure are dependent not only on the contributions of others but also on the individual’s 
productivity. Therefore the endowment of productive ability is endogenous, thus making 
the ability to contribute asymmetric across subjects. 
Results and Analysis 
The 20% and 80% tax treatments each consisted of two sessions. All four sessions 
were conducted using undergraduate students at Georgia State University. Each session 
included 15 subjects, who were split into three groups of five for the Regular Pay 
Periods. Table 2 labels the six 20% tax groups 1-6 and the six 80% tax groups 7-12. 
 
 
Efficiency is measured in terms of productivity so the loss of efficiency will be 
measured by the reduction in number of correct tasks completed. Figure 4 shows the 
mean number of tasks completed by treatment. Period 0 represents the mean number of 
Table 2. Group Treatment and Session Assignment 
Group Number Treatment Treatment Session 
1 20% Tax 1st Session 
2 20% Tax 1st Session 
3 20% Tax 1st Session 
4 20% Tax 2nd Session 
5 20% Tax 2nd Session 
6 20% Tax 2nd Session 
7 80% Tax 1st Session 
8 80% Tax 1st Session 
9 80% Tax 1st Session 
10 80% Tax 2nd Session 
11 80% Tax 2nd Session 
12 80% Tax 2nd Session 
 
23 
 
 
correct sequences typed in the Double Pay Period, which shows that on average the latent 
ability to type sequences is the same across treatments. Periods 1 through 12 represent the 
Regular Pay Periods. Here the mean of all individual correct tasks completed equals the 
mean of the group means for each tax rate. Under the 20% tax, production is relatively 
stable and increases towards the later periods. Under the 80% tax production is more 
erratic and declines as subjects approach later periods. The mean number of correct tasks 
performed in the Regular Pay Periods is 50.69 for groups facing a 20% tax with an 8.36 
standard deviation across the group means. For groups facing an 80% tax the mean 
number of sequences typed correctly is 32.32 with an 8.24 standard deviation across the 
group means. This is a 36.3% average productivity loss for each period. Using a t-test 
with unequal variances to compare the mean of the group means for each tax level, the 
null hypothesis that the means of the six group means for the two tax levels are the same 
is rejected at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0024), with the 20% tax groups being more 
efficient (p-value = 0.0012). 
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Figure 5 breaks down the mean number correct by session into four graphs. Each 
graph shows the mean productivity of each group in the session. Average performance in 
the Double Pay Period is very close across groups in each session. Production under the 
20% tax level is relatively the same for all groups, and the null hypothesis that they are 
the same cannot be rejected at the 10% level of statistical significance. Production under 
the 80% tax level does vary across sessions as the second session does not have as 
dramatic decay in productivity as the first. This is because the groups in the second 80% 
tax session choose to be more productive. Using a t-test with unequal variances to 
compare the mean of the group means for each 80% tax session, the null hypothesis that 
the mean of the three group means for each 80% tax session are the same is not rejected 
at the two-tailed test (p-value = 0.2837). 
 
Figure 4. Efficiency Measured in Productivity by Treatment 
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Figure 5. Efficiency Measured in Productivity by Session and Group 
 
Figure 5 (Continued). Efficiency Measured in Productivity by Session and Group 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
G
ro
up
 M
ea
n 
# 
C
or
re
ct
Period
Productivity: 20% Tax, 1st Session Groups
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
G
ro
up
 M
ea
n 
# 
C
or
re
ct
Period
Productivity: 20% Tax, 2nd Session Groups
Group 4 Group 5 Group 6
26 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 (Continued): Efficiency Measured in Productivity by Session and Group 
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Figure 6 shows the percentage loss in mean productivity over periods. The 
percentage loss in mean productivity increases over periods. If subjects were merely 
responding to the decrease in wage from the tax, then the response should happen rather 
quickly since the changes in wages from the tax are very salient. Subjects are responding 
to something else, perhaps subjects learn about their productivity and the size of the 
Group Account over time and decide that leisure is a more attractive option in the 80% 
tax treatments. Cooperation may play an important role in differences in productivity 
across groups. 
 The results show a significant loss in efficiency (productivity) over time when the 
tax is increased from 20% to 80%. Following Okun’s Leaky-Bucket test, is there a gain 
in equality that would make us tolerant of this efficiency loss? There are many ways to 
measure the inequality of an income distribution. We use the GINI coefficient because it 
carries the benefit of scale invariance so the inequalities can be compared across 
treatments. GINI coefficients of labor income inequality and productivity inequality are 
the same due to scale invariance and the piece-rate pay. The GINI coefficient measures 
the dispersion of distributions giving a score of 0 for a perfectly equal distribution to 1 for 
a perfectly unequal distribution. What was the level of inequality in the Double Pay 
Period, before redistribution was introduced? In the first Double Pay Period the 20% tax 
groups’ GINI coefficients are 0.081, 0.086, 0.089, 0.117, 0.128, 0.141 (average 0.107), 
and the 80% tax groups’ GINI coefficients are 0.111, 0.112, 0.113, 0.118, 0.118, and 
0.125 (average 0.116). As the GINI coefficients demonstrate, inequality of productivity 
in performing the labor task starts low, a consequence of the group procedure designed to 
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create groups similar in distribution of raw ability and the low difficulty of performing 
the labor task. 
 In the Regular Pay Periods the inequality of labor earnings after redistribution are 
of central interest for this is the final income distribution. The 80% tax is designed to 
reduce inequality more than the 20% tax, but by how much? Figure 7 shows how 
inequality within groups changed during the Regular Pay Periods. Again, period 0 
represents the Double Pay Period. Looking at the graphs, there is greater separation in 
GINI coefficients over periods in the 20% tax sessions. The average of the GINI 
coefficients for each group over all periods is taken and averaged with the other groups of 
the same tax rate. This gives an average GINI coefficient of 0.212 for the 20% tax and a 
GINI coefficient of 0.094 for the 80% tax. GINI coefficients were quite low in both 
treatments on average, which is likely due to the fact that labor was homogeneous across 
tasks leading subjects to become more equal in ability with practice. 
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Figure 6. Efficiency Loss Measured in Percentage Change 
 
 Figure 7. Changes in Inequality of Labor Earnings by Session and Group 
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Figure 7 (Continued). Changes in Inequality of Labor Earnings by Session and Group 
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 What are the efficiency-equality tradeoffs across-groups? Figure 8 maps the 
average efficiency and inequality averaged over all Regular Pay Periods for each group. 
It is clear from the graph that there is an overall efficiency-equality tradeoff when the 
redistribution level is increased by increasing labor taxes. However, the tradeoff varies 
depending on which groups are paired for comparison. If the least efficient 80% tax 
groups are paired with the most efficient 20% tax groups a much larger tradeoff (a large 
drop in productivity for a small gain in equality) is observed. If the most efficient 80% 
tax groups are paired with the least efficient 20% tax groups a much smaller tradeoff is 
observed. Some may argue that the real tradeoff is measured in the long run because 
individuals learn how redistribution affects them and they reduce their labor over time in 
response to the incentives created by redistribution. In consideration of this argument 
 
Figure 7 (Continued). Changes in Inequality of Labor Earnings by Session and Group 
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Figure 9 shows three graphs of group tradeoffs in the 1st, 6th, and 12th Regular Pay 
Periods. After the 6th Regular Pay Period the inequality of labor earnings after 
redistribution for the two most productive 20% tax groups are actually lower than all of 
the 80% tax groups. The results suggest that it is possible to lose both efficiency and 
equality over time if the tax rate is high enough. If groups are only compared with other 
groups facing the same tax then there is no tradeoff because efficiency and equality move 
in the same direction. This can be seen in Figures 8 and 9. This is likely due to the fact 
that inequality was already low in the Double Pay Period, so if everyone is working then 
efficiency is high and inequality stays low. 
 
 
Figure 8. The Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff (All Periods Averaged) 
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Figure 9. Tradeoff in the 1st, 6th, and 12th Regular Pay Periods 
 
Figure 9 (Continued). Tradeoff in the 1st, 6th, and 12th Regular Pay Periods 
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Can the tradeoff found be explained by a reduction in work incentives? Although 
a subjects’ exact effort level cannot be measured, changes in effort can be inferred from: 
(1) changes in time allocation between labor and leisure; and (2) changes in work 
intensity while performing labor. Changes in time allocation are the primary measure of 
the effect of income redistribution on work incentives. Figure 10 shows the mean number 
of seconds per period spent on leisure. The figure clearly shows that the reduction in 
productivity is coming primarily from subjects spending more of their time in leisure 
under an 80% tax. Comparing Figure 10 with Figure 4, which shows the changes in 
productivity over periods, one can see that changes in average productivity are almost a 
horizontal reflection of changes in average leisure time. It is because of this strong 
correlation that graphs showing the breakdown of leisure seconds for each group and 
 
Figure 9 (Continued). Tradeoff in the 1st, 6th, and 12th Regular Pay Periods 
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each session are not included. Figure 11 shows histograms of the leisure seconds taken by 
subjects in the 1st, 6th, and 12th Regular Pay Periods of each tax. The histograms confirm 
how strongly time allocation is driving the majority of changes in productivity as the vast 
majority of decisions made involve subjects working the entire time or not at all for both 
tax treatments. The mean number of leisure seconds is 81.46 (31.63 standard deviation 
across group means) under the 20% tax and 154.27 (37.36 standard deviation across 
group means) under the 80% tax. Using a t-test with unequal variances to compare the 
mean of the six group means of leisure seconds taken over all Regular Pay Periods for 
each tax level, the null hypothesis that the mean leisure seconds for each treatment are the 
same is rejected at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0035) with leisure time being significantly 
less for 20% tax groups (p-value = 0.0018). 
 
 
Figure 10. Leisure Seconds Taken by Treatment 
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What happens across treatments when subjects are working? Does work intensity 
also vary? Work intensity is defined as the number of sequences correctly typed per 
minute of labor time. The mean number of correct sequences per minute of labor is 13.32 
under the 20% tax and 12.43 under the 80% tax. Figure 12 shows that work intensity is 
the same under the 20% and 80% tax treatments across periods. Subjects also become 
more productive at performing the labor task over time in both treatments. Why is there 
no difference? One explanation is time is money in this experiment: it is rational for a 
subject to work at their maximum ability even if he or she intends to spend part of the 
period on leisure. The correlation between work intensity and leisure seconds overall is -
0.455, but the correlation is weak (-0.092) if you only include observations with leisure 
seconds less than 270 and strong (-0.856) if you only include observations with leisure 
 
Figure 11. Leisure Seconds Taken by Subjects (Bar Width = 30 Seconds) 
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seconds greater than or equal to 270. Perhaps subjects spending 30 seconds or less on the 
labor task do not have enough time to get into the groove of typing fast, or are typing 
slowly because they are already considering switching to leisure. Although insignificant, 
intensity is slightly less on average in the 80% tax, which could be due to the higher 
number of subjects spending almost all of their time on leisure. 
How can overall work effort be measured? It is a function of labor time supplied 
and work intensity. The number of sequences typed correctly serves as their measure of 
productivity, but the differences in ability must be controlled for. Ability is exogenous in 
the Double Pay Period, but endogenous thereafter because ability can increase through 
learning by doing. The effort proxy variable is generated by taking the number of 
sequences typed correctly in the current period and dividing it by the maximum number 
of sequences typed thus far in any period. The Double Pay Period is included in case a 
subject puts forth little effort in the Regular Pay Periods. If an individual scores a 0, then 
they are not working at all. If an individual’s score equals 1, then they have reached their 
maximum productivity threshold established in this period or in a previous period. This 
effort proxy only measures a decrease in effort relative to a revealed maximum 
productivity level, for increases in effort are confounded with increases in ability. During 
the Regular Pay Periods, the average work effort measure for any given individual in any 
given period was 0.75 for the 20% tax treatment and 0.49 for the 80% tax treatment. 
Figure 13 shows histograms of the work effort variable for the 1st, 6th, and 12th Regular 
Pay Periods of each tax rate. The majority of subjects in the 20% tax treatment continue 
to establish new or come close to their maximum over the periods. The majority of 
subjects in the 80% tax treatment decrease effort in later periods. 
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Figure 12. Work Intensity by Treatment 
 
Figure 13. Effort Proxy by Subjects (Bar Width = 0.1) 
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At the end of each period subjects are told their hypothetical earnings if they had 
spent the entire last period on leisure. Some could argue that this information is too 
salient and encourages subjects to perform leisure if it pays more than labor. Maybe so, 
but this salient information was given to subjects so the following question can be asked: 
“Do subjects follow the myopic best response, or do they have strategic and/or other 
regarding preferences?” A choice is consistent with the myopic best response if they see 
that they would have been better off (worse off) switching to leisure in one period and, 
subsequently, they spend the better half of the next period in leisure (labor). Over all 
decisions made after the first Regular Pay Period, 430 out of 660 (65.15%) are consistent 
with myopic best response. However, 230 out of 660 (34.85%) are not, including 80 out 
of 330 choices from the 20% tax treatment (24.24%) and 150 out of 330 choices from the 
80% tax treatment (45.45%). Of the decisions inconsistent with myopic best response, 
221 out of 230 (96.09%) cases occurred where the subject learned that he or she could 
have earned more by performing only leisure in the previous period yet chose to spend 
the majority of the following period on labor instead of leisure. 
This 34.85% of decisions inconsistent with myopic best response need to be 
explained. Subjects receive feedback at the end of each period. They are told whether 
their transfers to the Group Account are above or below the group average. They are told 
their opportunity cost of labor in terms of their hypothetical “earnings if entire period was 
spent on leisure.” Finally subjects are told that if everyone takes leisure then the Group 
Account will be zero for the period and everyone will only make $1.50. Subjects are 
aware of the non-excludability of income collected for redistribution and are told that the 
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size of the Group Account is conditional on the productivity of the other group members 
as well as their own.  
How does this feedback affect individual time allocation between labor and 
leisure? Figure 3 shows the feedback given to subjects at the end of each regular pay 
period. Here they can compare their transfers to the group account (or tax payments) with 
their share of the group account to see if they contributed more than the group average 
(themselves included) to the group account. They can also compare their total earnings 
with their hypothetical “earnings if entire period was spent taking leisure” to see if they 
would have been better off not working at all that period. Both of these comparisons are 
highly dependent on how many sequences the other four members’ type and the amount 
of labor income they transfer into the group account. As seen from Figure 11, the vast 
majority of labor-leisure time allocations involved subjects spending the entire period on 
labor or on leisure. This calls for a tobit random-effects estimation of the panel data 
which sets limits for the dependent variable, the number of leisure seconds taken in a 
period, from the left at 0 leisure seconds and from the right at 300 leisure seconds. 
Table 3 shows results of three separate two-limit tobit estimations of the panel 
data. The first tobit regression includes both 20% tax and 80% tax data for the Regular 
Pay Periods. The tax dummy variable, equal to 0 for 20% tax data and 1 for 80% tax data, 
came up highly significant and increased the leisure seconds by a large amount. The 
remaining explanatory variables are lagged because they are the feedback from the 
previous period which subjects respond to. The first variable, the leisure seconds (lagged 
one period), is included to control for the possibility that subjects who spend the majority 
of their time on leisure are more likely to do so in later periods. This variable is 
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significant in the tobit regression of all data and the tobit regression of the 80% tax data. 
The second variable, the others’ mean transfer to the Group Account (lagged one period 
and in cents), is calculated as the Group Account minus the subject’s transfer to the 
Group Account with the difference divided by 4. This variable was included to see if 
individuals responded to how much the other four members contributed to the Group 
Account, which they could determine indirectly by comparing the feedback information 
given to them at the end of each period. The third variable is the second variable squared, 
which is included to capture a possible quadratic relationship of the second variable to 
leisure seconds in the current period. Overall, other group members’ transfers to the 
Group Account were found to significantly decrease the number of leisure seconds taken 
at a significantly decreasing rate. The marginal effect of this variable calculated at the 
mean of the variable is -2.484+2*(0.0121)*(55.03) = -1.152. This variable does not come 
up significant when only the 20% tax data is used, but it is significant when only the 80% 
tax data is used (the marginal effect is -3.204+2*(0.0166)*(79.93) = -0.55).  
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An alternative dependent variable may be overall work effort as defined 
previously and shown in the histograms of Figure 13. How does this information and 
feedback affect individuals’ overall work effort? Table 4 shows a tobit regression 
censored from the left at 0 and at the right at 1. Using all of the data there were 157 left-
censored observations, 351 uncensored observations, and 152 right-censored 
observations. The tax dummy shows a significant effect on reducing effort. The lagged 
leisure seconds variable has a negative and significant effect on the effort proxy using all 
of the data and using only 80% tax data. Other group members’ transfers to the Group 
Account were found to significantly increase effort but at a significantly decreasing rate. 
The marginal effect of this variable calculated at the mean of the variable including all 
data is 0.0079+2*(-0.00004)*(55.03) = 0.0035. The marginal effect is 0.0111+2*(-
0.00006)*(79.93) = 0.0015 using all data. 
Table 3. Tobit Regressions of Leisure Seconds Taken 
Dep. Var. = Leisure Seconds 20% & 80% Tax Data 
20% Tax 
Data Only 
80% Tax 
Data Only 
n-obs 660 330 330 
Constant 97.536 33.022 259.94 
(0.006) (0.710) (0.000) 
Tax Dummy Variable 147.896 … … 
(1 = 80% tax, 0 = 20% tax) (0.001)*** 
Leisure Seconds 0.226 0.109 0.318 
(lagged) (0.001)*** (0.192) (0.003)** 
Others’ Mean Transfer to GA -2.48 1.959 -3.204 
(lagged and in cents) (0.002)** (0.733) (0.006)** 
[Others’ Mean Transfer]^2 .0121 -0.0414 0.0166 
(lagged and in cents) (0.017)* (0.667) (0.021)* 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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In both measurements of labor supply there is some evidence that individuals are 
responding to the contributions of other members to the Group Account, where the 
stronger responses are found in the 80% tax treatment. It is also shown that efficiency in 
the 80% tax groups decay over periods in a manner similar to the decay of contributions 
in voluntary public goods experiments. Recall that at a tax level of 100%, performing 
labor tasks becomes a 100% contribution to the public good (the Group Account). If the 
tax rate is 0%, or if there is no Group Account, then there is no public good and subjects 
will simply select the activity which pays them more. This means that the 80% tax 
treatment is more comparable to the standard voluntary public goods provision 
experiment. 
Table 4. Tobit Regressions of Effort Proxy Variable 
Dep. Var. = Effort Proxy 20% and 80%  Tax Data 
20% Tax 
Data Only 
80% Tax 
Data Only 
n-obs 660 330 330 
Constant 0.648 0.679 0.047 
(0.000) (0.025) (0.815) 
Tax Dummy Variable  -0.519 … … 
(1 = 80% tax, 0 = 20% tax) (0.000)*** 
Leisure Seconds -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0009 
(lagged) (0.009)** (0.605) (0.014)* 
Others’ Mean Transfer To GA  0.008 0.0083 0.0110 
(lagged and in cents) (0.007)** (0.675) (0.008)** 
[Others’ Mean Transfer To GA]^2 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.00005 
(lagged and in cents) (0.029)* (0.661) (0.021)* 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Survey Analysis 
 After performing all Regular Pay Periods subjects were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire. Subjects answered 30 questions which are listed in Appendix B. Questions 
1 through 7 asked subjects their sex, year in college, major, mother’s education, father’s 
education, marital status, and household income. Responses for these questions were 
coded from 0 to N for subjects choosing the 1st to (N+1)th answer. Question 3, the 
students’ major, remains uncoded. Questions 8 and 9 asked subjects how often they lent 
money or other items to friends. Questions 10 through 15 asked subjects how much they 
generally trust others to be fair and helpful. Questions 16 through 22 asked subjects how 
satisfied they were with various aspects of their life. Questions 23 through 26 elicited the 
subject’s fairness attitudes and perceptions. Questions 27 through 30 had subjects vote on 
distributions. 
Are any of the survey responses correlated with labor supply? The labor supply of 
individuals is highly driven by the tax rate and the labor supply of other group members, 
so individual correlations are expected to be weak. However, the average survey 
responses of each group might be correlated with the average labor supply of the group. 
Table 5 shows the average individual leisure seconds taken by each group across the 12 
Regular Pay Periods and the average group survey response to each survey question. 
Table 6 displays the correlations of the average group responses to the average 
group leisure seconds taken. Consider the response to Question 10: Do you think most 
people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be 
fair? If on average the group believes that “most people would take advantage,” then they 
could be less likely to coordinate and cooperate on labor supply resulting in a higher 
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average leisure seconds taken by the group across all Regular Pay Periods. Table 6 shows 
a relatively high negative correlation between this question and leisure seconds taken 
with a coefficient of -0.79 for the 20% tax treatment groups, -0.40 for the 80% tax 
groups, and -0.59 for all groups combined. This claim would be more plausible if 
subjects took the survey before the Regular Pay Periods because there is a possible order 
effect. Members who just finished an hour in a group that failed to coordinate and 
cooperate in labor supply are more likely to believe that “most people would take 
advantage” afterwards. 
Another interesting finding is that questions 9, 12, and 18 had high correlations in 
both treatments but with an opposite sign in each treatment. Question 9 asks: How often 
do you lend personal possessions to friends? Higher group lending has a strong and 
positive correlation with leisure seconds taken in the 20% tax treatment but a strong and 
negative correlation in the 80% tax treatment. Question 12 asks: Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people? More group trust is positively correlated with group leisure seconds 
in the 20% tax treatment and negatively correlated in the 80% tax treatment. Question 18 
asks: How satisfied are you with your social life? This question is important because 
subjects more satisfied with their social life may feel less of a need to please others 
outside their well-rounded social circle for self affirmation. More satisfied groups have 
less leisure seconds in the 20% tax groups and more leisure seconds in the 80% tax 
groups. How can these opposite signs be explained? High levels of trust and cooperation 
are a good for average group labor supply in the high tax treatment because cooperation 
levels have to be kept high to keep labor a profitable activity. This explanation seems 
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intuitive for the high tax treatment, so why is the result the opposite for the low tax 
treatment? One answer is that there were still free-riders who spent most of the Regular 
Pay Periods on the leisure tab. Free-riding is more tempting when the other group 
members are highly cooperative in both tax treatments in the short run, but it may only 
remain profitable in the long run for the low tax treatment. This is because one free-rider 
is a lot more damaging to others’ earnings in the high tax treatment, so cooperators are 
much more likely to switch to leisure in response to a free-rider in the high tax treatment. 
In short, the opposite effect in the 20% tax treatment can be attributed to the fact that a 
more cooperative group is also more tempting to a free-rider and cooperative groups are 
also more tolerant of free-riding in the low tax treatment were free riding is less hurtful to 
cooperators. 
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Table 5. Group Mean Leisure Seconds Taken and Group Mean Survey Responses 
20% Tax Rate Groups 80% Tax Rate Groups 
group number 5 3 1 6 2 4 12 11 7 9 10 8 
leisure seconds 50.7 60.0 64.1 71.3 118.5 124.1 106.9 111.6 152.1 178.4 185.7 190.9 
q1 1 0.6 0.6 1 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 
q2 1.2 2.2 1.6 1.8 2.2 1.8 1.4 2.2 6.4 1.8 2 2.6 
q4 2 3 2.8 1.6 2.4 1.8 2.4 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.8 2.4 
q5 2.8 2.4 3.2 2 2 1.8 2.4 2.6 1.6 2 2.4 1.8 
q6 0.4 0.2 0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0 
q7 1 1.8 2 2 2.8 2.8 1.8 1.4 2.8 1.8 3.4 1.8 
q8 0.6 3 1 1.2 1.2 1 2.6 1.2 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 
q9 0.8 2.8 1 0.8 4.6 1.6 3.8 2.2 1.2 2.4 1.2 1.8 
q10 4.8 5.2 5 5.8 3.6 4 4.6 4.2 5.2 3 1.2 5 
q11 3.6 5.8 4.4 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.8 5.4 4 5.6 2.4 4.4 
q12 1.25 4.2 3.6 3.6 5.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 3 3 2.2 3 
q13 5.75 7.8 6.8 6 7.2 5.2 6.6 7.2 6 7.8 4 5.2 
q14 2.75 3.4 2.6 1.8 3.2 2.2 6.2 4 2.2 2.8 0.6 5.2 
q15 5 6.4 3.4 4.8 6 5 5 5.2 6.4 5.8 4.2 5.4 
q16 5.8 8.6 5.6 6.4 6.8 6.6 4.2 7.2 6.4 7 7.8 7.2 
q17 5.6 5.4 6.2 4.6 7.8 6.4 5 6.4 7.2 4.8 7.4 8.4 
q18 7 7.8 7.8 6.2 6 5.6 4.6 6.8 5.4 7 7.6 7.4 
q19 5 7.2 4.6 5.6 5.6 4.6 3.4 6.6 5.8 3.2 9.2 5.2 
q20 4.4 7.8 6.2 7 7.4 7 4.6 6.6 7 7 8 8.2 
q21 2.4 4.4 2.4 3.8 3.4 4.2 2.8 2 3 1.8 4.6 2.6 
q22 3 5.6 6.75 7.6 5.2 5.6 3.4 6.4 4.8 3.8 5.2 5.4 
q23 3.2 2 3.8 5.6 2 2.8 2.6 4.4 2.8 3.2 5.2 4.6 
q24 4 1.4 0.8 4.2 0.8 2.6 1.8 2.75 0.2 1.8 2.4 1.6 
q25 0.8 0.6 1.2 1.4 0.2 2.4 2 2.8 2.2 5.2 0.6 1.6 
q26 5.4 2 2.4 4.8 4.4 3.2 4.6 4 3.8 1.2 5.2 3.4 
q27 1.4 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.4 1 2 1.4 0.2 1.8 1 1.6 
q28 1.4 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.6 1 2 1.4 0.6 1.8 0.8 1.6 
q29 2 1.8 2 2 1.8 1.4 2 1.6 1.8 1.8 2 2 
q30 2 1.8 2 2 1.8 1.6 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 2 
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Table 6. Correlations of Mean Survey Responses to Group Mean Leisure Seconds 
Question 20% Tax Groups 80% Tax Groups All Groups 
q1 -0.81* 0.03 -0.46 
q2 0.47 0.08 0.35 
q4 -0.28 -0.48 -0.37 
q5 -0.73 -0.52 -0.59** 
q6 0.15 -0.12 -0.46 
q7 0.92*** 0.46 0.49 
q8 -0.19 -0.74* -0.46 
q9 0.54 -0.63 0.07 
q10 -0.79* -0.40 -0.59** 
q11 -0.24 -0.44 -0.13 
q12 0.74* -0.92** -0.12 
q13 -0.22 -0.50 -0.37 
q14 -0.09 -0.50 -0.02 
q15 0.22 -0.02 0.18 
q16 0.05 0.66 0.27 
q17 0.70 0.49 0.54* 
q18 -0.80* 0.71 -0.03 
q19 -0.27 0.24 0.10 
q20 0.48 0.86** 0.53* 
q21 0.41 0.32 -0.04 
q22 0.10 0.04 -0.19 
q23 -0.33 0.46 0.22 
q24 -0.28 -0.16 -0.31 
q25 0.31 -0.06 0.41 
q26 0.00 -0.31 -0.11 
q27 -0.13 -0.18 -0.05 
q28 0.15 -0.27 0.04 
q29 -0.78* 0.42 -0.08 
q30 -0.78* -0.58 -0.22 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Conclusion 
The results demonstrate the potential for a significant efficiency-equality tradeoff 
in government-mandated income redistribution. The tradeoff can be explained by lower 
work incentives in the high tax treatment. If the primary goal of the public sector is to 
reduce income inequality they will be successful: income inequality is lower under the 
high tax treatment. However, this comes with a significant reduction in efficiency: output 
in the high tax treatment is 36.3% lower than the low tax treatment on average. There will 
be less income available for charity if the efficiency loss from redistribution becomes 
sufficiently large. 
Significant reductions in labor time and overall work effort supplied occurred in 
the high tax. This supports the hypothesis that lowered work incentives are an 
unavoidable consequence of income redistribution based upon wage taxation. Most of the 
efficiency loss comes from the lower labor time supplied in the high tax treatment. 
Subjects in the high tax treatment are also no less productive when they are working, as 
long as they spend more than 10% (30 seconds on the leisure tab) of the period 
performing the labor task. Constructing a work effort proxy, we find that on average 
subjects work at half of their revealed output capacity in the high tax treatment. If the 
public sector implements an intense redistribution program we might expect fewer 
charitable goods and services if people significantly reduce their labor supply. 
We find some evidence of strategic and social preferences. 34.85% of subjects’ 
decisions cannot be explained as myopic best responses to the relative returns to labor 
and leisure. Since tax revenue was redistributed as a public good, a comparison of this 
experiment to other public goods experiments was included. The level of cooperation 
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within a group can have a profound effect on group efficiency. Here labor participation is 
the signal of cooperation. One surprising result was that the two most cooperative and 
trusting low tax groups had greater efficiency and more equality than all of the high tax 
groups. This peculiar result suggests that, if a group is very cooperative, redistribution 
can do more harm than good regardless of whether your objective is efficiency, equality, 
or providing charitable goods and services. 
Results from this experiment are based solely upon the size and distribution of 
labor income. Outside the laboratory, there are of course other measures that go into 
evaluating the impact of redistribution. For example, while crowd out of charitable public 
goods is often incomplete there may be quality effects if government feedback 
mechanisms are weaker than in the independent sector. On the other hand, some positive 
unintended consequences may occur. In this experiment, labor activity yielded both a 
public and private return while leisure only provided a private return. Outside this 
experiment, leisure may provide both a private and public return. People who already 
spend some of their leisure time volunteering will volunteer more as they reduce their 
labor supply. In fact, volunteerism may increase more than proportionately with leisure 
time taken if volunteers grow dissatisfied with the quality of public charity provision and 
decide to offer competing alternatives. Future research may want to take account of the 
quality dimension of charitable goods as well as the unintended consequences of tax 
policy on the volunteer labor supply.
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CHAPTER III 
USING ROLE-REVERSAL IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
Introduction 
In determining the right decision to make, we will often consider how each 
decision affects our outcomes, how it affects others’ outcomes, and how others might 
react to each decision. This forecasting exercise is called role thinking: we mentally 
assume the role of our counterpart and react to each of our possible sets of decisions 
(Green and Armstrong 2009). Role-thinking helps people play competitive, coordination, 
and cooperative games better. Role-thinking in cooperative games helps us determine if 
our planned action is fair or generous towards our counterpart. Cooperative games 
include trust games, bargaining games, and dictator games. A popular cooperative role-
thinking convention is to follow the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether adding saliency to role-
thinking, by applying a role-reversal protocol, affects behavior in cooperative games. 
Role thinking is a mental exercise made under a level of saliency that depends on 
how often an individual plays the counterpart’s role. Role thinking under low levels of 
saliency may be more vulnerable to personal biases. One type of bias is called the 
consensus effect. The consensus effect states that people use information about 
themselves to predict other people’s decisions (Alicke and Largo 1995; Engelmann and 
Strobel 2000; Marks and Miller 1987; Mullen et al. 1985). Dawes (1989) states that 
thinking that another will behave like oneself in the same situation is rational as long as 
the individual recognizes that they are making predictions based on drawing a random 
sample of size one (Brosig, Weimann, and Yang 2003; Dawes 1989). Another type of 
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bias is called the positive self-image effect. The positive self-image effect states that 
people are psychologically driven to view themselves in a favorable manner (Singh, 
Choo, and Poh 1998; Wicklund and Gollwitzer 1981). This means that under a single-
role protocol subjects can engage in role-thinking yet maintain a false belief that they 
would be more generous playing the counterpart’s role. 
A role-reversal protocol can possibly reduce personal biases such as the 
consensus effect and positive self-image effect. The role-reversal protocol requires 
subjects to fully explore a game by playing all roles in the game. Brosig et al. (2003) 
describes how a role-reversal protocol can reduce biases:  
If subjects not only think about what they would do if they were in the role 
of their opponent, but are in addition aware that they will subsequently be 
given that opportunity, they are likely to undertake greater self-reflection 
right from the beginning and can hardly maintain unrealistic and positive 
beliefs about themselves without producing cognitive dissonance. As a 
result, each subject’s expectations about their counterpart’s decision and 
their own decision in the counterpart’s role are much more likely to be in 
line with each other (Brosig, Weimann, and Yang 2003). 
 
This suggests that the behavioral effect of a role-reversal protocol may be due to the 
mitigation of potential bias of role-thinking in the single-role protocol. However, subjects 
who may not engage in role-thinking in a single-role protocol would be forced to do so 
under the role-reversal protocol, and a role-reversal protocol may affect their behavior 
differently. Role-reversal requires more salient role thinking, for an individual must 
actually put himself or herself in the shoes of his or her counterpart by facing the same 
environment, opportunities, decision tasks, and outcomes accompanying the 
counterpart’s role. 
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Background and Literature 
Literature on the effect of a role-reversal protocol in cooperative games can be 
separated into two groups: studies that use the role-reversal protocol to learn more about 
behavior in the single-role protocol, and studies that test for the effect of using a role-
reversal protocol. Results from the second group of studies have implications for the first. 
If behavior under the single-role protocol is not robust to role-reversal, then the role-
reversal protocol cannot be effectively used to learn more about behavior in the single-
role protocol. 
Some studies are not directly interested in the effect of role-reversal. When 
decisions vary in a particular game and there are two or more different roles, 
experimenters may want to compare role decisions within individuals rather than across. 
One study applied role-reversal to a trust game to look for behavioral types between 
sexes and found that men with low trust in the first mover role are less trustworthy in the 
second mover role while women with low trust are no less trustworthy than women with 
high trust (Vyrastekova and Onderstal 2005). Another study used a role-reversal protocol 
of the Ultimatum Game and found that economists keep more and accept less (Carter and 
Irons 1991). Another study of a trust game using the role-reversal protocol found that 
high proportions returned implies high amounts sent but the converse did not hold 
(Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007). Other studies wanted to see if subjects’ choices as 
first and second mover were consistent in the Ultimatum Game. Subjects passed their 
consistency test if the amount they proposed to leave the second mover was no less than 
the minimal amount they would accept themselves (Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie 2003; 
Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982). 
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Other researchers are directly interested in the testing for a role-reversal effect. 
They will compare role-reversal protocols to single-role protocols across studies, or they 
will conduct a role-reversal and single-role protocols to compare behavior within a study. 
Looking for role-reversal effects across studies we get mixed evidence. Comparing an 
extensive form trust game with a role-reversal protocol to its single-role protocol, 
subjects who play both roles displayed more trust and trustworthiness (Güth, Ockenfels, 
and Wendel 1997; Snijders and Keren 1994). Vyrastekova and Onderstal (2005) compare 
their trust game with role-reversal to results from the Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, 
and McCabe 1995), a single-role trust game, and find no significant role-reversal effect. 
Role-reversal may lead to higher or lower proposer demands and more or less rejections 
in the Ultimatum Game depending on which studies are paired for comparison (Burks, 
Carpenter, and Verhoogen 2003; Carter and Irons 1991; Forsythe et al. 1994; Güth and 
Tietz 1990). Behavior in a role-reversal protocol of a two-stage bargaining game was 
found to be more in line with the equilibrium prediction under the single-role protocol 
(Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton 1985; Güth, Ockenfels, and Wendel 1997). 
Looking at role-reversal within studies we also get mixed evidence. Charness and 
Rabin conducted a series of two-person, one-shot dictator and response games where they 
applied role-reversal (Charness and Rabin 2002).6 Later, they ran the same games without 
role-reversal and found the results were not statistically different (Charness and Rabin 
2005). However, another study of dictator and response games found that those 
                                                 
6 The response games are a collection two-person and three-person games designed to measure social 
preferences.  Decisions were elicited from a first mover (Player A) and a responder (Player B) using the 
strategy method protocol. In these games Player A decides to get out of the game or enter, and entering 
gives Player B a more or less generous opportunity set and Player B rewards or punishes Player A for doing 
so. The response games also varied on whether or not there was a cost for Player B to punish or reward 
(Charness and Rabin 2002). 
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participating in the role-reversal treatment made selfish choices less frequently and 
engaged in costly surplus creating actions more frequently (Iriberri and Ray-Biel 2009). 
Weg and Smith (1993) conduct several two-period two-person bargaining games similar 
to the Ultimatum Game. In one game the player proposes twice and the other player 
responds twice. In the other game the two players alternate the proposer and responder 
roles. More is offered by the first proposer in the second game because he/she has less 
bargaining power. They also conducted a single-role protocol of the Ultimatum Game, 
where proposer offers are in between offers made in the other two treatments (Weg and 
Smith 1993). Another study which conducted both the standard and role-reversal 
protocols of the Ultimatum Game have some evidence of role-reversal leading to more 
generous proposals and a higher number of equal splits (Guth, Schmittberger, and 
Schwarze 1982).7 One study that replicated the Investment Game single-role protocol and 
conducted a role-reversal protocol found that significantly less was sent by the first 
mover and less was returned by the second mover (Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen 
2003). 
Why is evidence on the behavioral effect of a role-reversal protocol so mixed? 
One explanation is that not enough studies have been conducted to discover any 
consistent trends that may or may not exist. Effects found comparing across studies can 
be discounted: studies are conducted by different experimenters, using different subject 
pools, using different protocols and game designs, and are conducted at different times. 
Within studies there is no consensus on a single role-reversal protocol. Since the evidence 
                                                 
7 This is a weak test of role-reversal effects because second movers react in their single-role protocol use 
the strategy method protocol in their role-reversal protocol. Also, the amount to be bargained varies around 
$7 in the single-role protocol whereas it is constant at $7 in their role-reversal protocol. 
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is spread amongst multiple role-reversal protocols and multiple cooperative games it is 
not too surprising that the evidence is mixed. 
This study compares role-reversal and single-role protocols of the Investment 
Game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). The key design features of the Investment 
Game are: 
1. Subjects are split in half into two rooms: A and B. 
2. Both Room A subjects and Room B subjects are given a $10 endowment. 
3. The Room B subject is told to pocket the $10, while the Room A subject must 
decide whether to send none, some, or all of his $10 (in $1 increments) to the 
subject he is paired with in Room B and keep the remaining amount. 
4. The experimenters triple the amount sent before it reaches the paired Room B 
subject. 
5. The Room B subject must then decide whether she wants to return none, 
some, or all of her tripled amount (in $1 increments) to the paired subject in 
Room A. The amount returned is not multiplied and is returned to the paired 
Room A subject. 
6. The game is played only once. 
7. Complete privacy is ensured through a double-blind protocol. 
In the Investment Game, henceforth called IG, the Room A subject is the first 
mover, or Sender, and the Room B subject is the second mover, or Receiver. Assuming 
that players are rational and care only about maximizing their own payoffs, the Nash-
equilibrium prediction of the IG is: the Receiver will choose to keep the entire amount 
received and the Sender sends nothing in expectation of this. The game stops 
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immediately and both Sender and Receiver leave with their starting endowment of $10. 
The results of Berg et al. (1995) ran contrary to the Nash equilibrium prediction: an 
average of $5.16 was sent and an average of $4.66 was returned (Berg, Dickhaut, and 
McCabe 1995). This result has been replicated in other trust and Investment Game 
studies as well (Cox 2004; Cox and Deck 2005; Glaeser et al. 2000). Amounts sent can 
be motivated by the Sender’s trust in the Receiver and/or altruistic preferences towards 
the Receiver. Amounts returned can be motivated by the Receiver’s desire to reward the 
Sender’s generosity, be trustworthy, and/or altruistic preferences towards the Sender.8 
This will not be an exhaustive study of the role-reversal effect since only the 
Investment Game is tested. This is a good place to start since there is evidence that 
senders and receivers have different perspectives due to their asymmetric roles (Malhotra 
2004).9 The following null hypothesis is tested: Decisions made in the Investment Game 
under our role-reversal protocol will not be statistically different than decisions made 
under the single-role protocol.  
The behavioral results of the Investment Game under the single-role protocol are 
robust to the role-reversal protocol of this study. The send and return decisions made 
under the role-reversal protocol are not significantly different than decisions made under 
the single role protocol. The lack of a significant role-reversal effect can likely be 
attributed the decision to use the sequential move protocol instead of a strategy method 
protocol and to select role for payoff instead of multiple roles in the role-reversal 
                                                 
8 Cox (2004) showed that positive amounts sent by the Sender can be separated into trust and unconditional 
altruism and that the positive amounts returned by the Receiver can be separated into trustworthiness (also 
known as positive reciprocity) and unconditional altruism (Cox 2004). 
9 Malthora (2004) showed that Senders are more concerned with the risk associated with trusting while 
Receivers are more concerned with the benefit of the Sender’s trusting action. Neither Sender nor Receiver 
were found to be sensitive to the other’s perspective (Malhotra 2004). 
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protocol. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
methodology of choosing a role-reversal protocol and predictions on how it might affect 
behavior. Section 3 discusses the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 
discusses the results and Section 5 concludes. 
How Should a Role-Reversal Protocol be Designed? 
The minimal requirements for a role-reversal protocol are common knowledge 
that each subject will play each possible role in the game, and that each role decision has 
the potential to affect their earnings (saliency). From there all bets are off. However, if 
one wants to test for a fundamental role-reversal effect a good place to start is by 
minimizing the number of departures from the single-role protocol. One unavoidable 
departure is that any role-reversal protocol requires repetitions of the game: subjects will 
have more decisions to make if the single-role protocol is not repeated. This alone may 
cause a role-reversal effect, but further decisions must be made in designing a role-
reversal protocol which may also have an effect. 
 The first decision is on whether to pay only one or multiple roles played. 
Selecting only one role for payoff after decisions are made carries the benefit of more 
data per dollar. Subjects, by playing both roles, experience the higher mental cost from 
making multiple decisions. Selecting one decision for payoff reduces the saliency of 
payoff outcomes for each decision. Furthermore, the subject’s risk preferences must be 
consistent with the independence axiom of expected utility theory for the subject to treat 
the role decisions independently. Otherwise, selecting one role for payoff can lead to 
different behavior (Cox 2010). Thus, we do not know whether changes in behavior are 
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due to role-reversal effects, violations of the independence axiom, or a combination 
thereof. 
Paying for more than one of the roles a subject plays increases payoff saliency, 
but it also creates problems of wealth effects, feedback effects, and portfolio effects, 
which may confound any fundamental effect of role-reversal present. Wealth effects 
occur when subjects are paid for more than one role and the potential payoffs of each role 
remain unchanged. Controlling for wealth effects in a role-reversal protocol will require 
reducing the payment for each role which in turn reduces the saliency of each decision. 
Despite how the experimenter decides to handle wealth effects, the experimenter must 
then decide if he wants to introduce potential portfolio or feedback effects into the 
design. 
A portfolio effect can exist when a subject is paid for two or more decision tasks, 
yet does not know the payoff outcomes of any decision until the end of the experiment.10 
When a subject plays more than one role without payoff feedback from the previous role, 
he/she may view their role decisions, although played out independently, as a diversified 
investment portfolio. Using the IG as an example subjects could maximize a portfolio of 
expected earnings by making a riskier trust decision in the first mover role while 
returning less in the second mover role to insure against losses from a betrayal of trust. 
Subjects could also maximize a portfolio of interpersonal wealth preferences in the IG 
and other cooperative games. A subject may defer the responsibility of increasing their 
partner’s payoff to their partner’s partner in a separate role pairing. Burks, Carpenter, and 
Verhoogen (2003), who use this role-reversal protocol, find reductions in first and second 
                                                 
10 Literature on the preference reversal phenomenon was the first to discuss potential the problems of 
portfolio effects (Cox 2010; Grether and Plott 1979).  
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mover generosity in the IG and explain their results as a “reduced responsibility effect” 
(Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen 2003). 
One way to avoid possible portfolio effects is to provide the subject feedback on 
the outcome of their role decision before making their next role decision. Feedback, 
however, will force the study of role-reversal to adopt the complexity of repeated game 
theory. Since all roles are paid the problems associated with wealth effects are not 
avoided. Wealth effects can lead to changes in risk preferences which will change role 
decisions made under risk (Cox 2010). Wealth effects can also lead to changes in the 
willingness of subjects to pay for an increase (or decrease) in the incomes of their 
counterparts.  
Those interested in the effect of role-reversal could argue that portfolio effects, 
feedback effects, and/or wealth effects are not separable from role-reversal in some 
environments. However, researchers interested in using role-reversal protocols to learn 
more about behavior in the single-role protocol should avoid these effects by selecting 
only one role for payment. This study will select one decision for payment to test for a 
fundamental role-reversal effect. 
Another role-reversal protocol design choice is whether to use a sequential move 
protocol or a strategy method protocol in addition to the role-reversal protocol. Decisions 
are more often elicited using the sequential move protocol, where the decisions are made 
in the sequence decisions are played out in the game. This carries the advantage of 
getting a “hot” or a more emotional response to the first mover’s decision, but it also 
carries the disadvantage of fewer observations per subject. In the strategy method 
protocol all decisions are made simultaneously even though the decisions are played 
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sequentially in the game. Those who move after other players make decisions by 
submitting a strategy of planned responses to all possible decisions previously-moving 
players can make. The decisions are then played out using the decisions and strategies 
previously submitted. The strategy method protocol carries the advantage of more 
observations per subject possibly giving more information about the effect of role-
reversal. The strategy method protocol carries the disadvantage of getting a “cold” 
second mover response decision. Another disadvantage of the strategy method protocol 
has already been listed as a disadvantage for selecting one role for payoff in role-reversal: 
a greater mental cost is imposed on subjects since more decisions must be made under 
strategy elicitation. The saliency of payoffs for each decision is reduced since only one 
decision from each strategy set of ten decisions determines final payoffs. Saliency is even 
further reduced when only one role decision is selected for payoff.  
Several studies have looked for behavioral differences between the sequential 
move protocol and the strategy method protocol (Brandts and Charness 2000; Brosig, 
Weimann, and Yang 2003; Casari and Cason 2009; Cason and Mui 1998; Oxoby and 
McLeish 2004). Casari and Cason (2009) find a hot versus cold effect in a binary-
decision trust game: second movers are less trustworthy under the strategy method 
protocol (Casari and Cason 2009). Brandts and Charness (2000) use a role-reversal 
protocol and do not find a hot versus cold effect. Brosig et al. (2003) use the single-role 
protocol and do find a hot versus cold effect (Brandts and Charness 2000; Brosig, 
Weimann, and Yang 2003). Using a role-reversal protocol has not been ruled out as an 
influence on the hot versus cold effect, so conversely using the strategy method protocol 
may influence the role-reversal effect as well. Preliminary evidence from Vyrastekova 
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and Onderstal (2005) suggests that using role-reversal with the strategy method protocol 
could remove the role-reversal effect, since they found no role-reversal effect comparing 
their results to Berg et al. (1995) (Vyrastekova and Onderstal 2005). 
The strategy method protocol does carry the advantage of being able to minimize 
problems with order effects in role-reversal protocols for sequential games. Subjects can 
make all roles decisions with zero feedback under the strategy method protocol. If both 
role decisions are presented to the subject simultaneously on the same decision sheet or 
computer screen then subjects are free to make their “first mover” role decision first or 
their “second mover” decision first. One can then test for possible order effects from the 
task representation mixing the order in which role decisions are presented on the 
computer screen or sheet. 
One can test order effects to a limited degree if the sequential move protocol is 
used, and it gets exponentially complicated as the number of roles in the game increase. 
Consider the simplest case: the 2-person, sequential game. First two types must be 
created: 
 Type A: a subject who plays the first mover role then the second mover role 
 Type B: a subject who plays the second mover role then the first mover role 
Then the following matching protocols can be created: 
 Matching protocol AAA: Type A subjects paired only with Type A subjects who 
are also paired only with Type A subjects 
 Matching protocol ABA/BAB: Type A subjects are paired only with Type B 
subjects who are paired only with Type A subjects. This naturally creates Type B 
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subjects paired only with Type A subjects who are paired only with Type B 
subjects. 
 All other matching protocols require at least one subject to be paired with a Type 
A for one role and a Type B for another. Matching protocol BBB is impossible 
because at least one subject must play first mover first to create a matching 
protocol. 
Then the following tests of order effects can be conducted: 
 Type A subjects in matching protocol AAA can be compared with Type B 
subjects in matching protocol ABA/BAB to test for order effects in the sequence 
of roles subjects play. 
 Type A subjects in matching protocol AAA can be compared with Type A 
subjects in matching protocol ABA/BAB to test for order effects in the sequence 
of roles a subject’s partner plays. This can be done for Type A subjects only. 
 
Although there is no consensus on either design issue, this study will only take on 
the disagreement between selecting one or multiple roles for payment. Burks, Carpenter, 
and Verhoogen (2003) test for a prior knowledge of role-reversal effect in the Investment 
Game and find significant reductions in generosity by the first mover and second mover. 
They use the sequential move protocol version of the Investment Game and use matching 
protocol AAA in their role-reversal treatment. We test the possibility that their results are 
sensitive to a design choice to pay for both Sender and Receiver roles by randomly 
selecting one role decision for payoff in our design. We cannot definitively settle the 
argument because we do not replicate their role-reversal treatment. For now, we can 
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make across-studies comparisons of two within-study comparisons of role-reversal in the 
Investment Game to see if role payment is a prime suspect for the wide variation of role-
reversal effects found in the literature. 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design asks the question: “What effect does applying role-
reversal to the Investment Game have on the amounts sent and returned when only one 
decision is selected for payoff?” Undergraduates from Georgia State University were 
invited to participate in this experiment through the Experimental Economics Center 
(ExCEN) recruiter system. The experiment took place in two rooms, labeled Room A and 
Room B, in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies building of Georgia State 
University. Figure 14 shows a layout of the two seminar rooms. Room A and Room B are 
actually two parts of a large seminar room divided by a thick yet collapsible wall (see 
zig-zag line). Once the divider is closed, people must enter Room A through door 3 and 
Room B through door 4. On the left wall of Room A is a large closet area with doors 1 
and 2 providing access to it, which is the Experimenters’ Room.  
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 Both treatments of this study follow a double-blind protocol. Subjects signed a 
form in advance to confirm that they will be paid at the end of the experiment. Before 
making any decisions, subjects are told that their decisions will remain private from the 
other participants, the room monitors11, and the experimenters. They are told that 
anonymity is upheld by allowing them to randomly draw a numbered mailbox key where: 
(1) they use the number to identify their decisions; and (2) they use the key to collect 
their earnings related to their decisions.12 
                                                 
11 Three subjects were randomly selected to be Experimenters’ Room Monitor, Room A Monitor, and 
Room B monitor. All monitors were told that they would be paid $25 for participation. The Experimenters’ 
Room Monitor was told that his or her job involved monitoring the procedures conducted by the 
experimenters and distributing materials to the two Rooms (his or her path is marked out in Figure 14). The 
Room A and Room B Monitors were told that their job consisted of collecting and distributing materials 
within their assigned rooms and enforcing the rule of silence in the rooms.  
12 Figure 15 shows how subjects collect their payoffs.  Room A subjects collect their payoffs first for 
convenience, followed by Room B. Subjects were let into door 1 by an experimenter after they dropped off 
their questionnaire face down in a box. One subject was let in at a time, so subjects would have complete 
privacy when collecting their payoffs. Once the subject was in the Experimenters’ Room she collected her 
payoff envelope using her key to open her mailbox in the double-blind payoff locker. She then exited door 
2 and dropped her key in the box. An experimenter stood by door 2 to verify that she returned her key. 
Finally, the subject exits door 3 and the building. 
 
Figure 14. Layout of Rooms Used During the Experiment 
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Before entering Room A or Room B, subjects were asked to randomly draw a 
green card from a stack passed around by an experimenter. The green cards were used to 
select the three monitors used in the experiment and to determine which subjects go to 
Room A and Room B. The green cards in the stack include: 1 Experimenters’ Room 
Monitor card, 1 Room A Monitor card, and 1 Room B Monitor card with the remaining 
cards divided equally into Room A and Room B cards. Subjects who drew Room A and 
Room B cards went to their respective rooms and sat at their own table facing the wall 
(see Figure 14). Although subjects in the same room do not play each other, this setup is 
designed to maintain privacy. 
Instructions were handed to the subjects in each room to read silently.13 After 
reading the instructions the experimenter explained the instructions verbally. If there 
were no further questions the wall divider between Room A and Room B was closed and 
the experimenters went into the Experimenters’ Room and remained there until the end of 
                                                 
13 The instructions as well as the short summary of instructions handed to subjects for each treatment are 
located in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 15. Layout of Rooms During the Payoff Procedure 
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the experiment (see Figure 14). Any questions asked by subjects after the experimenters 
left were relayed by the monitors. 
Investment Game Control Treatment 
In the IG control treatment each subject plays under the single-role protocol. 
Subjects who randomly selected Room A cards play the Senders, and the Room B 
subjects play the Receivers. Their decisions were called the Room A Decision Task and 
Room B Decision Task. 
Subjects in Room A were given “Room A Decision Task” manila envelopes, 
which contained the materials subjects used to make their Sender role decision. Inside the 
manila envelope were three white envelopes and a short summary of instructions for 
handling the envelopes. The first envelope contains their mailbox key, which subjects are 
instructed to keep for the remainder of the experiment. The second envelope contains 
their endowment of 10 one-dollar certificates. The third envelope is empty. A subject’s 
Task X involves transferring none, some, or all certificates from the second envelope into 
the third. The number of certificates transferred to the third envelope states how much he 
intends to send to the paired person in the other room. The remaining certificates in the 
second envelope states how much he intends to keep. After the subject has made a 
decision, he places the second and third white envelopes back in the manila envelope and 
he drops the manila envelope in the return box. The Experimenters’ Room Monitor 
collects the return boxes from the two rooms and brings them to the experimenters. Two 
of the experimenters record the decisions made by subjects, and the third experimenter 
triples each amount sent. They then prepare the manila envelopes for the Room B 
Decision Task. 
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 The Room B subjects then randomly select a “Room B Decision Task” manila 
envelope from the return box. Inside are the materials necessary to make their Receiver 
role decision. The manila envelope contains four small white envelopes and a short 
summary of instructions on how to use the envelopes to make their decision. The first 
envelope contains their mailbox key, which subjects are instructed to keep for the 
remainder of the experiment. The second envelope contains 10 certificates that subjects 
are instructed to keep. The third envelope contains the tripled number of certificates sent 
by the person from Room A. The fourth envelope is empty. The Room B Decision Task 
involves transferring none, some, or all of their tripled certificates from the third 
envelope into the fourth. The number of certificates transferred to the fourth envelope 
states how much she intends to return to the paired person in the other room. The number 
of certificates left in the third envelope states how many of the certificates she intends to 
keep. After the subject makes a decision, she places the second, third, and fourth white 
envelopes back in the manila envelope and she drops the manila envelope in the return 
box. The experimenters’ room monitor collects the return boxes from the two rooms and 
brings them to the experimenters. The experimenters record the decisions made by 
subjects, and prepare the payoff envelopes by exchanging paper certificates for U.S. 
dollars. 
Role-Reversal Treatment 
In this treatment subjects play Sender and Receiver in two independent IG 
repetitions under the role-reversal protocol. Subjects know in advance that only one game 
will be selected for payoff, and their Sender and Receiver role will have an equal chance 
of determining their payoff. Since every subject played both roles in this treatment it did 
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not matter which room they selected into. The “Room A Decision Task” (Sender role) 
from the IG control became “Task X” for all subjects, and the “Room B Decision Task” 
(Receiver role) became “Task Y” for all subjects. Subjects were paired with another 
subject from each room for each decision. There was a small chance (1 out of 15) a 
subject could be paired with the same person for both decisions, but the double-blind 
procedure prevented either subject from knowing if this occurred. Similar to the 
procedure of Burks et al. (2003), all subjects made their Sender decision (Task X 
decision) first, and the tripled certificates were sent to opposite rooms for subjects to 
make their Receiver decision (Task Y decision).  
Since only one decision was randomly selected for payoff one-dollar certificates 
were printed in two colors to separate each role a subject plays. RED certificates were 
used for one IG and BLUE certificates were used for the other IG. Subjects in Room A 
used BLUE certificates for Task X and RED certificates for Task Y. Subjects in Room B 
used RED certificates for Task X and BLUE certificates for Task Y. After all decisions 
were made only one of each subject’s decisions, one of the two games, were randomly 
selected for payoff by the experimenters’ room monitor. This was done by the 
experimenters’ room monitor, who opened the room divider and flipped a coin to 
determine which color certificates were exchanged for U.S. Dollars and which color 
certificates became worthless. The room monitors confirmed the result of the coin flip. 
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Results and Analysis 
In the IG control there were two sessions with 32 subjects in the first session and 
28 subjects in the second (excluding monitors). The two sessions combined generated 30 
IG pairs, 30 observations of amounts sent, and 30 observations of amounts returned. In 
the role-reversal treatment there were 30 subjects making Sender and Receiver decisions, 
thereby generating 30 IG pairs. A detailed summary of the decisions made in both 
treatments is found in Table 7. From the summary table it is clear that decisions made in 
the IG control treatment and role-reversal treatment are not significantly different from 
one another. 
 
 
Sender Role Decisions 
The send mean was $4.10 (standard deviation of $3.49) in the IG control, and the 
send mean was $4.23 (standard deviation of $2.81) in the role-reversal treatment. In 
Table 8, standard t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests confirm that the amount sent in the 
role-reversal protocol is not significantly different from the single-role protocol. The send 
distributions do appear slightly different in Figure 16 with slightly more weight in the 
Table 7. Detailed Summary of Sender and Receiver Decisions by Treatment 
IG Control Treatment Role-Reversal Treatment 
Summary 
Stats 
Sender 
Sent 
Receiver 
Returned 
Sender 
Sent 
Receiver 
Returned 
# of obs. 30 30 30 30 
Mean 4.10 3.07 4.23 3.47 
Median 3.00 1.50 3.50 3.00 
Std. Dev. 3.49 4.33 2.81 3.44 
Variance 12.16 18.75 7.91 11.84 
Skewness 0.42 2.24 0.50 1.13 
Kurtosis 1.89 8.94 2.72 4.24 
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middle for the role-reversal treatment. The distribution of amounts sent is bimodal ($3 
and $5) for the role-reversal treatment, whereas there are four modes ($0, $3, $5, and 
$10) for the IG control treatment. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test has an exact p-value of 
0.808, so the null hypothesis that the distributions are equal cannot be rejected. The two-
sample variance comparison test shows that the variance is lower under role-reversal but 
at an insignificant level (one-sided p-value = 0.1262). 
 
 
 
Table 8. Statistical Tests for Treatment Differences in Amounts Sent 
Treatment 
Comparison 
Means Test 
(t-test) 
Mann-Whitney 
Test 
(rank sum test) 
Variance Test 
K-S 
Distribution 
Test 
IG Control 
versus 
 Role-Reversal 
t = -0.163 
Pr(T>t) = 0.565 
z = -0.442 
Prob>|z| = 
0.659 
f = 1.5377 
d.f. = 29,29 
Pr(F>f) = 
0.1262 
Exact p-value = 
0.808 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
 
Figure 16. Amount Sent by Treatment 
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Receiver Role Decisions 
Table 7 shows that the mean amount returned was $3.07 (standard deviation of 
$4.33) in the IG control, and $3.47 (standard deviation of $3.44)14 in the role-reversal 
treatment. The standard deviation for Receiver decisions is also lower in the role-reversal 
treatment, but this is likely driven by the lower variance in the amount received. The 
returns are higher in the role-reversal treatment on average, but more was also sent on 
average in the role-reversal treatment. Does the difference hold after controlling for the 
amount received? Table 9, shows the results from the tobit regression on the amount 
returned. The tobit regression uses data from both treatments. An intercept dummy for 
role-reversal protocol data is needed to see if a changing the environment from a single-
role protocol leads to different Receiver decisions. A slope dummy for the role-reversal 
protocol, which is equal to the amount sent to the Receiver for role-reversal data and 0 
otherwise, could be used because the role-reversal effect may be stronger for larger 
amounts sent, but the slope dummy was found to be negative, near zero, and highly 
insignificant, so it was dropped from the tobit regression. The role-reversal intercept 
dummy is negative, but it appears to have no significant effect on the amount returned.  
 
                                                 
14 In the role-reversal treatment the sum of all amounts received does not match the tripled sum of all 
amounts sent due to an experimenter error. $3 was reported as sent by a subject in Room B, and was tripled 
to $9 and stuffed into the tripled number of certificates envelope. The error occurred when the original $3 
sent was also stuffed into the tripled number of certificates envelope, meaning that a subject in Room A 
received $3 + $9 = $12 when they should have only received $9. Had the subject in Room A actually sent 
$4, the send mean would have been $4.26 instead. The subject in Room B who received $12 thought that 
the other subject sent $4, and had no knowledge of the error, so the Receiver data is analyzed as if the 
Sender from Room A sent $4 instead of $3. 
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Figure 17 shows a scatter plot15 with linear prediction lines based on the amounts 
returned for each amount received in both treatments. Although the role-reversal protocol 
intercept dummy is insignificant in the tobit regression, the slope of the linear prediction 
line is steeper for the role-reversal treatment. The average return decision of those who 
received between $3 and $15 was $3.71 (14 observations) in the IG control and $2.89 (19 
observations) in the role-reversal treatment. The average return decision of those who 
received between $18 and $30 was $4.44 (9 observations) in the IG control and $6.13 (8 
observations) in the role-reversal treatment. Receivers experiencing salient role-reversal 
appear to return less (return more) when the amount received is low (high) relative to 
Receivers in the IG control but more data is needed to see if this result holds. Figure 18 
plots the same data, except the amount returned divided by the amount sent to the subject 
is mapped on the y-axis. The IG control trend line shows that it does not pay to send 
more than $5 on average. The role-reversal trend line shows that on average you get 
slightly less than your money back for all amounts sent. 
 
                                                 
15 The scatter plot points were displaced so plot points from both treatments can be seen using the “jitter” 
option for scatter plots in Stata. Subjects made decisions over whole-dollar amounts, so points near each 
other are in fact the same decision. 
Table 9. Tobit Regression of Return Decisions 
Constant 
Role-Reversal 
Intercept 
Dummy 
Received/3 Heteroscedasticity Term = Received 
Sigma: 
Disturbance 
Std. Dev. 
1.056 
(0.302) 
-0.692 
(0.416) 
0.594 
(0.017)* 
0.061 
(0.003)** 
1.425 
(0.006)** 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Figure 17. Amount Returned by Treatment 
 
Figure 18. Amount Returned Divided by Amount Partner Sent by Treatment 
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What Else Can be Learned From the Role-Reversal Protocol? 
 What can be learned from using the role-reversal protocol in trust games? First, 
we can see if Sender behavior can explain Receiver behavior and vice versa. Here, only 
individuals who received positive amounts can be analyzed. Can the amounts returned by 
individuals explain the amounts they have sent. Table 10 shows tobit regression results 
with the amount sent as the dependent variable and the ratio of the amount returned over 
the amount the Sender was sent in the Receiver role as the independent variable. The sign 
of the coefficient is positive, meaning those who returned more were likely to have sent 
more, but is only near significant (p-value = 0.080). 
 
 
 Table 11 shows tobit regression results which tests if the amounts sent by 
individuals can explain the amounts they have returned. The results show the expected 
positive sign: on average higher amounts sent lead to higher returns, but the coefficient is 
insignificant (p-value = 0.152). There is little evidence to suggest that trust predicts 
trustworthiness in the role-reversal protocol we use. Afterall, individuals can rationally 
decide to send more and return less if they believe that on average people will return 
more than they would in the same role. This does not mean that these individuals’ 
decisions are inconsistent, but rather evidence of opportunistic sending. Role-reversal 
reveals some of these Senders as opportunistic when the amount sent to them as Receiver 
Table 10. Tobit Regression of Amount Sent Under Role-Reversal 
Constant Returned/ (Received/3) 
Heteroscedasticity 
Term = Received 
Sigma: Disturbance 
Std. Dev. 
2.794 
(0.009) 
1.776 
(0.080) 
-0.004 
(0.883) 
3.717 
(0.017) 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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is greater than or equal to the amount they sent in their Sender role, yet they return less 
than they had originally sent. Table 12 shows how subjects in the role-reversal treatment 
are classified as opportunistic senders. In this experiment 1 out of 14 (7%) subjects tested 
for opportunistic sending are revealed to be opportunistic senders. 
 
 
 
Survey Analysis 
Subjects in both surveys were told, after learning their payoff, that they would 
receive an additional $5 for filling out a short survey. The general survey questions can 
be found in the Appendix. Table 13 shows the simple correlations of survey responses to 
Sender role decisions. Survey questions related to general trust of strangers have higher 
correlations with the amounts sent in the control treatment. Questions related to the stakes 
of the trusting action have higher correlations in the control treatment. Questions related 
to how often subjects loan money and personal items to friends have higher correlations 
Table 11. Tobit Regression of Amount Returned Under Role-Reversal 
Constant Receiver Sent Received/3 Heteroscedsticity Term = Received 
Sigma: 
Disturbance 
Std. Dev. 
-1.186 
(0.400) 
0.231 
(0.152) 
0.781 
(0.017)* 
0.045 
(0.186) 
1.479 
(0.065) 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
Table 12. Role-Reversal and Opportunistic Senders 
Study 
% Revealed 
Opportunistic 
Senders 
Revealed 
Opportunistic 
Senders 
Received/3 
Greater than 
Amount Sent 
Received 
Certificates 
Sender 
Decisions
Hall 7.1% 1 14 27 30 
BCV(2003) 36.4% 8 22 33 40 
CG (2007) 26.9% 14 52 82 100 
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in the role-reversal treatment. This suggests that Sender decisions made under role-
reversal are more correlated with survey questions that ask about subjects actual practice 
and experience with trust. Survey responses are weakly correlated to the amount returned 
in both treatments, with the exception of it being positively correlated and significant in 
the helpful question for IG data. 
 One of the survey questions in the Investment Game control treatment asked 
subjects to hypothetically play the other role. Receivers were asked what they would have 
sent if they played the Sender role instead. Receivers in the control treatment claimed that 
they “would have sent” an average of $5.67 if they were Senders instead. An average of 
$4.23 was sent in role-reversal treatment. Senders “received” the same distribution of 
amounts received by Receivers in the role-reversal treatment and asked how much they 
would return if they played the Receiver role instead. Senders in the control treatment 
claimed that they “would have returned” an average of $6.60 if they were receivers 
instead. This is much higher than the average of $3.85 returned in the role-reversal 
treatment. This disparity provides some evidence of the positive self-image effect 
Senders have about what they would do as Receivers in the control treatment. The 
positive self-image effect could have affected Sender’s decisions in both treatments or 
not at all, since the average amounts sent are not different across treatments. 
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Conclusion 
 We conducted an experiment to test the effect of role-reversal in the Investment 
Game and found no significant effect. The lack of a role-reversal effect is likely due to 
selecting one decision for payment in the role-reversal protocol. Support for this 
conjecture comes from the previous test of role-reversal effects on the trust game 
conducted by Burks et al. (2003). Paying for both roles in their role-reversal treatment 
they found significant reductions in the amounts sent and returned. Their results are 
important because they show the joint effects of portfolio effects, income effects, 
endowment effects16, and role-reversal effects. These extra effects can still be considered 
                                                 
16 The following role-reversal trust games remove the $10 endowment for the Receiver: Burks et al. (2003), 
Vyrastekova and Onderstal (2005), and Chaduri and Gangahardan (2007). If their results are compared to 
Investment Game data, then a joint test of endowment and role-reversal effects are tested. 
Table 13. Survey Correlations with the Amounts Sent and Returned in both Treatments 
Amount Sent Proportion Returned
Decisions/Responses IG Control Role-Reversal IG Control Role-Reversal
sent 1.000 1.000 … 0.259 
proportion returned … 0.259 1.000 1.000 
female -0.102 0.015 -0.009 -0.004 
mother's education -0.071 0.230 0.009 -0.050 
father's education 0.179 0.313 0.211 -0.033 
marital status 0.256 0.160 … -0.281 
family income -0.111 0.050 -0.206 0.069 
fair 0.330* 0.105 -0.166 -0.014 
helpful 0.198 0.026 0.456** -0.080 
general trust 0.361* 0.111 -0.067 0.077 
stranger trust -0.524*** -0.147 0.124 -0.195 
small stakes trust 0.239 -0.127 0.215 -0.122 
high stakes trust 0.467*** 0.150 0.082 0.087 
loan money to friends 0.120 -0.248 0.128 -0.195 
loan stuff to friends -0.120 -0.378* 0.265 -0.210 
number of friends 0.270 -0.007 -0.149 0.144 
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 
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part of role-reversal for some environments, but they inhibit testing for a fundamental 
role-reversal effect.  
There is also some evidence that paying for both roles can encourage 
opportunistic sending. Table 12 compares the proportion of opportunistic senders in the 
role-reversal data of this experiment to role-reversal data where subjects are paid for both 
roles. In our role-reversal treatment only 1 out of 14 testable subjects were revealed as an 
opportunitic sender (7.1%). More subjects were revealed to be opportunistic senders 
when they are paid for both roles: 8 out of 22 (36.4%) subjects in Burks et al. (2004) and 
14 out of 52 (26.9%) subjects in Chaduri and Gangahardan (2007). 
After selecting one decision for payoff we found no role-reversal effect, which is 
good news for researchers whose purpose of using a role-reversal protocol is to learn 
more about behavior in the game under its traditional single-role protocol. Paying for 
multiple roles introduce features that limit comparability between the role-reversal and 
single-role protocols. Research opportunities continue for those who wish to test for a 
role-reversal effect in other domains. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TRUST IN PRIVATE AND COMMON PROPERTY EXPERIMENTS: 
EFFECTS OF STRONGER PROPERTY RIGHT ENTITLEMENTS 
 
Introduction 
This paper builds on the Cox, Ostrom, and Walker et al. (2009) study titled, 
“Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments.” Cox, Ostrom, and Walker et al. 
(2009), henceforth COW, addressed notions that common property is fundamentally over 
extracted, neglected, and abused. Predictions of such “tragedies of the commons” are 
often based on reasoning that confuses common property with open access (Hardin 
1968). Cox, Ostrom, and Walker have an ongoing research project designed to look for 
behavioral differences in assigning endowments as private and common property. In the 
COW study, they look at two payoff equivalent 2-person sequential games: the Private 
Property Trust Game and the Common Property Trust Game. Both games are designed to 
measure the generosity of the first mover (denoted as the Type X person) and the 
cooperative response of the second mover (denoted as the Type Y Person). The games 
differ in the initial property right assignments defined by the endowments. They find 
marginally greater first mover generosity and second mover cooperation in the Common 
Property Trust Game; however the game behavior was significantly different (Cox et al. 
2009). 
We investigate whether these results are robust to assigning stronger property 
right entitlements. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to 
meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their private or common property 
endowments. This simple change reveals some insights about behavior in private and 
common property environments previously unseen. Although the levels of generosity and 
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cooperative responses are similar across regimes, first mover decisions move to the 
extremes of zero and full generosity in the Common Property Trust Game. 
The COW study and our initial investigation had subjects make decisions using 
the sequential move protocol. Under this protocol, a Type Y (second mover) decision was 
elicited after the Type Y person learned their paired Type X (first mover) player’s 
decision. This protocol made Type Y responses to some possible (but not observed) Type 
X choices unknowable. To measure Type Y decisions in this domain we employ the 
strategy method protocol. This protocol elicits responses from a Type Y player for each 
potential decision made by the Type X player. Using this protocol, we find significant 
evidence of lower Type Y cooperation in the Common Property Trust Game than in the 
Private Property Trust Game. 
Another important finding is that differences in cooperative behavior between 
private and common property environments are quite sensitive to multiple dimensions of 
saliency. The two dimensions of saliency present are the saliency of property ownership 
and the saliency of monetary payoffs. A reduction in the saliency of property ownership 
can be accomplished by reducing the performance quota subjects have to meet to earn 
their private or common property endowments or by removing the real effort task 
entirely. A reduction in the saliency of monetary payoffs for the Type Y player can be 
accomplished by switching from the sequential move protocol to the strategy method 
protocol. These reductions in saliency led to more generous Type X decisions in both 
games. However, the increase in generosity is only significant when the switch to the 
strategy method is made, although the switch to the strategy method does not affect the 
Type X player’s saliency of payoffs. Tobit analysis of Type Y decisions reveal that either 
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reduction in saliency leads to more Type Y generosity in both games after controlling for 
the amount received, although the finding is not statistically significant. The saliency of 
property ownership has a strong effect on Type Y players’ sensitivity to Type X 
deviations from the status quo in these trust games. It is sensitivity to the status quo 
which makes these games different behaviorally. Our findings have implications for how 
we model social preferences and how we test them empirically. 
The essay is organized as follows. The first section introduces the Private and 
Common Property Trust Games and the related theoretical predictions. The second 
section discusses the COW study design and results. The third section discusses the 
potential impact of stronger property right entitlements. The fourth section employs 
stronger property rights by adding a real effort task to the COW design. Design of the 
real effort task, and results from employing it are discussed. The fifth section discusses 
the advantages and disadvantages of using the strategy method protocol as opposed to the 
sequential move protocol. The sixth section adds the strategy method protocol to the 
design, and results from adding it are discussed. The seventh section discusses the impact 
saliency has on behavior across the two games. The eighth section analyzes the survey 
data, and the last section concludes. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The Private Property Trust Game and the Common Property Trust Game are both 
derived from the Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). In the 
Investment Game, there is a first mover and a second mover who interact in a one-shot 
game. Both start with an endowment of $10 as their private fund. The second mover is 
constrained to keep his/her $10 endowment, while the first mover must decide whether to 
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send none, some, or all of his/her $10 in $1 units to the second mover. Each dollar sent 
by the first mover is tripled by the experimenters and added to the private fund of the 
second mover. Sending money creates a surplus which the second mover must then 
decide whether or not to share. A maximum surplus of $20 is generated when the first 
mover sends his entire endowment of $10. The second mover can return to the first 
mover any amount (in whole dollars) less than or equal to the tripled amount added to her 
private fund (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). 
The amount sent by the first mover is traditionally interpreted as the level of trust 
in the second mover. The amount returned is traditionally interpreted as the second 
mover’s willingness to reward that trust, or positive reciprocity. However, Cox (2004) 
showed that first mover and second mover actions can be partially motivated by 
unconditional altruism by using first mover and second mover dictator controls for the 
Investment Game. Still, we use the traditional interpretations for simplicity when we refer 
to decisions of “full trust” and “no trust” made in the Common Property Trust Game. 
The 2-person Private Property Trust Game is different from the Investment Game 
in only one aspect: the second mover can return none, some, or all of his $10 endowment 
in addition to the tripled amount received if he/she wishes to do so. This change is 
necessary to make comparisons with the Common Property Trust Game possible because 
common property is shared jointly and the second mover is allowed to leave all of the 
common property for the first mover if he/she wishes to do so. The 2-person Common 
Property Trust Game is the inverse version of the Private Property Trust Game. In the 
Common Property Trust Game $40, the maximum amount that can be generated for 
subject pairs in the Investment Game and 2-person Private Property Trust Game, is 
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assigned as the amount of the common property endowment. The common property is 
described as a “joint decision fund” both subjects can withdraw from. The first mover can 
withdraw up to $10, in whole dollar units, from the joint fund and place it into his/her 
private fund. However, each dollar withdrawn by the first mover reduces the joint fund 
by $3. The second mover’s decision is on how to divide the remaining joint fund between 
his/her private fund and the paired first mover’s private fund after the first mover’s 
decision. 
 The 2-person Private Property Trust Game and the 2-person Common Property 
Trust Game are theoretically isomorphic games according to “economic man” game 
theory. This means the decisions should not be different in the two games according to 
that theory. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is the same for both games: the 
second mover will return none (divide none) of her private fund (remaining joint fund) to 
the first mover, and the first mover, expecting this, will send nothing to the second mover 
(withdraw $10 from the joint fund). 
The Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995), has the same 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium as the Private and Common Property Trust Games. 
However, repeated deviations from this prediction have been generated in laboratory 
experiments (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Cox 2004). New theory has been 
developed to model social preferences in order to account for deviations from the 
standard theory of selfish preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 
2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). These theories also predict that the Private and Common 
Property Trust Games are isomorphic game pairs because they model unconditional 
preferences over the final distributions of wealth amongst the set of distributions 
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available. The two games are payoff equivalent and are isomorphic under these theories 
because the set of final distributions are identical across games. 
 Revealed Altruism Theory implies that these games are not isomorphic (Cox, 
Friedman, and Sadiraj 2008). Revealed Altruism Theory was developed to model second 
mover behavior in sequential games involving social dilemmas. First, the theory allows 
for individual preferences to include other-players’ earnings as well as their own 
earnings. An individual’s preferences are characterized as more altruistic than another if 
he/she is willing to pay more of his/her own income to increase the income of another. 
Second, the theory provides a partial ordering of the generosity of opportunity sets that 
the first mover can offer the second mover. 
Revealed Altruism Theory states that individual preferences can become more or 
less altruistic depending on the actions of another agent. Reciprocity, denoted as Axiom 
R, states that if a first mover engages in an intentional action that provides a more 
generous opportunity set to the second mover, then the second mover will have 
preferences that are more altruistic towards the first mover because of the first mover’s 
generosity (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 2008). 
Evidence of Axiom R in the Investment Game comes from comparing second 
mover decisions in Treatments A and C of Cox (2004). Treatment A is the Investment 
Game. Treatment C takes the opportunity sets offered by first movers in Treatment A, 
and randomly allocates them to second movers. Second movers in Treatment A know that 
they received a more generous opportunity set because the first mover was generous, 
while second movers in Treatment C know their paired first movers had no part in 
determining their opportunity set. Evidence of Axiom R comes from significantly greater 
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returns by second movers in Treatment A than in Treatment C after taking into account 
the income effects of more generous opportunity sets (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 
2008).17 Following evidence from Investment Game data, the similar Private and 
Common Property Trust Games should follow Axiom R. 
 Axiom S is the section of Revealed Altruism Theory which says that the two 
games are not isomorphic. Axiom S distinguishes between acts of commission, which 
overturn the status quo, and acts of omission which uphold the status quo. The status quo 
is defined by the opportunity set determined by the initial endowments. A first mover 
upholds the status quo by offering the second mover the opportunity set defined by the 
initial opportunity set and overturns the status quo by offering any other opportunity set. 
Axiom S states that if the decision made by a first mover overturns the status quo then the 
reciprocal response, for individuals with preferences consistent with Axiom R, will be 
stronger than when the status quo is upheld. 
A feasible set is defined as a convex set of (m, y) ordered pairs where m 
represents the second mover’s money payoff and y represents the first mover’s money 
payoff. For both the Private and Common Property Trust Games the opportunity sets the 
first mover can offer to the second mover are defined by downward sloping lines in 2-
dimensional m x y space. The lists of opportunity sets are identical across games, but the 
status quo set E determined by the endowments is different. ܧ௉ is the least generous 
opportunity set a first mover can offer in the Private Property Trust Game and is defined 
as ܧ௉ ൌ  ሼሺ݉, ݕሻ א ܴାଶ : ݉ ൅ ݕ ൌ 20, ݉ א ሾ0,10ሿሽ. ܧ௖ is the most generous opportunity 
                                                 
17 It is not easy to disentangle increases in second mover cooperativeness into increases in reciprocity due 
to first mover generosity and increases in unconditional altruism due to increases in income. Cox, 
Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) achieved this by controlling for the size of the opportunity set in a 
Stackelburg mini-game (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 2008). 
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set a first mover can offer in the Common Property Trust Game and is defined as 
ܧ௖ ൌ  ሼሺ݉, ݕሻ א ܴାଶ : ݉ ൅ ݕ ൌ 40, ݉ א ሾ0,40ሿሽ. To uphold the status quo set the first 
mover must send nothing to the second mover in the Private Property Trust Game and 
withdraw nothing from the joint fund in the Common Property Trust Game. A first mover 
overturns the status quo set in the Private Property Trust Game by sending tokens. A first 
mover overturns the status quo set in the Common Property Trust Game by withdrawing 
tokens. 
Second movers with preferences consistent with Axiom R and Axiom S will care 
about how the opportunity set compares to the entire list of opportunity sets the first 
mover could have chosen and also how the opportunity set chosen by first movers 
compares to the status quo opportunity set. Second movers will respond more 
altruistically towards first movers who overturn the status quo in the Private Property 
Trust Game by sending 1, 2, 3, …, or 10 tokens than first movers who equivalently 
withdraw 9, 8, 7, …, or 0 tokens in the Common Property Trust Game. Also, second 
movers will respond less altruistically towards first movers who overturn the status quo 
in the Common Property Trust Game by withdrawing 1, 2, 3, …, or 10 tokens than first 
movers who equivalently send 9, 8, 7, …, or 0 tokens in the Private Property Trust Game. 
The net effect is that second mover generosity is predicted to be relatively lower in the 
Common Property Trust Game. 
How can Axiom S be tested in these two games? After controlling for the first 
mover’s decision by matching the tokens left (not withdrawn) to the tokens sent, second 
movers should leave less for the first movers in the Common Property Trust Game than 
second movers return to first movers in the Private Property Trust Game. 
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How would knowledge of second movers with Axiom S preferences affect first 
mover decisions? If a first mover is not comfortable with fully trusting the second mover, 
then he may wish to send or not withdraw tokens but not at the maximum of 10. Sending 
a number of tokens less than ten may disappoint the second mover, but they are still 
happy because the status quo was less generous. Withdrawing any tokens may disappoint 
the second mover but also may anger them because the status quo was more generous. At 
the extreme, the second mover may decide to punish the first mover for withdrawing 
anything by leaving none of the remaining joint fund to the first mover. If the first mover 
partially trusts the second mover, but is afraid the second mover may also punish him for 
withdrawing then he may respond optimally by withdrawing the maximum of 10 tokens 
or none at all. These extremes are traditionally interpreted as “no trust” and “full trust” 
although actual levels of trust by first mover may be less extreme. Evidence of first 
movers anticipating strong Axiom S preferences will be confirmed by a greater 
proportion of first movers making decisions at the extremes of withdrawing none or all 
10 tokens in the Common Property Trust Game.  
The Cox, Ostrom, and Walker et al. (2009) Study 
The COW study supports Axiom R but not Axiom S. Trust, reciprocity, 
cooperation, and generosity can be found in both games, but decisions are not 
significantly different across games. First movers are denoted as Type X players and 
second movers as Type Y players. Table 14 shows the summary data for the COW paper 
in the Private Property Trust Game. Their Private Property Trust Game sessions 
generated 34 Type X decisions (an average of $5.65 was sent) and 34 Type Y decisions 
(an average of $6.65 was returned). Figure 19 shows a histogram of the Type X decisions 
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made in Treatment COW1, their Private Property Trust Game treatment. There are modes 
at 0, 7, and 10 tokens sent. 
 
 
 
Table 15 shows the summary data for the Cox et al. (2009) paper in the Common 
Property Trust Game. Their Common Property Trust Game sessions generated 34 Type X 
decisions (an average of $6.71 was left) and 34 Type Y decisions (an average of $8.76 
was returned). Figure 20 shows a histogram of the Type X decisions made in Treatment 
Table 14. Subject Decisions for COW1 Treatment 
2-Person Private Property Trust Game 
N-Pairs = 34 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tokens X Sent 5.65 3.83 0 10 
$ Y Returned 6.65 6.43 0 20 
$ X Earned 11.00 5.08 0 20 
$Y Earned 20.29 9.09 0 40 
 
 
Figure 19. Type X Decisions: COW1, Private Property Trust Game 
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COW2, their Common Property Trust Game treatment. There are modes at 0, 4, and 10 
tokens left.  
 
 
How do the two games compare? Figure 21 compares the distributions of Type X 
decisions for the Private and Common Property Trust Games. The shapes of both 
distributions are quite similar, with slightly more weight to the right for the Common 
Property Trust Game. Table 16 shows the results of some standard parametric and non-
parametric tests on Type X decisions. The number of tokens left (not withdrawn) in the 
Common Property Trust Game is greater than the number of dollars sent in the Private 
Property Trust Game, but the difference is insignificant. 
 
Table 15. Subject Decisions for COW2 Treatment 
2-Person Common Property Trust Game 
N-Pairs = 34 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tokens X Left 6.71 3.88 0 10 
$ Y Returned 8.76 8.20 0 20 
$ X Earned 12.12 6.60 0 20 
$Y Earned 20.85 9.76 5 40 
 
Table 16. Parametric and Non-Parametric Tests of Type X Decisions 
Parametric Tests Nonparametric Tests 
Test Means Test  (t-test) 
Variance Test 
(F-test) 
Mann-Whitney Test 
(Rank Sum Test) K-S Test 
Null 
Hypothesis 
COW1 = 
COW2 
S.D.(COW1)/ 
S.D.(COW2) =1 COW1 = COW2 
Distributions 
are Equal 
Test Statistic 
t = -1.1325  
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 
0.2614 
Pr(T<t) = 
0.1307 
f = 0.9733 
2*Pr(F < f) = 
0.9384 
Pr(F < f) = 
0.4692 
z = -1.212 
Pr > |z| = 0.2255 
Pr(COW1>COW2) 
= 0.418 
D = 0.2059 
Exact p-value 
= 0.473 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Figure 20. Type X Decisions: COW2, Common Property Trust Game 
 
Figure 21. Comparison of Type X Decisions for COW1 and COW2 
0
10
20
30
40
50
P
er
ce
nt
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Amount Sent by Type X
Common Property Trust Game (Sequential Move Protocol, No Mole Quota)
Distribution of Type X Decisions: Treatment COW2
0
10
20
30
40
50
P
er
ce
nt
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Amount Sent/Left by Type X
COW1 "Private" COW2 "Common"
COW Data Only
Comparison of Type X Decisions Across Trust Games
92 
 
 
Figure 22 compares Type Y decisions graphically across games using quadratic 
line fits with 95% confidence intervals. Comparing the lines more reciprocity or 
trustworthiness by Type Y players is found in the Common Property Trust Game. 
However, the 95% confidence intervals overlap significantly. This graphical 
representation is good for an initial comparison because it shows the general trend of 
Type Y responses as well as the degree of variability of Type Y responses around each 
Type X decision. However, the graph implies that negative or Type Y returns larger than 
upper bound of the opportunity set are feasible when they are not. The quadratic best fit 
lines and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are formed using the least squares 
method and do not take into account that the dependent variable (Type Y decisions) is 
bounded. Type Y decisions lie in a cone: decisions on the amount in dollars and cents to 
return (leave) are bounded from below at $0.00 and from above by the dollar value of the 
Type Y Fund (joint fund) determined by the Type X decision. To get a more accurate 
comparison of Type Y decisions across games we use a tobit regression which recognizes 
that the data lies in a cone and restricts the error term to the bounds set by the cone. 
Table 17 shows a tobit regression of the amount returned by a Type Y player. Our 
primary variable of interest is the Common Property Trust Game intercept dummy 
variable. Revealed Altruism Theory, Axiom S predicts that a switch from the Private 
Property Trust Game to the Common Property Trust Game results in a regime change 
because the status quo switches from the least generous opportunity set to the most 
generous opportunity set. Therefore an intercept dummy for the Common Property Trust 
Game is included in the analysis to test for this effect.18  
                                                 
18 The effect of Axiom S could also be stronger when larger opportunity sets are offered or when greater 
deviations from the status quo are made. This could be tested by including a slope dummy for returns on 
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the Common Property Trust Game. The Common Property slope dummy variable was dropped from all 
tobit regressions for the following reason: Revealed Altruism Theory predicts that more generous 
opportunity sets generate more altruistic responses from second movers but makes no prediction as to 
whether this effect is increasing, constant, or diminishing as the opportunity sets offered become more 
generous. Similarly, Axiom S states that deviation from the status quo set may invoke stronger Axiom R 
preferences, but it makes no prediction on how the location or size of the deviation affects the strength of 
Axiom S. Also, earlier tobit analysis found the Common Property slope dummy insignificant in all tobit 
regressions, so it was dropped. This suggests that responses to deviations from a status quo are more 
sensitive to the act than the magnitude of the deviation towards the opportunity set offered instead. 
 
Figure 22. Type Y Decisions for COW1 and COW2 
Table 17. Tobit Analysis of Type Y Decisions in COW Study 
Number of Observations 67 
Constant Term -2.192 
(.2668) 
Type X Sent (Left) 1.37 
(.0000)*** 
Common Property Dummy .128 
(.9486) 
Heteroscedasticity Term  
 
0.013 
(.1993) 
Sigma Disturbance of Std. Dev. 5.04 
(.0006)*** 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Hypothesis tests reported by Cox et al. (2009) do not reject the hypothesis that the 
two games are isomorphic. The differences, albeit insignificant, point in the opposite 
direction of the prediction following Axiom S. One of two possibilities can explain their 
results: (1) Subjects have preferences consistent with Axiom R, but not Axiom S 
fundamentally; or (2) this particular environment and institution did not invoke latent 
preferences consistent with Axiom S. In the spirit of the second explanation we change 
the environment by adding saliency to private and common property ownership. 
Specifically, we ask if strengthening property entitlements will reveal preferences 
consistent with Axiom S and lead to behavioral differences between the Private and 
Common Property Trust Games. 
Adding Stronger Property Right Entitlements 
 In experimental economics, monetary incentives are used to ‘mimic’ the 
preferences we want to study or to dominate outside preferences subjects may bring to 
the lab that we do not wish to study. Monetary endowments are also used as resources or 
property which subjects use to make purchases, transfers, and other decisions. Money is 
used to induce preferences, create incentives, and present opportunity costs to decision-
makers (Smith 1982). 
More often than not, monetary endowments are given to subjects simply for 
participating in the experiment. In other words they receive “house money” from the 
experimenter’s research budget and are asked to make decisions with that money. 
Subjects could treat this “house money” differently than if the same money came from 
their regular income (Clark 2002). Milton Friedman’s permanent income (PI) hypothesis 
states that subjects who prefer to smooth lifetime consumption will have a lower 
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marginal propensity to consume a one-time gain in income (Clark 2002; Friedman 1957). 
Although some subjects participate in multiple experiments, experimental house money 
is not a regular source of income. Some studies have found that unexpected one-time 
gains encourage risk taking with the new money (Arkes et al. 1994; Battalio, Kagel, and 
Jiranyakul 1990; Keasey and Moon 1996; Thaler 1990; Thaler and Johnson 1990). 
However, Clark (2002) looked for “house money” effects in the voluntary-contributions 
mechanism (VCM) public goods game and found none, so the “house money” effect is 
not a completely robust phenomenon (Clark 2002). 
Why may property right entitlements not be strong enough already? If subjects 
treat their endowments as house money, then they may not be treating the endowment as 
their private or common property. If this is true, then property ownership is not salient to 
the subject. One way to strengthen entitlements and make property ownership salient is to 
have subjects earn their private or common property endowments. 
How might earning endowments create stronger senses of entitlement? Subjects 
must bear more effort costs in obtaining the property right than the usual costs of 
showing-up and devoting time to the experiment, which can develop a stronger 
attachment to the property. This could motivate subjects’ selfish tendencies to ensure 
they get the most out of the effort they invested in the game. It could also strengthen 
subjects’ preferences for fairness or their risk preferences could change. Once the 
property right has been earned all costs to obtain it should be considered sunk costs. 
Whether or not subjects ignore this sunk cost is an empirical question. Daniel Friedman 
(2007) tested to see if subjects commit the sunk cost fallacy under a variety of different 
settings, but surprisingly found very few cases where they did (Friedman 2007). 
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Another convention is to randomly assign subjects to roles with symmetric 
entitlements. Cherry et al. (2002) compared decisions made with unearned endowments 
in a Dictator Game baseline (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996) to a treatment with 
earned endowments. Low-stakes (high-stakes) endowments of $10 ($40) were earned by 
dictators answering less than 10 (10 or more) questions correctly on a quiz. Non-dictators 
had $0, and had no opportunity to take the quiz so entitlements were asymmetric. The 
percentage of dictators who transferred $0 to the non-dictator increased from 19% (15%) 
in the low-stakes (high-stakes) baseline to 79% (70%) in the earned endowments 
treatment (Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002). Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000) looked at 
the effect of the relative strength of property rights between the first mover and second 
mover of the trust game. There were three treatments defined by whether the first mover, 
second mover, or both had to crack walnuts to play the trust game. If required to crack 
walnuts, subjects had to collect 150g of walnut kernels in about a half an hour to earn the 
right to play. They found that the second movers were more generous towards first 
movers when the first movers worked and even more generous when the first movers 
worked and they did not work. First mover decisions were similar across treatments (Fahr 
and Irlenbusch 2000). Hoffman et al. (1994) tested the effects of allowing subjects to earn 
the right of playing first mover in the Ultimatum Game by scoring high on a general 
knowledge quiz. They found that first movers offered smaller splits to the second movers 
who were also less likely to reject compared to players who were randomly assigned to 
play first or second mover (Hoffman et al. 1994).  
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Since there is evidence that adding earned entitlements to endowments or player 
roles has an effect in games similar to the COW study, we want to test if adding stronger 
private and common property entitlements affects behavior differently in the common 
and private property treatments. Entitlements will be symmetric, and this will be done by 
having all players perform the same effort task. 
Cox and Hall Sequential Move Protocol Treatments 
The experimental design and procedures for the Cox and Hall (CH) Sequential 
Move Protocol Treatments are identical to the COW treatments with one exception: 
subjects earn their private or common property endowments by meeting a performance 
quota in a real effort task. The treatments are called the sequential move protocol 
treatments because decisions are made in sequence as described in the COW Private and 
Common Property Trust Games. The experiment procedure was changed from hand-run 
to computer-run to save time needed for subjects to perform the real effort task.19 The 
computerized decision forms and questionnaires are identical in appearance to those in 
the COW study. Decision forms, questionnaires, and instructions used in this experiment 
are located in the Appendix. Undergraduate students at Georgia State University were 
recruited by email using the Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN) recruiter 
software. The experiment was run using a double-blind procedure which prevents the 
subjects and experimenters from being able to personally identify any subject’s decisions 
and payments. After signing in subjects entered the ExCEN computer lab and began 
reading instructions for the real effort task. 
 
                                                 
19 The computer-run procedure was programmed using the Visual Basic Express 2008 Edition software. 
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The real effort task was intended to give subjects a stronger sense of entitlement 
to their private property or common property endowment. Subjects had to meet a 
performance quota to earn their endowment, which they were told would be used in the 
next game. Subjects were also told in advance that if their quota was not met then they 
would be paid their show-up fee of $5 and asked to leave the experiment without 
participating in the decision task. 
The real effort task was called “The Whack-A-Mole Game.” The Whack-A-Mole 
game is similar to a mole-whacking game that can be played at an arcade, except the 
moles do not disappear until they are “whacked.” This change was made to make the 
game easy so most subjects could earn their endowments for the decision task provided 
they put in the effort. Figure 23 shows a typical screen subjects would see during the 
game. There is a 6 by 4 grid of moles and holes on the field. Each time the subject 
mouse-clicked a mole picture the picture box would show a hole picture. If the subject 
clicked on a hole picture nothing would happen. The object of the game is to mouse-click 
all of the moles until the field is clear of moles (there is only a field of holes). Once a 
field is cleared the computer generates a new field of moles for the subject to whack. 
Each picture box has an equal probability of being a mole picture or a hole picture, so 
fields are halfway full of moles on average.20 The performance quota required the subject 
to clear a pre-specified number of fields within an announced time limit. Subjects had to 
meet the quota to earn the tokens that were used in the Private Property or Common 
                                                 
20 Each subject faced the same fields in the same sequence because all subjects start with the same 
probability generating seed. 
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Property Trust Game. After the time ran out for the Whack-A-Mole game anyone who 
did not meet the quota was paid $5 and asked to leave.21 
 
 
In the first treatment, Treatment CH1, subjects had to clear 120 mole fields in 15 
minutes (900 seconds) to earn 10 tokens, worth $1 each. These tokens became their 
private fund in the Private Property Trust Game. In Treatment CH2, subjects had to clear 
120 mole fields in 15 minutes (900 seconds) to earn 20 tokens, worth $1 each, which 
were combined with the 20 tokens of another subject who met the quota and placed into a 
joint decision fund totaling 40 tokens worth $40 dollars to be used in the Common 
Property Trust Game. In Treatment CH3, subjects had to clear 240 mole fields in 30 
minutes (1800 seconds) to earn the tokens necessary to play the same Common Property 
Trust Game played in Treatment CH2. Treatment CH3 was conducted to set the mole-
whacking wage equal to Treatment CH1, although the potential final earnings are 
                                                 
21 If only an odd number of subjects met the performance quota, then the subject who was closest to 
meeting the performance quota was allowed to participate in the decision task.  
 
Figure 23. Computer Screenshot of the Real Effort Task 
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identical in all three treatments. Once the subjects who did not fulfill the quota left, the 
remaining subjects were handed instructions to the Private Property Trust Game if in 
Treatment CH1 or were handed Common Property Trust Game instructions if in 
Treatment CH2 or CH3. 
After the Whack-A-Mole stage is over the procedures of the Cox et al. (2009) 
study are followed hereafter. The procedures reported herein were only different in that 
they were computerized whereas the procedures used by Cox et al. (2009) were hand-run. 
The instructions and wording of decision-making forms were identical: paper instructions 
were handed to subjects but decision-forms appeared on subjects’ computer screens 
instead of on paper. 
For both games subjects were randomly paired as “Type X” and “Type Y” 
players. After reading the instructions and listening to a scripted explanation, each subject 
chose a sealed envelope containing a numbered mailbox key from a box containing 
identical envelopes. Subjects were told that the number on the mailbox key was their 
private identification number. They were told the numbered key would open a numbered 
mailbox containing their earnings from the decision making game plus their show-up fee 
of $5. After all Type X and Type Y subjects made their decisions, they filled out a Type 
X or Type Y questionnaire (the Type X and Type Y questionnaires for the Common 
Property Trust Game are located in the Appendix). While subjects were filling out 
questionnaires, their payments were stuffed in a locker containing the numbered 
mailboxes. Subjects collected their earnings one at a time to protect privacy, and then left 
the experiment. 
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184 undergraduate students from Georgia State University participated in 
treatments CH1, CH2, and CH3 run in seven sessions from April until July in 2009.22 56 
subjects participated in Treatment CH1, the Private Property Trust Game with a 120 mole 
field task. Table 18 displays the summary statistics for Treatment CH1, which generated 
28 Type X decisions (an average of $4.75 was sent) and 28 Type Y decisions (an average 
of $6.59 was returned). Figure 24 shows a histogram of the Type X decisions in 
Treatment CH1, the Private Property Trust Game. The distribution is W-shaped with 
modes at 0, 4, 5, and 10. 
Table 19 shows the summary statistics for Treatment CH2, the Common Property 
Trust Game with a 120 mole-field quota. Treatment CH2 data was collected in three 
sessions and generated 32 Type X decisions (an average of $5.28 was sent) and 32 Type 
Y decisions (an average of $6.14 was returned). Figure 25 shows a histogram of Type X 
decisions. The distribution is U-shaped with high modes at 0 and 10. 
Table 20 shows the summary statistics for Treatment CH3, the Common Property 
Trust Game with a 240 mole-field quota. Treatment CH3 data was collected in two 
sessions, which generated 32 Type X decisions (an average of $4.84 was sent) and 32 
Type Y decisions (an average of $5.70 was returned). Figure 26 shows a histogram of 
Type X decisions. The distribution is even more sharply U-shaped with high modes at 0 
and 10. 
                                                 
22 188 subjects actually participated in the experiment. However 4 subjects were asked to leave because 
they were unable to meet the mole quota in the last session of Treatment CH2. 3 of the 4 subjects could not 
meet the mole quota because their computer software shutdown during the middle of the task for these 
individuals. Since the subjects faced unusual circumstances, all 4 subjects were paid $15 in private for 
participation once they left the lab. Two subjects, in different sessions, did not meet the mole quota in time 
for Treatment CH1. These 2 subjects were allowed to play the Private Property Trust Game because an 
even number of subjects was needed to generate unique Type X and Type Y pairings.  See the “Whack-A-
Mole Game” Instructions for further details. 
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Table 18. Subject Decisions for CH1 Treatment 
2-Person Private Property Trust Game 
 N-Pairs = 28 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tokens X Sent 4.75 3.45 0 10 
$ Y Returned 6.59 7.43 0 20 
$ X Earned 11.84 5.36 0 20 
$Y Earned 17.66 6.86 10 40 
 
 
Figure 24. Type X Decisions: CH1, Private Property Trust Game 
Table 19. Subject Decisions for CH2 Treatment 
2-Person Common Property Trust Game 
N-Pairs = 32 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tokens X Left 5.28 4.70 0 10 
$ Y Returned 6.14 7.85 0 20 
$ X Earned 10.87 5.86 0 20 
$Y Earned 18.77 10.53 0 40 
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Figure 25. Type X Decisions for CH2, Common Property Trust Game 
Table 20. Subject Decisions for CH3 Treatment 
2-Person Common Property Trust Game 
N-Pairs = 32 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tokens X Left 4.84 4.78 0 10 
$ Y Returned 5.70 8.35 0 20 
$ X Earned 10.86 5.99 0 20 
$Y Earned 18.83 10.27 0 40 
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At a glance, the Treatment CH2 and Treatment CH3 generate similar decisions, so 
the Treatment CH2 and CH3 data is pooled for analysis. Table 21 summarizes the pooled 
Type X and Type Y decisions from Treatments CH2 and CH3, the Common Property 
Trust Game. 128 subjects participated in Treatments CH2 and CH3 combined, which 
generated 64 Type X decisions (an average of $5.06 was left) and 64 Type Y decisions 
(an average of $5.92 was returned). Figure 27 shows the distribution of Type X decisions 
in all three treatments. When stronger property right entitlements are added Private and 
 
Figure 26. Type X Decisions: CH3, Common Property Trust Game 
Table 21. Treatments II and III, Combined Common Property Trust Game Data 
2-Person Common Property Trust Game 
N-Pairs = 64 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tokens X Left 5.06 4.71 0 10 
$ Y Returned 5.92 8.04 0 20 
$ X Earned 10.86 5.88 0 20 
$Y Earned 18.80 10.32 0 40 
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Common Property Type X decisions have different distributions: Type X decisions move 
to the extremes of “full trust” and “no trust” in the Common Property regime but not in 
the Private Property regime. 
 
 
Figure 27. Comparison of Type X Decisions for CH1, CH2, and CH3 
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How does the Private Property Trust Game compare to the Common Property 
Trust Game in the sequential move protocol treatments only? Table 22 conducts 
parametric and non-parametric means comparison tests to see if any of the means are 
significantly different. All tests fail to reject the null that all treatments have similar mean 
amounts sent (left). In Table 22, the Komolgorov-Smirnov test concludes that no 
distribution is significantly greater than another in any treatment comparison. There 
appears to be no difference in the central tendency of tokens sent (left) by Type X 
players. 
Table 23 shows that the standard deviation of the Common Property Trust Game 
(4.71) is significantly greater than the standard deviation of the Private Property Trust 
Game (3.45) using a standard deviation ratio F-test (one-sided p-value = 0.0384). Table 
24 shows the proportions tests of Type X decisions comparing Private Property Trust 
Game data and Common Property Trust Game data. There are significantly greater 
Table 22. Means and Distribution Tests for Treatment Differences in Type X Decisions 
 Parametric Tests Nonparametric Tests 
Null Hypothesis Means Test (t-test) Mann-Whitney Test (Rank Sum Test) 
Distributions Test
(K-S Test) 
Treatment CH1 = 
Treatment CH3 
t = -0.0878 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9303 
Pr(T>t) = 0.4652 
z = 0.277 
Pr > |z| = 0.7821 
Pr(CH1>CH3) = 0.520 
D = 0.2589 
Exact p-value = 
0.224 
Treatment CH1 = 
Treatment CH2 
t = -0.5031 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6168 
Pr(T<t) = 0.3084 
z = -0.245 
Pr > |z| = 0.8065 
Pr(CH1>CH2) = 0.482 
D = 0.2545 
Exact p-value = 
0.240 
Treatment CH1 = 
Treatment CH2 & 
CH3 Pooled 
t = 0.3559 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7230 
Pr(T>t) = 0.3615 
z = -0.018 
Pr > |z| = 0.9858 
Pr(CH2<CH3) = 0.499 
D = 0.2388 
Exact p-value = 
0.181 
Treatment CH2 = 
Treatment CH3 
t = -0.3692 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7132 
Pr(T<t) = 0.3566 
z = -0.460 
Pr > |z| = 0.6459 
Pr(CH2<CH3) = 0.469 
D = 0.938 
Exact p-value = 
0.999 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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proportions of 0 and 10 tokens left in the Common Property Trust Game. There are 
significantly greater proportions of 4, 5, and 6 sent (left) in the Private Property Trust 
Game, although there are fewer observations in the middle for comparison. 
 
 
 
Table 23. Variance Tests for Treatment Differences in Type X Decisions 
Null Hypothesis Standard Deviation Ratio Test 
S.D.(Treatment CH1)/S.D.(Treatment CH3) =1 
f = 0.5208 
2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0889 
Pr(F < f) = 0.0444* 
S.D.(Treatment CH1)/S.D.(Treatment CH2) =1 
f = 0.5389 
2*Pr(F < f) = 0.1065 
Pr(F < f) = 0.0533 
S.D.(Treatment CH1)/S.D.(Treatments CH2 and CH3 pooled) =1
f = 0.5370 
2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0767 
Pr(F < f) = 0.0384* 
S.D.(Treatment CH2)/S.D.(Treatment CH3) =1 
f = 1.0347 
2*Pr(F > f) = 0.9250 
Pr(F > f) = 0.5375 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
Table 24. Proportions Tests of Type X Decisions 
Type X sent 
(left) 
Private Property 
Trust Game N 
Common Property 
Trust Game one-sided p-value N 
0 0.1786 5 0.390625 0.0229* 25 
1 0.0357 1 … 0.0642 0 
2 0.0357 1 0.0625 0.301 4 
3 0.1071 3 0.03125 0.0698 2 
4 0.1429 4 0.015625 0.0066** 1 
5 0.1429 4 0.03125 0.023* 2 
6 0.1071 3 0.015625 0.0238* 1 
7 0.0357 1 … 0.0642 0 
8 ... 0 … … 0 
9 … 0 … … 0 
10 0.2143 6 0.453125 0.015* 29 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Figure 28 Compares Type Y Decisions across trust games when mole-field quota 
is the same at 120. Quadratic fit lines are mapped with a 95% confidence interval for 
each treatment. One can see that there is some evidence of less reciprocity in the 
Common Property Trust Game Treatment CH2. However the evidence is weak because 
the 95% confidence interval in the Common Property Trust Game overlaps the Private 
Property Trust Game to a large degree. A large portion of the bottom half of the 
confidence interval for CH2 lies below a Type Y player’s feasible set (they cannot return 
a negative amount). The confidence interval bulges in the middle because there are so 
few Type Y choices due to the lack of Type X choices made in the middle. To get a better 
idea of how Type Y is responding to Type X decisions in the middle we pooled the data 
for CH2 and CH3 in Figure 29. The result is a similar story, but with a tighter confidence 
interval for the Common Property quadratic line.  
 
Figure 28. Type Y Decisions for CH1 and CH2 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
A
m
ou
nt
 R
et
ur
ne
d
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Amount Sent/Left by Paired Type X Person
Private Quad. Line w/ 95% CI Common Quad. Line w/ 95% CI
CH Sequential Move Protocol, Mole Quota = 120 Data Only
Comparison of Type Y Decisions Across Trust Games
109 
 
 
 
Table 23 shows three Tobit regressions of Type Y return decisions as the 
dependent variable looking only at data from Treatments CH1, CH2, and CH3. The 
independent variables include the Type X Sent (Left) variable and Common Property 
Trust Game dummy variable. Using tobit analysis, we cannot say that subjects return 
significantly less in the Common Property Trust Game because the dummy variable 
comes up insignificant in all three regressions. The lack of significance is likely coming 
from differences in the distribution of Type X decisions between the Private and 
Common-Property Trust games. Roughly 1/3 of all Type X decisions lie between 
withdraw 0 and 10 tokens for the Common Property Trust Game compared to 2/3 of all 
Type X decisions that lie between send 0 and 10 tokens in the Private Property Trust 
Game. The modal Type Y response to 0 tokens sent (10 tokens withdrawn) is to return 
(leave) $0, resulting in $10 dollars for each player. Very few deviations from return 
 
Figure 29. Type Y Decisions for CH1 and CH2 & CH3 (pooled) 
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(leave) $0 occur in either game. When 10 tokens are sent in the Private Property Trust 
Game, the average return is $16.67 (8.16 standard deviation), and when 0 tokens are 
withdrawn in the Common Property Trust Game the average return is $12.14 (8.23 
standard deviation). The mean in the Private Property Trust Game is not significantly 
different (t-test one-sided p-value = 0.1140), which is likely due to the small number of 
Type X decisions to send all 10, 6 cases, compared to 29 cases of 0 tokens withdrawn in 
the Common Property Trust Game. If the number of cases were increased from 6 to 14, 
holding the mean and standard deviation constant, the difference would become 
significant (t-test one-sided p-value = 0.0489). 
 
 
 
Table 25. Tobit Regressions of Type Y Decisions 
Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Data Set Cox Hall 
Treatments CH1, 
CH2, and CH3 
Data 
Cox Hall 
Treatments CH1 
and CH2 Data 
Cox Hall 
Treatments CH1 
and CH3 Data 
N 92 60 60 
Constant -4.108 
(.0667) 
-3.861 
(.1117) 
-3.352 
(.0937) 
Type X Tokens Sent (Left) 1.799 
(.0000)*** 
1.753 
(.0000)*** 
1.727 
(.0001 )*** 
Common Property Trust 
Game Dummy 
-1.869 
(.4914) 
-1.995 
(.4469) 
-2.380 
(.3592) 
240 Mole Field-Quota -1.396 
(.5266) 
… … 
Heteroscedasticity: Tripled 
Amount Sent 
0.017 
(.0705) 
0.014 
(.1776) 
.0313 
(.0349 )* 
Sigma: Disturbance 
standard deviation 
4.650 
(.0003)*** 
4.913 
(.0007)*** 
2.766 
(.0325)* 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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It is natural to ask why the effort task may lead to behavior more consistent with 
Axiom S. The real effort task creates a more emotional sense of entitlement to the 
endowments with which the Type X and Type Y subjects make decisions. When the 
Type X withdraws tokens in the Common Property Trust Game he/she destroys property 
that is not just jointly owned but now the Type X and Type Y players may have a 
stronger sense of partial entitlement to the joint fund. In other words the real effort task 
may create entitlements which make the property right assignments salient enough to 
bring Axiom S preferences out of latency. The entitlements are apparently salient enough 
for the Type X person to think about and recognize the possibility of Axiom S as well. As 
a result, the Type X person responds by withdrawing none or all 10 tokens from the joint 
decision fund based on the level of trust he/she has in the paired Type Y player. Due to 
lack of difference between Treatment CH3, which had a higher mole-field quota, and 
Treatment CH2, perhaps even lower effort tasks can be used to add saliency. 
The strongest evidence that the common and private property game pairs are not 
isomorphic comes from the Type X decisions. In the common property treatments 2/3 of 
Type X decisions were to withdraw 0 or all 10 tokens, that is, to fully trust or completely 
withdraw from trusting the Type Y player. One possible interpretation is that the Type X 
person has some probability in his/her head that he/she is paired with a trustworthy Type 
Y player with reciprocal preferences consistent with Axiom R. If the Type X player is 
playing the Private Property Trust Game, he/she may choose to send an amount 
consistent with his/her level of trust (or perceived probability of being matched with a 
trustworthy Type Y player). In the Common Property Trust Game the Type X player 
must also wonder if the Type Y person has preferences consistent with Axiom R and 
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Axiom S. Suddenly, the act of withdrawing tokens out of partial trust is not a good 
strategy if the paired Type Y with strong Axiom S preferences may refuse to reward a 
less but not least generous opportunity set. In that case, the Type X person may decide to 
leave all (withdraw all) tokens if his or her trust is high (low). If the Type X player is 
playing the Common Property Trust Game, he/she may not be able to choose an amount 
consistent with his/her level of trust. One way to confirm that these Type X beliefs are 
credible is to elicit all potential Type Y responses using the strategy method protocol. 
Adding the Strategy Method Protocol 
The difficulty in testing Axiom S using the more traditional sequential move 
protocol is that only one Type Y decision is made, and the potential responses to other 
opportunity sets the Type X could have offered are not observed. This is not a big 
problem if Type X decisions are evenly distributed for each game, but Type X decisions 
are clustered at the extremes in the Common Property Trust Game. This makes a direct 
test of Axiom S under the sequential move protocol require a very large sample. The 
strategy method protocol offers the benefit of making all potential responses observable. 
It does this by asking a Type Y player to submit a planned response for each possible 
decision by a Type X player. This provides a cheaper means for testing Axiom S across 
the games. 
There are some potential costs to using the strategy method protocol. First is the 
reduction in the saliency of payoffs for Type Y players. Type Y players now have to 
make multiple potentially binding responses, yet only one decision determines their 
payoffs in the end. Their decision-making costs increase, but their expected rewards do 
not. There is also a potential “hot” versus “cold” effect. A Type Y response in the 
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sequential move protocol is considered “hot” because it is potentially more emotional for 
the Type Y player to learn the Type X player’s decision, and how the decision affects 
their opportunities, before responding. The strategy method protocol is considered “cold” 
because Type Y is submitting a planned response and does not know the Type X decision 
beforehand. For sequential games designed to measure social behavior there is mixed 
evidence on the significance of hot versus cold responses. Three studies do not find a hot 
versus cold effect (Brandts and Charness 2000; Cason and Mui 1998; Oxoby and 
McLeish 2004), while two studies do find an effect (Brosig, Weimann, and Yang 2003; 
Casari and Cason 2009). 
Casari and Cason (2009) do find that the strategy method protocol significantly 
lowers trustworthy behavior in a trust game. Their trust game differs from the Private 
Property Trust Game in that the multiplier is 5 instead of 3, and the Type X decision is 
binary to send all or none of the $10 endowment. Their design is ideal for testing for a 
hot versus cold effect in the trust game because it minimizes the reductions in saliency by 
reducing the number of Type Y decisions in the strategy method protocol to one. 
However, their design is not ideal for testing isomorphism between the Private and 
Common Property Trust Games because Type Y responses to Type X decisions in the 
middle help tell the story. Despite the potential drawbacks of employing the strategy 
method protocol, it is the only way we can cheaply check to see if Type X decisions are 
indeed an effect of Type X players correctly anticipating Type Y responses consistent 
with Axiom S. 
114 
 
 
Cox and Hall Strategy Method Protocol Treatments CH4 and CH5 
Treatments CH1, CH2, and CH3 used the sequential move protocol to elicit 
decisions in the Private and Common Property Trust Games. For Treatments CH4 and 
CH5 we employ the strategy method protocol to elicit Type Y responses. The strategy 
method protocol differs from the sequential move protocol in these games that the Type 
Y players have to submit 11 potentially binding decisions before learning of the Type X 
player’s actual decision. The Whack-A-Mole game is still played at the beginning with a 
120 mole-field quota for both strategy method protocol treatments. Once a Type X and 
Type Y pair make their decisions, the Type X decision makes the associated Type Y 
response to the decision binding and the game is played out to calculate the final 
earnings. Figure 30 shows a screen shot of the Type Y player’s decision sheet for the 
Private Property Trust Game with the strategy method protocol. The rows are organized 
by the Type X person’s potential actions in Column A, with the first row representing the 
status quo. The decision sheet for the Common Property Trust Game is identical except 
the Type X player withdraws rather than contributing so the value of Column B decreases 
from $40 to $10.  
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126 undergraduate students from Georgia State University participated in 
treatments CH4 and CH5 in four sessions running from January to February in 2010. 
Table 26 shows the summary data for Treatment CH4, the Private Property Trust Game 
using the strategy method protocol. Two sessions included 32 Type X subjects and 32 
Type Y subjects. In total, 32 Type X decisions were made (an average of $5.63 was sent) 
and 352 Type Y decisions were made (32 subjects made 11 decisions each and an 
average of $6.96 was returned).23 Figure 31 shows a histogram of the Type X decisions 
made in Treatment CH4, the Private Property Trust Game treatment. There are modes at 
                                                 
23 Note that the average Type Y decisions in Treatments CH4 and CH5 cannot be directly compared to the 
average Type Y decisions in the other treatments which use the sequential move protocol. First, Type Y 
players submit 11 decisions instead of one in the strategy method protocol. Second, Type Y decisions 
correspond to actual Type X decisions in the sequential move protocol but not in the strategy method 
protocol. 
Figure 30. Type Y Decision Sheet for Eliciting Decisions Under the Strategy Method 
Protocol 
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0, 3, and 10 tokens sent. Here we have a W-shaped distribution with a fat right tail at 10 
tokens sent. 
 
 
 
Table 26. Subject Decisions for CH4 Treatment 
2-Person Private Property Trust Game 
N-Pairs=32 
(352 Y Decisions) Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tokens X Sent 5.63 3.94 0 10 
$ Y Returned 6.96 6.25 0 20 
$ X Earned 12.72 5.49 0 20 
$Y Earned 18.53 8.87 0 40 
 
 
Figure 31. Type X Decisions for CH4, Private Property Trust Game 
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Table 27 shows the summary data for the CH5 treatment in the Common Property 
Trust Game. The Common Property Trust Game sessions included 31 Type X subjects 
and 31 Type Y subjects. In total, 31 Type X decisions were made (an average of $7.26 
was left) and 341 Type Y decisions were made (31 subjects made 11 decisions each and 
an average of $5.82 was returned).Figure 32 shows a histogram of the Type X decisions 
made in Treatment CH5, their Common Property Trust Game treatment. There are modes 
at 0, 5, and 10 tokens left. Here we have a J-shaped distribution with over half of the 
subjects chose to withdraw 0 tokens. 
How do the two games compare? Figure 33 compares the distributions of Type X 
decisions for the Private and Common Property Trust Games. The shapes of both 
distributions are quite similar, but with more weight to the right for the Common 
Property Trust Game. Table 28 shows the results of some standard parametric and non-
parametric tests on Type X decisions. The number of dollars left in the Common Property 
game is greater than the amount of number of dollars sent in the Private Property Trust 
Game, but the difference is insignificant.  
Table 27. Subject Decisions for CH5 Treatment 
2-Person Common Property Trust Game 
N-Pairs = 31 
(341 Y Decisions) Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tokens X Left 7.26 3.64 0 10 
$ Y Returned 5.82 6.70 0 25 
$ X Earned 12.84 6.49 0 21 
$Y Earned 21.68 7.56 10 40 
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Figure 32. Type X Decisions for CH5, Common Property Trust Game 
 
Figure 33. Comparison of Type X Decisions for CH4 and CH5 
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There are 352 and 341 Type Y decisions made in Treatments CH4 and CH5 
respectively. Figure 34 compares the Type Y decisions across trust games for the strategy 
method protocol. Here the quadratic fit line for Type Y decisions in the Common 
Property regime lie below the line of Private Property decisions. Even the top band of the 
95% confidence interval of Common Property decisions lie below the bottom band of the 
95% confidence interval of the Private Property decisions in the middle domain of 
potential Type X decisions. This is strong evidence of Axiom S leading to differences in 
reciprocity across Private and Common Property environments. Table 29 shows tobit 
regression analysis of Type Y decisions in the strategy method protocol treatments. The 
regression shows that there is a significant reduction in the amount returned for the 
Common Property Trust Game under the strategy method protocol. 
 
Table 28. Parametric and Non-Parametric Tests of Type X Decisions 
 Parametric Tests Nonparametric Tests 
Test Means Test  
(t-test) 
Variance Test  
(F-test) 
Mann-Whitney 
Test (Rank 
Sum Test) 
K-S Test 
Null 
Hypothesis 
CH4 = CH5 S.D.(CH4)/ 
S.D.(CH5) =1 
CH4 = CH5 Distributions 
are Equal 
Test Statistic t = -1.7088  
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 
0.0924 
Pr(T<t) = 
0.0462* 
f = 1.1710 
2*Pr(F < f) = 
0.6673 
Pr(F <>f) = 
0.3337 
z = -1.692 
Pr > |z| = 
0.0906 
Pr(CH4>CH5) 
= 0.383 
D = 0.2399 
Exact p-value = 
0.256 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Since every Type Y player makes the same decision under the strategy method 
protocol a t-test can also be conducted on the amounts returned, and significantly less is 
returned under this test as well (p-value = 0.0104). Four Type Y subjects took Axiom S 
to the extreme in treatment CH5: They split equally the remaining joint decision fund if 
zero tokens were withdrawn and split $0.00 to the Type X player if they withdrew any 
tokens. If Type X players are risk averse enough to prepare for the possibility of facing 
Type Y players like these, then they are responding optimally by withdrawing 0 or the 
maximum of 10 tokens. 
 
 
Figure 34. Type Y Decisions for CH4 and CH5 
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Testing for Saliency Effects 
We define saliency in this experiment on two dimensions: saliency of property 
ownership and saliency of payoff outcomes. Reductions in saliency can be accomplished 
by removing the real effort task to reduce property right entitlements or by switching 
from the sequential move protocol to the strategy method protocol. Removing the real 
effort task may lead some subjects to interpret their private or common property 
endowments as the experimenter’s money rather than their own. When does a subject feel 
ownership of the money they are making decisions with? Is it upon receiving the 
endowment or upon exiting the laboratory with the cash in hand? Having the subject earn 
their property before making decisions increases the saliency property ownership and 
allows for a more appropriate test of differences between private and common property. 
The strategy method protocol requires Type Y subjects to make 11 decisions instead of 
one, yet only one decision will determine earnings and it is less salient to the subject 
which decision will count towards their earnings. 
 
Table 29. Tobit Analysis of Type Y Decisions in Treatments CH4 and CH5 
Number of Obs. 693 
Constant Term -0.789 
(.0634) 
Type X Sent (Left) 1.384 
(.0000)*** 
Common Property Dummy -1.847 
 (.0001)*** 
Heteroscedasticity Term 0.0359 
(.0000)*** 
Sigma: Disturbance of standard deviation 2.360 
(.0000)*** 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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What are the effects of changing the saliency within the Private Property Trust 
Game? Figure 35 compares Type X decisions in the Private Property Trust Game. The 
most salient treatment is CH1 because subjects have to earn the right to play and the 
sequential move protocol is used. Reducing saliency can be accomplished by removing 
the effort task as in COW1 or by switching to the strategy method protocol as in CH4. 
Either reduction in saliency results in more generous Type X Decisions, in particular 
more decisions to send all 10 tokens are made. 
 
 
What are the effects of changing the saliency within the Common Property Trust 
Game? Figure 36 compares Type X decisions in the Common Property Trust Game. The 
most salient treatments are CH2 and CH3 because subjects have to earn the right to play 
and the traditional sequential move protocol is used. Reducing saliency can be 
 
Figure 35. Comparison of Type X Decisions in the Private Property Trust Game 
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accomplished by removing the effort task as in COW2 or by switching to the strategy 
method protocol as in CH5. Either reduction in saliency results in more generous Type X 
Decisions, in particular more decisions to withdraw 0 tokens are made. What is also 
interesting is how the distributions of Type X decisions for Treatments CH2 and CH3 are 
U-shaped and are J-shaped distributions for Treatments CH5 and COW2. 
 
 
Comparing the COW1 and COW2 treatments with the CH1, CH2, and CH3 
treatments the lower amount sent and left in this study for both Private and Common 
Property data could come from subject-pool effects, weaker entitlement effects, or a 
combination thereof. The COW sessions were conducted at the University of Indiana, 
where 54% of the participants were male. The sessions for this study were conducted at 
Georgia State University, where only 38% of the participants were male. Several studies 
 
Figure 36. Comparison of Type X Decisions in the Common Property Trust Game 
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have shown that men send more than women in similar trust games but under a private 
property setting, either because they trust more or are more risk loving (Chaudhuri and 
Gangadharan 2007; Vyrastekova and Onderstal 2005). Still evidence of people becoming 
more risk loving with house money can also explain the lower amounts sent (left) in this 
study (Arkes et al. 1994; Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul 1990; Keasey and Moon 1996; 
Thaler 1990; Thaler and Johnson 1990). Since these are different studies, we shall make 
no guess as to which effect is stronger in lowering the average amount sent (left) in the 
sequential move treatments for this experiment. However, lower saliency through lack of 
entitlements is a likely culprit because we get a similar effect when saliency is reduced by 
switching to the strategy method protocol. 
Figures 37 and 38 compare the effects of saliency on Type Y decisions in the 
Private Property Trust Game. Less generosity appears to be found in the COW1 treatment 
when compared with the CH1 treatment. The effect of switching to the strategy method 
protocol is less clear because there appears to be relatively greater (lower) returns when 
the amounts sent are low (high) for treatment CH4. Figures 39 and 40 compare the effects 
of saliency on Type Y decisions in the Common Property Trust Game. There appears to 
be more generosity in the COW2 treatment compared to the CH2 treatment. The effect of 
switching to the strategy method protocol also results in greater amounts left to the Type 
X player.  
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Figure 37. Effect of Real Effort Task on Type Y Decisions in the Private Property Trust 
Game 
 
Figure 38. Effect of Strategy Method Protocol on Type Y Decisions for Private Property 
Trust Game 
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Figure 39. Effect of Real Effort Task on Type Y Decisions for Common Property Trust 
Game 
 
Figure 40. Effect of Strategy Method Protocol on Type Y Decisions for Common 
Property Trust Game 
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Tobit analysis is conducted using Type Y decisions as the dependent variable. 
The independent variables include the Type X Sent (Left), a dummy variable for the 
COW study and a dummy variable for the strategy method protocol treatments. Table 30 
shows five tobit regressions used to test for saliency effects. The first regression pools all 
of the data and finds that reducing saliency increases Type Y generosity whether by 
removing stronger entitlements in the COW study or by switching to the strategy method 
protocol in Treatments CH4 and CH5. The COW and Strategy method protocol dummy 
variables are only near-significant however. The results hold when we only look at non-
strategy data in the second regression, CH data only in the third, Private Property data 
only in the fourth, and Common Property data in the fifth. These findings run contrary to 
Casari and Cason (2009), who found that the strategy method protocol reduces Type Y 
decisions, but we may be comparing apples to oranges. They analyzed Type Y responses 
to being offered the most generous opportunity set so we will as well. 
Table 31 shows the Type Y average responses to 10 tokens sent (0 withdrawn) by 
a Type X player. Here we get Type Y responses similar to Casari and Cason (2009) in the 
Private Property Trust Game but responses go in the opposite direction for the Common 
Property Trust Game. These effects are not significant, which is likely due to the small 
sample size. These effects however do show how saliency may affect the strength of 
Axiom S in each trust game. 
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Table 30. Tobit Regressions of Type Y Decisions 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Data Set All Data 
 
Cox Hall 
Sequential 
move 
protocol and 
COW Data 
 
Cox Hall 
Data 
Private 
Property 
Trust Game 
Data Only 
Common 
Property 
Trust Game 
Data Only 
N 852 159 60 414 438 
Constant 
 
 
-2.118 
(.0099) 
-3.922 
(.0227) 
-2.031 
(.0127) 
-1.843 
(.0858) 
-5.115 
(.0008) 
Type X 
Tokens Sent 
(Left) 
1.412 
(.0000)*** 
1.612 
(.0000)*** 
1.422 
(.0000)*** 
1.396 
(.0000)*** 
1.506 
(.0000) 
Common 
Property 
Dummy 
-1.807 
(.0000)*** 
-1.441 
(.2965) 
-1.872 
(.0001)*** 
… … 
COW 
Dummy 
 
1.247 
(.1755) 
1.233 
(.3535) 
… 0.823 
(.5178) 
2.237 
(.2383) 
Strategy 
Method  
Dummy 
1.108 
(.1307) 
… 1.058 
(.1453) 
1.164 
(.2583) 
1.276 
(.3296) 
Heterosceda
sticity Term 
 
0.031 
(.0000)*** 
0.017 
(.0112)** 
.0332 
(.0000)*** 
.0346 
(.0000)*** 
.0252 
(.0000)*** 
Sigma: 
Disturbance 
Std. Dev. 
2.730 
(.0000)*** 
4.660 
(.0000)*** 
2.576 
(.0000)*** 
2.118 
(.0000)*** 
3.828 
(.0000)*** 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
Table 31. Type Y Average Responses to 10 Sent (0 Withdrawn) 
Private 
Property 
Avg. 
Return if 
10 Sent 
N 
t-test 
one-sided 
p-value 
Common 
Property 
Avg. Return 
if 0 
Withdrawn 
N 
t-test one-
sided  
p-value 
CH1 16.67 6 base CH2 11.80 15 base 
CH4 13.80 32 0.2247 CH3 12.50 14 0.4121 
COW1 12.73 11 0.1661 CH5 14.65 31 0.1370 
 COW2 14.06 16 0.2165 
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Survey Analysis 
Subjects in all treatments were paid $5 to fill out a survey, which can be found in 
Appendix F. The survey provides demographic information such as the age and gender of 
the decision maker. The questionnaire also asks three questions related to subjects’ social 
attitudes. The three questions are:  
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful dealing with people? 
 
Answers: Can’t be too careful, Most people can be trusted, Don’t know 
 
2. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are 
mostly just looking out for themselves? 
 
Answers: Just look out for themselves, Try to be helpful, Don’t know 
 
3. Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they got a chance or 
would they try to be fair? 
 
Answers: Most people would take advantage, They would try to be fair, Don’t 
know  
 
From each question two dummy variables are created as seen in Tables 30 and 31. The 
“Trust Pos” dummy variable codes “Most people can be trusted” as 1, and the “Trust 
Null” Dummy variable codes “Don’t know” as 1. 
 Table 32 displays tobit regressions of Type X decisions using the survey variables 
described above. The tobit lower and upper limits were set at 0 and 10. The first 
regression looks at all of the data. The Common Property Trust Game Dummy has a 
positive and significant effect on Type X decisions. In terms of saliency, the strategy 
method protocol dummy variable also has a positive and significant effect on the amounts 
sent. The COW dummy variable has a positive yet only near significant effect. It is fairly 
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intuitive that a non-negative response to the trust and fairness question has a positive and 
significant effect on the amount sent or left. Regressions (2) and (3) look at only one trust 
game at a time to see if the results are robust to each game. The effect of the strategy 
method protocol on Type X decisions is stronger in the Common Property Trust Game. 
Interestingly a non-negative response to the trust question has a stronger effect on the 
amount left in the Common Property Trust Game than on the amount sent in the Private 
Property Trust Game. Responses to the fairness and helpful questions did a relatively 
better job than trust in explaining Type X decisions in the Private Property Trust Game. 
This finding suggests that there is a greater need for trust in the Common Property Trust 
Game, and that perceptions of fairness are relatively more important in the Private 
Property Trust Game.  
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Table 32. Tobit Regressions of Type X Decision with Questionnaire Analysis 
Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Data Set All Data Private Property Trust Game Data 
Common Property 
Trust Game Data 
N 220 92 128 
Constant -12.042 -24.018 -11.275 
(.0566) (.0102) (.2447) 
Common Property  2.725 … … 
Trust Game Dummy (.0489)* 
COW Study  2.187 -0.190 4.185 
Dummy (.1801) (.9006) (.2098) 
Strategy Method 5.153 2.043 11.002 
Dummy (.0027)** (.2012) (.0022)** 
Male Gender  1.798 2.391 2.340 
Dummy (.1916) (.0628) (.3932) 
Age 0.520 1.279 0.426 
(.0792) (.0053)** (.3287) 
Trust Pos Dummy 6.831 2.590 12.996 
(.0006)*** (.1272) (.0043)** 
Trust Null Dummy 3.638 -0.083 9.703 
(.1068) (.9650) (.0658) 
Helpful Pos Dummy 0.767 -1.223 3.738 
(.6422) (.4135) (.2721) 
Helpful Null  -4.465 -4.424 -4.790 
Dummy (.0782)* (.0518)* (.3744) 
Fair Pos Dummy 7.117 7.828 6.951 
(.0001)*** (.0000)*** (.0638) 
Fair Nul Dummy 3.940 1.953 5.199 
(.0412)** (.3146) (.1513) 
Sigma Disturbance: 8.595 5.217 12.209 
Standard Deviation (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)*** 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Table 33 displays tobit regressions of Type Y decisions using the questionnaire 
variables described above.24 The tobit lower and upper limits were set at 0 and the Type 
Y Fund (remaining Joint Fund). The first regression looks at all of the data. The Common 
Property Trust Game Dummy still has a negative and significant effect on Type Y 
decisions. In terms of saliency, the strategy method protocol dummy variable still has a 
positive effect on the amounts returned and becomes significant when the questionnaire 
variables are added. A positive response to the trust and fairness question has a positive 
and significant effect on the amount sent or left. All three regressions show that men are 
significantly less trustworthy than women. Regressions (2) and (3) look at only one trust 
game at a time to see if the results are robust to each game. Age has an economically and 
statistically significant negative effect on Type Y Decisions in the Common Property 
Trust Game. This suggests that older students may respond more strongly to deviations 
from the status quo. The ages of the four Type Y players who returned 20 if 0 is 
withdrawn and returned 0 otherwise are is 21, 21, 27, and 32 while the average age is 
20.93 for Type Y players in treatment CH5. In the Common Property Trust Game 
regression a non-negative response to the Helpful question has a strong effect on 
increasing Type Y decisions. Perhaps people who believe others “try to be helpful” are 
extra generous to those who confirm their beliefs and decide not to destroy their 
commonly owned property. From the Trust question we find that the Trust Pos Dummy 
variable has a stronger effect in the Private Property Trust Game, and the Trust Null 
Dummy variable has a weaker effect in the Common Property Trust Game. 
 
                                                 
24 The Fair Pos Dummy and Fair Null Dummy variables were dropped because the LimDep tobit regression 
limits the number of explanatory variables to 13 and they had less explanatory power than the Trust and 
Helpful Variables. 
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Table 33. Tobit Regressions of Type Y Decision with Questionnaire Analysis 
Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Data Set All Data Private  
Property Trust 
Game Data 
Common 
Property Trust 
Game Data 
N 838 403 435 
Constant 1.241 0.703 14.637 
 (.4624) (.7435) (.0007) 
Tokens Type X Sent 1.435 (1.3790) 1.644 
 (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)*** 
COW Study  1.704 1.258 1.145 
 (.0919) (.3028) (.5005) 
Common Property  -2.21 … … 
 (.0000)***   
Strategy method protocol  1.885 0.986 2.571 
 (.0282)* (.3349) (.0598) 
Male -2.538 -2.954 -1.876 
 (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0284)* 
Age -0.167 -0.068 -1.081 
 (.0096)** (.4289) (.0000)*** 
Trust Pos Dummy 1.898 2.360 1.402 
 (.0073)** (.0002)*** (.3914) 
Trust Null Dummy -1.050 0.452 -4.192 
 (.1730) (.5345) (.0313)* 
Helpful Pos Dummy 0.654 -0.046 5.259 
 (.2651) (.9289) (.0017)** 
Helpful Null Dummy 3.075 -1.024 5.742 
 (.0009)*** (.5919) (.0001)*** 
Heteroscedasticity Term 0.029 0.037 0.016 
 (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0013)*** 
Sigma Disturbance Std. Dev. 2.758 1.872 4.520 
 (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)*** 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
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Conclusion 
 We added a real effort task where subjects had to meet a performance quota to 
earn the right to play in the Private Property Trust Game or the Common Property Trust 
Game. This was done to give the subjects a stronger sense of entitlement to their private 
or common property endowments, and increase the saliency of property ownership  
Treatments CH1, CH2, and CH3 employ the sequential move protocol as did the 
COW study. Looking only at the means and tobit analysis, the Private Property Trust 
Game and the Common Property Trust Game seem to remain isomorphic under our 
design: the means comparison tests do not reject the null that the means are the same, and 
the tobit analysis finds the Common Property Trust Game dummy variable to be 
insignificant. However isomorphism breaks down when we look at the distributions of 
Type X decisions: Type X decisions move to the extremes of “full trust” and “no trust” in 
the Common Property Trust Game but not in the Private Property Trust Game. There is 
some weak evidence that reciprocity is lower in the Common Property Trust Game, but 
we observe very few Type X decisions that fall between withdrawing 0 and 10 tokens so 
that inferences on Type Y decisions are limited. 
To reveal Type Y decisions less frequently observed in the sequential move 
protocol we employ the strategy method protocol in Treatments CH4 and CH5. The 
strategy method protocol asks Type Y subjects to submit a planned response to each 
possible Type X decision. The strategy method protocol treatments reveal that reciprocity 
is lower in the Common Property Trust Game. This finding supports Axiom S from 
Revealed Altruism Theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 2008), and it justifies the extreme 
decisions of Type X players in the Common Property Trust Game. 
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We generate new evidence that suggests that the games are not isomorphic under 
stronger entitlements. Outside the lab, private and common property rights are more often 
acquired by money generated from real effort. We find evidence of Type Y preferences 
consistent with Axiom S; which provides some insights into the differences in the need 
for trust and cooperation between private property environments and common property 
environments. We also provide further evidence that having subjects earn their 
endowments is an important experimental design consideration in testing theory.  
One notable finding is that Type X players move towards the extremes when 
stronger entitlements are added and particularly when the sequential move protocol is 
employed. If Type X players are responding optimally to the possibility that Type Y 
players have preferences consistent with Axiom R and Axiom S, then Revealed Altruism 
Theory may provide a useful foundation on which to build new theory to explain first 
mover behavior in sequential games that involve social dilemmas. 
Another interesting observation is the possible hot versus cold effect appears but 
not in the expected direction for trust games. A Type Y player responds to generous 
decisions made by a Type X player, therefore the “hot” sequential move protocol should 
generate a more positive emotional response and more generous return. Casari and Cason 
(2009) find that the strategy method protocol has no effect on Type X decisions and 
reduces generosity in Type Y decisions (Casari and Cason 2009). Their results are in the 
expected direction for Type Y decisions. However, we find that the strategy method 
protocol has a positive and significant effect on Type Y returns when the questionnaire 
variables are added to the tobit regression. In the strategy method protocol the Type X 
players know that the Type Y players will not know their decision before making the 
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Type Y decision, hence they cannot directly influence a positive emotional response and 
therefore as high returns from the Type Y player. If a Type X player believes this then 
he/she should send or leave fewer tokens under the strategy method protocol. Contrary to 
this we find that the strategy method protocol also increases generosity in Type X 
decisions. 
Two explanations are offered why Type X generosity increased in the strategy 
method treatment. However, these explanations are speculative and not testable with the 
data from this experiment. The first explanation is that betrayal by Type Y players may 
be less emotional and personal under the strategy method protocol for Type X players, 
thus betrayal aversion is reduced. However, this argument also implies that Type Y 
players would also feel less guilty about betraying Type X players and as a result would 
return less under the strategy method protocol. This explanation is only plausible for the 
Type X players.  
The second explanation is that it is more difficult for the Type Y player to ignore 
or neglect all of the opportunity sets the Type X player could have chosen under the 
strategy method protocol. If the Type X offers the most generous opportunity set to the 
Type Y player, he/she could have offered one of ten less generous opportunity sets 
instead. If the Type Y player fails to recognize this, he/she may return less because they 
do not fully appreciate the generosity of the Type X player. We go to great efforts to 
make sure subjects fully understand the game, the choice set of the Type X player, and 
how each Type X choice affects the choice set of the Type Y player. We delay Type X or 
Type Y role assignment until after the instructions are read silently by the subjects, 
explained verbally by the experimenter, and all remaining subject questions about the 
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trust game are answered. We do this because we want the subjects to pay attention to 
each role in the game. Under the strategy method protocol, Type Y subjects must fill out 
a table so they cannot ignore the alternative Type X choices and must compare them. 
This is more likely to bring reciprocal preferences out of latency for Type Y subjects. 
Type X players may be more confident that Type Y players will reciprocate and, as a 
result, be more generous. 
Cox, Ostrom, and Walker have extended their COW study of behavioral 
differences in private and common property regimes to include more than two players 
and to include multiple rounds. We extend their previous study into earned entitlements 
and the strategy method protocol. The earned entitlements were symmetric and 
independently earned. We plan on investigating whether our results are robust to 
asymmetric entitlements and team-earned entitlements. The strategy method protocol 
revealed more information about how subjects viewed the game, leaving open the 
investigation for other elicitation and decision making protocols. 
A potential criticism of the differences between Private and Common Property 
experiments is that the status quo is generating the behavioral differences and that the 
framing of the endowment as private or common and the Type X action as sending or 
withdrawing has little effect. We welcome anyone interested to test this by removing the 
framing, or by keeping the framing and choosing payoff equivalent status quo 
opportunity sets.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation comprises three essays on experiments with redistribution, trust, 
and entitlements. The first essay reports experiments designed to assess the labor supply 
effects of increasing redistribution by the public sector for the purpose of providing 
charitable goods and services. Subjects perform a real effort task to give them a stronger 
sense of entitlement to their labor earnings under redistribution. The second essay looks 
at previous experiments to see if behavior in some standard cooperative games is robust 
under a role-reversal protocol that asks each subject to play all roles in the game. A new 
experiment is reported that addresses the question whether behavioral results in the 
Investment Game (a trust game) are robust to applying a role-reversal protocol. The third 
essay reports a theory-testing experiment designed to test for differences in trust-related 
behavior under different private and common property environments. Subjects perform a 
real effort task to give them a stronger sense of entitlement to their private or common 
property. 
 The first essay sets up an experiment designed to test how different levels of 
redistribution affect the size and distribution of income. Income redistribution, by 
transferring income from the rich to the poor, will decrease income inequality but may 
also reduce total income, leading to an efficiency-equality tradeoff. Focus is placed on 
the source of the efficiency-equality tradeoff attributed to increases in the redistribution 
level lowering incentives for work. Subjects are allowed to freely allocate time between 
labor and leisure to make responses to work incentives more observable. Income 
redistribution is implemented by proportionately taxing individual labor earnings and 
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dividing the revenue equally amongst the group members. Subjects receive feedback each 
period which tells them whether they are net taxpayers into redistribution or net 
recipients from it. Low and high tax rates are implemented in separate treatments to 
measure effects on efficiency, equality, and labor supply. We find a significant 
efficiency-equality tradeoff that can be explained by lowered work incentives. Labor 
supply decisions become signals of cooperation and strategic and cooperative behavior 
similar to behavior found in public goods experiments. The efficiency-equality tradeoff 
calls for a reconsideration of increasing dependence on the public sector for charity 
provision and reducing inequality. 
 The second essay looks for effects of applying a role-reversal protocol to 
cooperative games such as bargaining games and trust games. Under a role-reversal 
protocol players know in advance they will be playing all possible roles in repetitions of 
the same game. Some researchers use role-reversal protocols to gather more information 
about how decisions are made in the single-role protocol. This makes role-reversal a 
valuable empirical tool as long as behavior in the single-role protocol is robust to the 
application of role-reversal. We survey the current literature to determine the effects of 
role-reversal and find the evidence is mixed. Mixed evidence is due to the lack of within-
study tests of role-reversal, and the lack of consensus on how to design a role-reversal 
protocol. We conduct an experiment comparing behavior in the Investment Game (a trust 
game) to behavior in its role-reversal protocol. Only one role decision is selected for 
payoff in the role-reversal protocol. We find evidence that paying subjects for one role 
instead of all roles in the role-reversal treatment leads to no significant role-reversal 
effect. 
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 The third essay follows a previous study which tested behavior in the Private 
Property Trust Game and the Common Property Trust Game. This study looks at the 
effects of assigning stronger property rights to these games. Subjects’ property rights are 
strengthened by requiring that subjects meet a performance quota in an effort task to earn 
their private or common property endowment. Stronger property rights lead to a 
divergence between decisions made in the Private and Common Property trust games not 
found in the previous study. In first mover behavior we find similar levels of generosity 
in both games and a significantly higher variance of generosity in the Common Property 
Trust Game. First mover decisions in the Common Property Trust Game move to the 
extreme decisions of “no trust” and “full trust” towards the second mover. First mover 
decisions in the Private Property Trust Game are similar to decisions made in the 
previous study. When a strategy method protocol is added to make all second mover 
responses observable significantly less generous behavior is observed in the Common 
Property Trust Game. These results provide support for Revealed Altruism Theory, 
which states that first mover deviations from the status quo can generate stronger 
reciprocal behavior in second movers (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 2008). We find that 
stronger property right entitlements add saliency to property ownership which results in 
behavior consistent with Revealed Altruism Theory.
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER II 
These are the instructions used in the 80% Tax Treatment. The 20% tax treatment 
instructions are identical after the “20% of Your Labor Earnings are Transferred 
to the Group Account” replacement is made. 
 
<INSTRUCTIONS HANDED OUT BEFORE THE DOUBLE PAY PERIOD> 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. We ask that you remain 
in your seat for the entire time. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.  
 
Your Labor Task 
You are going to participate in a labor task. Your earnings will be determined by how many 
times you complete the task correctly. 
Your labor task is to type a sequence of single-digit numbers exactly as they are displayed 
on a computer screen. Each sequence consists of five numbers, which are determined 
randomly. Once you have copied your entire sequence of numbers you will click the 
Submit Your Sequence button. 
 
A Correctly Typed Sequence   An Incorrectly Typed Sequence 
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The figure on the left shows a correctly typed sequence, and the figure on the right shows an 
incorrectly typed sequence. Notice that there is no room for error as the incorrect sequence 
has only one incorrect number (6 is typed in the last box instead of 5). 
 
Every time you submit a sequence correctly your earnings will increase by 6 cents. 
If you enter an incorrect sequence, you will not be penalized but your earnings will not 
increase when you perform the task incorrectly. 
 
After you have viewed your results, click the Type Another Sequence button to repeat the 
labor task. 
 
Periods 
There are 13 periods in this experiment. Each period lasts 5 minutes and 30 seconds. For the 
last 30 seconds of each period, you cannot type any sequences. This is done to give you time 
to review your earnings information. 
 
The first period is called the Double Pay Period. You will be paid 6 cents for each correct 
task during this period only. This is twice the amount you will be paid for each correct task 
for the 12 remaining Regular Pay Periods, so take advantage. Your earnings will be 
displayed in the Total Earnings box when the Double Pay Period Summary is displayed.  
 
<INSTRUCTIONS HANDED OUT AFTER THE DOUBLE PAY PERIOD> 
 
The Regular Pay Periods 
You will keep your earnings from the Double Pay Period. You will have the exact same 
labor task in the next 12 Regular Pay Periods, but your earnings will be determined 
differently. 
 
Groups of Five 
All participants in this session have been assigned to a group with 5 members. You will stay 
in the same group for all of the Regular Pay Periods. Please note that you will not be 
interacting with any of the other groups in the experiment. 
 
Earnings Calculation for the Regular Pay Periods 
The third page shows a sample screen shot of your earnings information at the end of a 
Regular Pay Period. Use this picture as a guide while the remaining instructions describe 
the types of earnings information displayed. When you are finished reading instructions, 
the experimenter will demonstrate how your earnings are calculated each period with 
examples. 
 
<----Your Labor Earnings 
 
You will be paid 3 cents for each correct task in the Regular Pay Periods. You will 
receive continuous feedback on your labor earnings during each period. 
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<--- 80% of Your Labor Earnings are Transferred to the Group Account 
 
80% of your labor earnings will be automatically transferred into the Group Account. 
This happens to every member of your group. You will receive continuous feedback on 
your transfers to the Group Account during each period. 
 
<---Your 20% Share of the Group Account 
 
Your 20% Share of the Group Account will be revealed at the end of each period once all 
transfers to the Group Account are summed together. The Group Account is then split 
evenly such that each member of the group receives 20% of the Group Account. 
 
<---Your Leisure Earnings 
 
You may want to take a leisure break after completing the labor task a number of times. If 
you take a leisure break, you will receive payment for your leisure activities: 1 cent for 
every 2 seconds of leisure time spent. These earnings are private to you, and none of your 
leisure earnings will be transferred to the Group Account.  
Taking a leisure break is easy. Click on the tab labeled Leisure to start your leisure break. A 
blank screen will open up and you will immediately begin to collect leisure earnings. When 
you are ready to complete more labor tasks click the tab labeled Labor. 
 
<---Your Total Earnings 
 
Your total earnings will be revealed at the end of each period. Your total earnings are 
equal to your labor earnings MINUS your transfers to the Group Account PLUS your 
20% share of the Group Account PLUS your leisure earnings.  
 
<---- Earnings if entire period was spent taking leisure 
 
This shows information on what your hypothetical earnings would have been if you spent 
the entire period with the Leisure Tab active. This information is revealed at the end of 
each period.  
 
Reviewing Your Earnings Information 
 
For the last 30 seconds of each period, you will be prohibited from making any labor or 
leisure earnings. You should take this time as an opportunity to review and interpret what 
has happened to your earnings this period. Your cumulative earnings for this experiment 
can also be viewed during this time. Once the thirty seconds are over, a new period will 
start and you may continue typing sequences or making leisure earnings.  
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SAMPLE SCREEN SHOT of EARNINGS INFORMATION 
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APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENT SURVEY FOR CHAPTER II 
Exit Questionnaire – You will be paid an additional $5 for filling out this questionnaire. 
ID Code __________ 
1. Are you male or female? 
 
2. What is your class (freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior)?  
 
3. What is your major? 
 
 
4. What level of education did your mother complete?  
A. Didn’t finish high school 
B. High school diploma or equivalent 
C. Some college 
D. Four year college degree 
E. Some graduate or professional schoolwork 
F. Graduate or professional degree 
 
5. What level of education did your father complete?  
A. Didn’t finish high school 
B. High school diploma or equivalent 
C. Some college 
D. Four year college degree 
E. Some graduate or professional schooling 
F. Graduate or professional degree 
 
6. What is your current marital status?  
A. Single (never married) 
B. Married or in a marriage-type relationship 
C. Divorced or separated 
 
7. What is your family’s household income? 
A. $0-$20,000 
B. $20,000-$40,000 
C. $40,000-$60,000 
D. $60,000-$100,000 
E. $100,000-$200,000 
F. more than $200,000 
 
8. How often do you lend money to friends? 
 
Number of times per month 
 -0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+ 
 
 
More questions on the following page… 
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9. How often do you lend personal possessions to friends? 
 
Number of times per month 
 -0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+ 
 
For the next set of questions, please circle 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10. Selecting a lower 
number indicates how strongly you agree with the answer on the left, and higher numbers 
indicate how strongly you agree with the answer on the right. 
 
10. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or 
would they try to be fair? 
 
Would take advantage of you                 Would try to be fair 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
11. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 
 
Just look out for themselves         Try to be helpful 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
12. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people? 
 
Need to be very careful     Most people can be trusted 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
13. How much do you tend to trust others when you have a little at stake? 
 
Not at all                 A lot 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
14. How much do you tend to trust others when you have a lot at stake? 
 
       Not at all                 A lot 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
       
15. In the past, when you trusted someone, was your trust usually rewarded or usually 
exploited? 
  
 Usually exploited        Usually rewarded 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
16. How satisfied are you with your life as a whole? 
 
 Very Unsatisfied             Very Satisfied 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
 
 
More questions on the following page… 
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17. How satisfied are you with your family life? 
 Very Unsatisfied             Very Satisfied 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
18. How satisfied are you with your social life? 
 Very Unsatisfied             Very Satisfied 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19. How satisfied are you with your love (romantic) life? 
 
 Very Unsatisfied             Very Satisfied 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
20. How satisfied are you with your spiritual/philosophical life? 
 
 Very Unsatisfied             Very Satisfied 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21. How satisfied are you with your income/financial status? 
 
 Very Unsatisfied             Very Satisfied 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
22. How satisfied are you with your current job and/or career path? 
 
 Very Unsatisfied             Very Satisfied 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The next sets of questions propose a statement.  Please circle 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 to 
indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement. 
 
23. It is not fair if the results (or allocations) are not fair. 
 
Agree strongly        Disagree Strongly 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
24. It is not fair if the rules (or institutions) are not fair. 
 
Agree strongly        Disagree Strongly 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
25. If I earn my money I have a right to keep it. 
 
Agree strongly        Disagree Strongly 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
26. People should give up some of their earnings to those less fortunate. 
 
Agree strongly        Disagree Strongly 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
 
More questions on the following page… 
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For the remaining questions, a hypothetical amount has been generously been 
allocated to you and another person whom you will never meet. You have been 
randomly selected to choose between Plan A, Plan B, or Plan C, which would 
determine your earnings and the other person’s earnings. The other person has no 
decision to make. Please indicate your decision by circling the Plan you prefer. 
 
27. Suppose you are Person 1. Please circle the Plan you prefer. 
Plan A  Plan B  Plan C 
Person 1 gets  $300  $250  $200 
Person 2 gets  $100  $150  $200 
Total  $400  $400  $400 
 
28. Suppose you are Person 1. Please circle the Plan you prefer. 
Plan A  Plan B  Plan C 
Person 1 gets  $300  $233  $167 
Person 2 gets  $100  $133  $167 
Total  $400  $366  $333 
 
29. Suppose you are Person 2. Please circle the Plan you prefer. 
Plan A  Plan B  Plan C 
Person 1 gets  $300  $250  $200 
Person 2 gets  $100  $150  $200 
Total  $400  $400  $400 
 
30. Suppose you are Person 2. Please circle the Plan you prefer. 
Plan A  Plan B  Plan C 
Person 1 gets  $300  $233  $167 
Person 2 gets  $100  $133  $167 
Total  $400  $366  $333 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER III 
Investment Game Control Instructions 
No Talking Allowed  
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Three Monitors and Two Rooms 
Three monitors have been randomly selected from among those of you who came here 
today. The rest of you have been randomly divided into two rooms, called Room A and 
Room B. 
 
Anonymity  
Each person in Room A will be randomly paired with a person in Room B. You will never 
play with another person in the same room as you. No one will learn the identity of the 
person she/he is paired with. 
 
Initial Certificates for Room B 
Each person in Room B will be given 10 one-dollar certificates and asked to simply keep 
them. 
 
Initial Certificates for Room A 
Each person in Room A will be given 10 one-dollar certificates. As explained below, each 
Room A person will have a decision to make about what to do with her/his 10 one-dollar 
certificates. 
  
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters, the monitors, 
and the other people participating in the experiment will ever know the personal decision 
of anyone else in the experiment. This is accomplished by a procedure in which you 
collect your money payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from a numbered mailbox that 
only you have the key for. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor 
your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this 
experiment. The only identifying mark on the decision forms will be a number known 
only to you. You will be able to collect your money payoffs with privacy by using a key, 
which opens a mailbox. The key and mailbox will be labeled with the same number you 
will mark on your decision-reporting forms. But you will be the only person who knows 
your personal number. It is your responsibility to mark all decision forms with your 
personal number. If you fail to do this correctly, then the experimenters may not be 
able to pay you for your decisions. 
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Room A Decision Task  
Each person in Room A will decide whether to keep all 10 of his/her one-dollar certificates 
or give some or all of them to his/her paired person in Room B who will then complete 
his/her Room B Decision Task. Every certificate given by a person in Room A to a person 
in Room B will be tripled by the experimenters. The following table shows how this works. 
 
If the Room A 
Person Gives 
The Experimenters 
Triple the Amount 
And the Room B 
Person Receives 
0 3 * 0  0 
1 3 * 1  3 
2 3 * 2  6 
3 3 * 3  9 
4 3 * 4  12 
5 3 * 5  15 
6 3 * 6  18 
7 3 * 7  21 
8 3 * 8  24 
9 3 * 9  27 
10 3 * 10 30 
 
 
Room B Decision Task 
In addition to the initial one-dollar certificates, each person in Room B will receive another 
envelope containing the tripled number of one-dollar certificates given to him/her by the 
paired person in Room A. He/she will then decide whether to return some, all, or none of the 
tripled number of one-dollar certificates to the same person in Room A who gave them. 
 
The Role of the Monitors 
The monitors have been randomly chosen from among the students who volunteered for 
today’s experiment. The monitors will be in charge of distributing and collecting the large 
manila envelopes containing mailbox keys and one-dollar certificates. One monitor will be 
asked to watch and make sure that the experimenters actually follow the procedures that 
have been explained here. The other two monitors are room monitors and will make sure 
silence is maintained during the experiment. 
 
The Payoff Procedure 
You will be using one-dollar certificates printed on green while making your decision task. 
After all decisions have been recorded by the experimenters the one-dollar certificates will 
be exchanged for real U.S. dollars. You may then use your key to obtain your earnings and 
take your earnings home. 
 
Investment Game Control Summary of Instructions 
Room A: A short summary of instructions for the Room A Decision Task 
Enclosed in this manila envelope are three small white envelopes: 
 The first envelope is labeled “KEEP THIS KEY” and contains a numbered 
mailbox key. You will keep this key for the remainder of the experiment. This key 
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# will be the only way the experimenters can keep up with your decisions and 
earnings, so please make sure the number on your key matches the “key 
#___” written on the first line of any envelope you receive. 
 The second envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “my certificates” 
on the following line. Inside the envelope are 10 one-dollar certificates. 
 The third envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “certificates given 
to a person in Room B” on the following line. The envelope is currently empty.  
 
The Room A Decision Task involves you transferring none, some, or all of the 
certificates in the second envelope into the third envelope.  
 The amount left in the second envelope represents the certificates you wish to 
keep.  
 The amount you put in the third envelope indicates the amount you wish to send 
to the person in Room B you are paired with. The amount will be tripled before 
reaching the person in Room B. 
After making your transfers, please close (but do not seal) the second and third envelopes 
and place them back in the manila folder. Please close (but do not seal) the manila 
envelope, place it in the return box, and return to your seat. 
 
Room B: A short summary of instructions for the Room B Decision Task 
Enclosed in this manila envelope are four small white envelopes: 
 The first envelope is labeled “KEEP THIS KEY” and contains a numbered 
mailbox key. You will keep this key for the remainder of the experiment. This key 
# will be the only way the experimenters can keep up with your decisions and 
earnings, so please make sure the number on your key matches the “key 
#___” written on the first line of any envelope you receive. 
 The second envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “my initial 
certificates” on the following line. Inside the envelope are 10 one-dollar 
certificates. You may count the certificates if you like, but you will do nothing 
with these certificates because they are yours to keep. Please leave these 
certificates in the second envelope. 
 The third envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “tripled number of 
certificates sent by person holding key #___ in Room A” on the following lines. 
Inside is the tripled number of certificates sent from the other room. 
 The fourth envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “certificates 
returned to the person holding key #___ in Room A” on the following lines. The 
envelope is currently empty.  
 
The Room B Decision Task involves you transferring none, some, or all of the tripled 
certificates in the third envelope into the fourth envelope.  
 The amount left in the third envelope represents the certificates you wish to keep.  
 The amount you put in the fourth envelope indicates the amount you wish to 
return to the person in Room A who sent you the tripled number of certificates.  
After making your transfers, please close (but do not seal) the second, third, and fourth 
envelopesand place them back in the manila folder. Please close (but do not seal) the 
manila envelope, place it in the return box, and return to your seat. 
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Role-Reversal Instructions 
 
No Talking Allowed  
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Three Monitors and Two Rooms 
Three monitors have been randomly selected from among those of you who came here 
today. The rest of you have been randomly divided into two rooms, called Room A and 
Room B. 
 
Anonymity  
Each person in Room A will be randomly paired with a person in Room B. You will never 
play with another person in the same room as you. No one will learn the identity of the 
person she/he is paired with. 
 
Initial Certificates for Task Y 
Each person completing Task Y will be given 10 one-dollar certificates and asked to simply 
keep them. 
 
Initial Certificates for Task X 
Each person completing Task X will be given 10 one-dollar certificates. As explained 
below, each person completing Task X will have a decision to make about what to do with 
her/his 10 one-dollar certificates. 
  
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters, the monitors, 
and the other people participating in the experiment will ever know the personal decision 
of anyone else in the experiment. This is accomplished by a procedure in which you 
collect your money payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from a numbered mailbox that 
only you have the key for. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor 
your student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this 
experiment. The only identifying mark on the decision forms will be a number known 
only to you. You will be able to collect your money payoffs with privacy by using a key, 
which opens a mailbox. The key and mailbox will be labeled with the same number you 
will mark on your decision-reporting forms. But you will be the only person who knows 
your personal number. It is your responsibility to mark all decision forms with your 
personal number. If you fail to do this correctly, then the experimenters may not be 
able to pay you for your decisions. 
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Task X  
Each person completing Task X will decide whether to keep all 10 of his/her one-dollar 
certificates or give some or all of them to his/her paired person in the other room who will 
then complete Task Y. Every certificate given by a person completing Task X to a person 
completing Task Y will be tripled by the experimenters. The following table shows how this 
works. 
 
If the Person 
Completing  
Task X  
Gives 
The 
Experimenters 
Triple the 
Amount 
And the Person 
Completing  
Task Y  
Receives 
0 3 * 0  0 
1 3 * 1  3 
2 3 * 2  6 
3 3 * 3  9 
4 3 * 4  12 
5 3 * 5  15 
6 3 * 6  18 
7 3 * 7  21 
8 3 * 8  24 
9 3 * 9  27 
10 3 * 10 30 
 
Task Y 
In addition to the initial one-dollar certificates, a person completing Task Y will receive 
another envelope containing the tripled number of one-dollar certificates given to him/her by 
the paired person in Task X. He/she will then decide whether to return some, all, or none of 
the tripled number of one-dollar certificates to the same person who gave them in Task X. 
 
You will be completing Task X and Task Y 
People in both rooms will complete Task X first and then Task Y. This is done by the 
following procedure: 
1. Each person will select a large manila envelope from a box carried around by his/her 
room monitor. 
2. Each person will complete Task X, reseal his/her large manila envelope, and return 
it to the box. 
3. The experimenters will record the Task X decisions and prepare new large manila 
envelopes for Task Y.  
4. Once again, each person will select a new manila envelope from a box carried 
around by his/her room monitor. 
5. Each person will complete Task Y, reseal his/her manila envelope, and return it to 
the box. 
6. The experimenters will record the Task Y decisions and prepare the payoffs for the 
end of the experiment. 
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The Role of the Monitors 
The monitors have been randomly chosen from among the students who volunteered for 
today’s experiment. The monitors will be in charge of distributing and collecting the large 
manila envelopes containing mailbox keys and one-dollar certificates. One monitor will be 
asked to watch and make sure that the experimenters actually follow the procedures that 
have been explained here. The other two monitors are room monitors and will make sure 
silence is maintained during the experiment. 
 
The Payoff Procedure 
You will be using one-dollar certificates printed on either BLUE or RED paper for each 
task: 
 BLUE Certificates: Used by people in Room A completing Task X and people in 
Room B completing Task Y. 
 RED Certificates: Used by people in Room B completing Task X and people in 
Room A completing Task Y. 
You will know the outcome of both of your tasks, but only one of your tasks will be 
randomly selected for payoff: After both rooms have completed Task Y, the monitor will 
flip a coin to determine if the BLUE (heads) or the RED (tails) one-dollar certificates will be 
exchanged for real U.S. dollars. You may then use your key and take your earnings home. 
 
Role-Reversal Summary of Instructions 
 
Room A: A short summary of instructions for Task X 
Enclosed in this manila envelope are three small white envelopes: 
 The first envelope is labeled “KEEP THIS KEY” and contains a numbered 
mailbox key. You will keep this key for the remainder of the experiment. This key 
# will be the only way the experimenters can keep up with your decisions and 
earnings, so please write down your key # each place you see “key #___” on 
an envelope or form. 
 The second envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “my certificates” 
on the following line. Inside the envelope are 10 BLUE one-dollar certificates. 
 The third envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “certificates given 
to a person in Room B” on the following line. The envelope is currently empty.  
Task X involves you transferring none, some, or all of the certificates in the second 
envelope into the third envelope.  
 The amount left in the second envelope represents the certificates you wish to 
keep.  
 The amount you put in the third envelope indicates the amount you wish to send 
to the person in Room B you are paired with. The amount will be tripled before 
reaching the person in Room B. 
After making your transfers, please close but do not seal the second and third envelopes 
and place them back in the manila folder. Please close but do not seal the manila 
envelope, place it in the return box, and return to your seat. 
 
Room A: A short summary of instructions for Task Y 
Enclosed in this manila envelope are three small white envelopes: 
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 The first envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “my initial 
certificates” on the following line. Inside the envelope are 10 RED one-dollar 
certificates. You may count the certificates if you like, but you will do nothing 
with these certificates because they are yours to keep. 
 The second envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “tripled number 
of certificates sent by person holding key #___ in Room B” on the following 
lines. Inside is the tripled number of certificates sent from the other room. 
 The third envelope is labeled “key #___” on the first line and “certificates 
returned to the person holding key #___ in Room B” on the following lines. The 
envelope is currently empty.  
 
Please record your key # on all three envelopes. 
Task Y involves you transferring none, some, or all of the certificates in the second 
envelope into the third envelope.  
 The amount left in the second envelope represents the certificates you wish to 
keep.  
 The amount you put in the third envelope indicates the amount you wish to return 
to the person in Room B who sent you the tripled number of certificates.  
After making your transfers, please close (but do not seal) all three envelopes and place 
them back in the manila folder. Please close (but do not seal) the manila envelope, place 
it in the return box, and return to your seat.
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APPENDIX D 
EXPERIMENT SURVEY FOR CHAPTER III 
 
Survey Questions 
 
1. What is your key number? 
 
2. Are you male or female? 
 
3. What is your class (freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior)? 
  
4. What is your major? 
 
5. What level of education did your mother complete?  
A. Didn’t finish high school 
B. High school diploma or equivalent 
C. Some college 
D. Four year college degree 
E. Some graduate or professional schoolwork 
F. Graduate or professional degree 
 
6. What level of education did your father complete?  
A. Didn’t finish high school 
B. High school diploma or equivalent 
C. Some college 
D. Four year college degree 
E. Some graduate or professional schooling 
F. Graduate or professional degree 
 
7. What is your current marital status?  
A. Single (never married) 
B. Married or in a marriage-type relationship 
C. Divorced or separated 
 
8. What is your family’s household income? 
A. $0-$20,000 
B. $20,000-$40,000 
C. $40,000-$60,000 
D. $60,000-$100,000 
E. $100,000-$200,000 
F. more than $200,000 
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Task X Questions [Room A Questions for IG Control] 
9. Did you send part of your initial certificates to the paired person completing Task 
Y? 
 
10. If you did send some, how many certificates did you send? 
 
11. What were your reasons for making the decision that you made? 
 
 
Room A Hypothetical Role-Reversal Question for IG Control 
Suppose you were placed into Room B instead of Room A and you must complete 
the Room B Decision Task. A person from Room A has sent you ____ one-dollar 
certificates which are tripled by the experimenter resulting in you receiving ____ 
one-dollar certificates. How many of the tripled one-dollar certificates would you 
have returned to this person from Room A? 
 
Task Y Questions [Room B Questions for IG Control] 
12. Did you receive some “additional certificates”? 
 
13. If you did receive some “additional certificates,” how many did you receive? 
 
14. If you did receive “additional certificates,” did you return any of them to your 
paired person completing Task X? 
 
15. How many certificates did you return, if any? 
 
16. What were your reasons for making the decision that you made? 
 
Room B Hypothetical Role-Reversal Question for IG Control 
 
Suppose you were a member of Room A instead of Room B and you must 
complete the Room A Decision Task. How many of your one-dollar certificates 
would you have sent?   
Please circle only one value. 
 
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 
Other Questions 
17. There was a 50% chance that the decision you made in each Task would affect the 
real payoffs of you and your paired person for each Task. Did knowing this 
influence your decisions? Please explain your answer. 
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18. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair? 
A. Would take advantage of you 
B. Would try to be fair 
C. Depends 
D. Don't know 
 
19. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are 
mostly just looking out for themselves? 
A. Try to be helpful 
B. Just look out for themselves 
C. Depends 
D. Don't know 
 
20. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
A. Most people can be trusted  
B. Need to be very careful  
C. Depends 
D. Don't know 
 
21. When dealing with strangers, one is better off using caution before trusting them. 
A. Disagree strongly 
B. Disagree somewhat 
C. Disagree slightly 
D. Agree slightly 
E. Agree somewhat 
F. Agree strongly 
 
      22. How much do you tend to trust others when you have a little at stake? 
A. Not at all 
B. A little 
C. Some 
D. A lot 
 
      23. How much do you tend to trust others when you have a lot at stake? 
A. Not at all 
B. A little 
C. Some 
D. A lot 
 
      24. How often do you lend money to friends? 
A. More than once a week 
B. About once a week 
C. About once a month 
D. Once a year or less  
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     25. How often do you lend personal possessions to friends? 
A. More than once a week 
B. About once a week 
C. About once a month 
D. Once a year or less 
 
     26. How many friends do you have whom you would consider close?
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APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER IV 
Used in Treatments CH1 and CH4 (Private Property Trust Game) 
 
Instructions for the 
Whack-A-Mole Game 
 
 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
The Whack-A-Mole Game Description 
You will be playing the Whack-A-Mole Game for the next 15 minutes. The Whack-A-
Mole Game is similar to the arcade version you may be familiar with, but the rules and 
scoring are a bit different.  
 
 The object of the game is to hit the moles as they pop out of their holes by 
clicking on the picture squares with moles in them.  
 All of the moles pop out of their holes at once. The number of moles that pop up 
is random: at any given time there is a 50% chance that each mole will pop out of 
his/her hole. 
 You do not have to hit the moles right away. They will stay up until you hit them. 
 You will earn points for each field of moles you clear. Each time you clear a field 
your score will increase and a new bunch of moles will pop up for the next field 
you have to clear. 
 
Field Clearing Requirements 
If you clear a minimum of 120 fields within the allotted time of 15 minutes you will earn 
10 tokens to use in the next game. The 10 tokens have a starting value of one dollar each, 
for a total value of $10. Once you clear 120 fields, you do not have to clear any more 
fields, and you will not be paid extra for clearing more fields. 
 
If you do not clear enough fields, then you will be paid your show-up fee of $5 and will 
be asked to leave before the next game begins. 
 
The next game is played in pairs, so the number of participants must be even. If an odd 
number of participants clear 120 fields then the one participant who was closest to 
clearing 120 fields will also be allowed to play to make the number of participants even. 
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Decision Game Instructions 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the decision game has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a 
question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Two Types 
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly divided into two types, referred to 
as Type X and Type Y. 
 
Random Pairing and Anonymity  
Each person of Type X will be randomly paired with a person of Type Y. No one will learn 
the identity of the person with whom he/she is paired. As discussed below, Type X persons 
will make their decisions anonymously in one room, and Type Y persons in another room. 
 
Starting Balances 
Each person in a pair of decision-makers will start with his/her token fund of 10 tokens 
earned in the Whack-A-Mole game. The 10 tokens have a starting value of one dollar each, 
for a total value of $10.  
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters or the other 
participants, will ever know the personal decision or money earnings of anyone in the 
experiment. This is accomplished by a procedure in which you collect your earnings, 
contained in a sealed envelope, from a numbered mailbox that only you have the key for. 
Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will 
appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment. The only identifying 
mark on the decision forms will be an identification number known only to you. You will be 
able to collect your money payoffs with privacy by using a key, which opens a mailbox 
located in a room adjacent to this room. The key and mailbox will be labeled with the same 
number as your decision-reporting forms. But you will be the only person who knows your 
personal number.  
 
The Type X Decision Task  
Each person of Type X will decide whether or not to send any of his/her tokens to the 
paired person of Type Y. Each token that a Type X person sends reduces the value of 
his/her token fund by $1 but increases the value of the token fund of the paired Type Y 
person by $3. A Type X person cannot send more than his initial 10 token starting 
balance. Four examples illustrate how the values of the tokens that may be sent by Type 
X are related to the value of the Type Y token fund. 
 
 If the Type X person sends 0 tokens, that reduces the value of his/her fund by $0 
and adds $0 to the value of the fund held by the paired Type Y person.  
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 If the Type X person sends 1 token, that reduces the value of his/her fund by $1 
and adds $3 to the value of the fund held by the paired Type Y person.  
 If the Type X person sends 5 tokens, that reduces the value of his/her fund by $5 
and adds $15 to the value of the fund held by the paired Type Y person. 
 If the Type X person sends 10 tokens, that reduces the value of his/her fund by 
$10 and adds $30 to the value of the fund held by the paired Type Y person. 
 
The Type Y Decision Task – Treatment CH1 Version (Sequential Move Protocol) 
After the Type X person in a pair makes his/her decision, the Type Y person in that pair 
makes his/her decision. The Type Y person’s decision is to divide the value of the token 
fund he/she holds between his/her self and the paired person of Type X. That is, the Type Y 
person decides how much of the fund to keep for his/her self and how much to send back to 
the Type X person. 
 
The Type Y Decision Task – Treatment CH4 Version (Strategy Method Protocol) 
The Type Y person’s decision task is to divide the value of the token fund he/she holds 
between his/her self and the paired person of Type X. That is, the Type Y person decides 
how much of the fund to keep for his/her self and how much to send back to the Type X 
person. 
 
The Type Y person will not know the Type X person’s decision until after he/she finishes 
the Type Y Decision Task. Therefore, the Type Y person will have to submit a binding 
decision for each possible Type X decision. 
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Used in Treatments CH2, CH3, and CH5 (Common Property Trust Game)25 
 
Instructions for the 
Whack-A-Mole Game 
 
 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
The Whack-A-Mole Game Description 
You will be playing the Whack-A-Mole Game for the next 15 minutes. The Whack-A-
Mole Game is similar to the arcade version you may be familiar with, but the rules and 
scoring are a bit different.  
 
 The object of the game is to hit the moles as they pop out of their holes by 
clicking on the picture squares with moles in them.  
 All of the moles pop out of their holes at once. The number of moles that pop up 
is random: at any given time there is a 50% chance that each mole will pop out of 
his/her hole. 
 You do not have to hit the moles right away. They will stay up until you hit them. 
 You will earn points for each field of moles you clear. Each time you clear a field 
your score will increase and a new bunch of moles will pop up for the next field 
you have to clear. 
 
Field Clearing Requirements 
If you clear a minimum of 120 fields within the allotted time of 15 minutes you will earn 
20 tokens to use in the next game. Your 20 tokens will be placed in a joint decision fund 
together with the 20 tokens of another person who cleared 120 fields. The 40 tokens in 
the joint decision fund will have a value of one dollar each, for a total value of $40. 
 
If you do not clear enough fields, then you will be paid your show-up fee of $5 and will 
be asked to leave before the next game begins. 
 
The next game is played in pairs, so the number of participants must be even. If an odd 
number of participants clear 120 fields then the one participant who was closest to 
clearing 120 fields will also be allowed to play to make the number of participants even. 
 
                                                 
25 Treatment CH3 differs only in the size of the Mole Field Quota =240 and allotted time of 30 Minutes to 
meet the quota. 
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Decision Game Instructions 
 
No Talking Allowed  
Now that the decision game has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a 
question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Two Types 
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly divided into two types, referred to 
as Type X and Type Y. 
 
Random Pairing and Anonymity  
Each person of Type X will be randomly paired with a person of Type Y. No one will learn 
the identity of the person with whom he/she is paired. As discussed below, Type X persons 
will make their decisions anonymously in one room, and Type Y persons in another room. 
 
Starting Balances 
Each pair of decision-makers will start with balance of 40 tokens in their joint decision fund 
earned in the Whack-A-Mole game. The 40 tokens have a starting value of one dollar each, 
for a total value of the joint decision fund of $40.  
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters or the other 
participants, will ever know the personal decision or money earnings of anyone in the 
experiment. This is accomplished by a procedure in which you collect your earnings, 
contained in a sealed envelope, from a numbered mailbox that only you have the key for. 
Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will 
appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment. The only identifying 
mark on the decision forms will be an identification number known only to you. You will be 
able to collect your money payoffs with privacy by using a key, which opens a mailbox 
located in a room adjacent to this room. The key and mailbox will be labeled with the same 
number as your decision-reporting forms. But you will be the only person who knows your 
personal number.  
 
The Type X Decision Task  
Each person in Type X will decide whether or not to withdraw tokens from the joint 
decision fund. Each token that a Type X person withdraws has a value to that person of 
$1. Each token withdrawn reduces the value of the joint decision fund by $3. A Type X 
person cannot withdraw more than 10 tokens. Four examples illustrate how the values of 
the tokens remaining in the decision fund are related to the values of the tokens that may 
be withdrawn:  
 
 If the Type X person removes 0 tokens, that adds $0 to his/her earnings and does 
not change the value of the joint decision fund. 
 If the Type X person removes 1 token, that adds $1 to his/her earnings and 
reduces the value of the joint decision fund by $3. 
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 If the Type X person removes 5 tokens, that adds $5 to his/her earnings and 
reduces the value of the joint decision fund by $15.  
 If the Type X person removes 10 tokens, that adds $10 to his/her earnings and 
reduces the value of the joint decision fund by $30.  
 
The Type Y Decision Task – Treatment CH2 and CH3 Version (Sequential Move 
Protocol) 
After the Type X person in a pair makes his/her decision, the Type Y person in that pair 
makes his/her decision. The Type Y person’s decision is to divide between his/her self and 
the paired person of Type X the value of the joint decision fund after the Type X person’s 
withdrawal decision. That is, the Type Y person decides how much of the remaining value 
of the fund to keep for his/her self and how much to leave for the Type X person. 
 
The Type Y Decision Task – Treatment CH5 Version (Strategy Method Protocol) 
The Type Y person’s decision task is to divide between his/her self and the paired person of 
Type X the value of the joint decision fund after the Type X person’s withdrawal decision. 
That is, the Type Y person decides how much of the remaining value of the fund to keep for 
his/her self and how much to leave for the Type X person. 
 
The Type Y person will not know the Type X person’s decision until after he/she finishes 
the Type Y Decision Task. Therefore, the Type Y person will have to submit a binding 
decision for each possible Type X decision. 
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APPENDIX F 
EXPERIMENT SURVEY FOR CHAPTER IV 
Type X Questionnaire 
Thank you very much for participating in our decision experiment. We would like to ask you a 
few questions about your experience in this experiment and about you. What is Your Key 
Number? _____ 
 
Questions about the experiment: 
 
1. Is this the first decision experiment in which you have participated?    Yes ____  No  ____  
2. If your answer to #1 is “No”, approximately how many other experiments have you been in?   
_______ 
3. Were the experiment instructions clear?   Yes___  No ____ 
4. Did you have any questions you wanted to ask us?   If yes, please briefly write them in the 
space provided  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Did you send all or some of your tokens to the Type Y person with whom you were paired?   
Yes ____ No _____ 
     If yes, how many tokens did you send? _______ 
     What were your reasons for making the decision that you made?  
 ____________________________________________________________________________   
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
[For the Common Property Trust Game Treatments the Type X Person was asked:  
5. Did you withdraw any tokens from the joint decision fund?  
Yes ____ No _____ 
     If yes, how many tokens did you withdraw? _______] 
 
More general questions: 
 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful dealing with people? 
 
 Most people can be trusted _____   Can’t be too careful _____ Don’t know ____ 
 
2. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 
 
 Try to be helpful _______  Just look out for themselves_____ Don’t know ____      
 
3. Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they got a chance or would 
they try to be fair? 
 
Most people would take advantage ___They would try to be fair___ Don’t know____ 
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Information about you: 
What year are you in school?   Freshman ____  Sophomore ____   Junior ____  Senior ____ 
What is your intended or declared major ? ___________________________________ 
What is your age? ______      What is your gender?   Female ____    Male _____ 
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Type Y Questionnaire 
 
Thank you very much for participating in our decision experiment. We would like to ask you a 
few questions about your experience in this experiment and about you. What is Your Key 
Number? _____ 
 
Questions about the experiment: 
 
1. Is this the first decision experiment in which you have participated?     Yes ____  No  ____  
2. If your answer to #1 is “No”, approximately how many other experiments have you been in?   
_______ 
3. Were the experiment instructions clear?   Yes___  No ____ 
4. Did you have any questions you wanted to ask us? If yes, please briefly write them in the space 
provided  
______________________________________________________________________________   
______________________________________________________________________________   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Did the Type X person with whom you were paired send all or some of their token fund to 
you?  
Yes ___ No __ 
If yes, how much money from their fund did they send you? _______ 
How much did you send to the Type X person with whom you were paired? _______ 
What were your reasons for making the decision that you made?   
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
[For Common Property Trust Game Treatments Type Y was asked:  
 
5. Did the Type X person withdraw any tokens from the joint decision fund?  
Yes ___ No __ 
If yes, how many tokens did they withdraw? _______ 
How much did you send to the Type X person with whom you were paired from the 
remaining joint decision fund? _______ 
What were your reasons for making the decision that you made?] 
More general questions: 
 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful dealing with people? 
 
 Most people can be trusted _____   Can’t be too careful _____ Don’t know ____ 
 
2. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 
 
 Try to be helpful _______  Just look out for themselves_____ Don’t know ____      
 
3. Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they got a chance or would 
they try to be fair? 
 
Most people would take advantage ___They would try to be fair___ Don’t know____ 
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Information about you: 
 
What year are you in school?   Freshman ____  Sophomore ____   Junior ____  Senior ____ 
What is your intended or declared major ? ___________________________________ 
What is your age? ______      What is your gender?   Female ____    Male _____ 
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